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INTRODUCTION 
Congress has a bureaucracy. 
Legal scholarship, judicial discourse, and doctrine about Congress and 
statutes have focused almost entirely on elected members of Congress and the 
ascertainability of their purported intentions about policymaking and statutory 
language. In recent years, we and others have broadened that perspective, with 
new scholarship about the on-the-ground realities of the congressional drafting 
process—including the essential role that staff plays in that process—and have 
argued the relevance of those realities for theory and doctrine.1 
Here we go deeper. This Article goes beyond our previous accounts of 
partisan committee sta,, congressional counsels, and other select sta, o-ces 
to introduce the broader concept of what we call the congressional bureaucracy. 
The congressional bureaucracy is the collection of approximately a dozen 
nonpartisan o-ces that, while typically unseen by the public and largely 
ignored by courts and practicing lawyers, provides the specialized expertise 
 
1 See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, (( STAN. L. REV. )$" 
($%!#) (studying drafting practices of congressional counsels and the assumptions they make about 
judicial interpretation); Jesse M. Cross, Legislative History in the Modern Congress, ") HARV. J. LEGIS. 
*! ($%$%); Jesse M. Cross, The Sta!er’s Error Doctrine, "( HARV. J. LEGIS. +, ($%!*); Jesse M. Cross, 
When Courts Should Ignore Statutory Text, $( GEO. MASON L. REV. #", ($%!+); Abbe R. Gluck, 
Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways that 
Courts Can Improve on What They Are Already Trying to Do, +# U. CHI. L. REV. !)) ($%!)) (defending 
an approach based on congressional process and calling attention to the role of the Law Revision 
Counsel and Congressional Budget O-ce in drafting statutes) [hereinafter Gluck, Statutory 
Interpretation]; Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, (" STAN. L. REV. *%! 
($%!,); Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell, & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox 
Rulemaking, !!" COLUM. L. REV. !)+* ($%!") (detailing recent deviations from traditional legislative 
and processes and their implications for doctrine and theory); Abbe R. Gluck, The “CBO Canon” and 
the Debate Over Tax Credits on Federally Operated Health Insurance Exchanges, BALKINIZATION (July 
$%, $%!$), https://balkin.blogspot.com/$%!$/%)/cbo-canon-and-debate-over-tax-credits.html  
(introducing concept of CBO canon) [hereinafter Gluck, CBO Canon]. 
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that helps make congressional lawmaking possible. In the process, the 
bureaucracy furthers Congress’s own internal separation of powers and 
safeguards the legislative process from executive and interest-group 
encroachment. 
These institutions internal to Congress use bureaucracy’s traditional 
tools—including nonpartisanship and technical expertise—to separate 
powers both inside of Congress and external to it. But they do more than 
that: the congressional bureaucracy also performs functions that add 
important layers to our understanding of the relevant inputs into statutory 
text. For one thing, its work destabilizes common views of the boundaries of 
the “legislative process” and what a “statute” actually is. Some expert inputs, 
like the economic estimates of legislation, are as critical a part of—and 
sometimes even more important to—the legislative process and members’ 
understandings of what bills say as the speci+c words chosen. Some key 
aspects of statutes as the public receives them—such as the ways in which 
statutes are organized and ordered, and even what words appear—are 
changed, or rearranged, by the congressional bureaucracy: that is, changed by 
nonelected, nonpolitical sta, with precisely these delegated functions—even 
after members vote. Understanding the context in which law is made changes 
how we understand law itself. 
In the pages that follow, we theorize what it means for Congress to have 
this infrastructure—a workforce of nonpartisan, expert, and long-serving 
institutional actors and entities without which Congress as we know it could 
not function. 
We focus primarily on Congress’s nine nonpartisan legislative 
institutions: 
• The Congressional Research Service (CRS)—the research arm of 
Congress that provides in-depth legal and policy analysis of existing 
and proposed legislation or other issues;2 
• The O!ces of the House and Senate Legislative Counsel (Legislative 
Counsel)—the nonpartisan sta, in each chamber who actually draft 
the text of most federal legislation; 
• The O!ce of the Law Revision Counsel (OLRC)—sta, who turn 
Congress’s various enacted public laws into a U.S. Code re-organized 
 
2 We focus on CRS within the Library of Congress, because its mission to “serve[] the 
Congress throughout the legislative process by providing . . . legislative research and analysis,” 
makes CRS a consistent presence in the legislative process. About CRS: History and Mission, LIBRARY 
OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/about/history.html (last visited April !*, $%$%). 
However, we note that other parts of the Library of Congress do sometimes provide independent 
research for Member o-ces as well. See, e.g., Law Library, Legal Reports, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-reports.php (providing reports produced by the Law Library) 
(last visited April !*, $%$%). 
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into +fty-three titles—a process that involves rearranging and 
reordering statutory sections, cleaning up language, moving enacted 
text into statutory notes, and sometimes even adding new statutory 
provisions; 
• The Congressional Budget O!ce (CBO)—economists and analysts who 
provide in.uential economic analysis, including estimates of the cost 
of all signi+cant legislation; 
• The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT)—a nonpartisan committee 
with sta, that assists with all aspects of tax legislation, including 
policy analysis, drafting assistance, and all revenue estimates; 
• The O!ces of the House and Senate Parliamentarians 
(Parliamentarians)—the arbiters of congressional procedure in each 
chamber who rule on the appropriateness of amendments, resolve 
jurisdictional questions among committees, and operate as the 
keepers of legislative precedents; 
• The Government Accountability O!ce (GAO)—Congress’s “watchdog” 
over the executive branch that conducts audits, performs in-depth 
policy research, and informs Congress about the implementation of 
its laws. 
We selected these nine institutions because they share a generally 
nonpartisan nature and common roles of information- and expertise-
imparting upon Congress in the context of the legislative process. They also 
share surprisingly common origins in a desire to safeguard Congress’s 
legislative power from the executive. From *&!' to *&!), we conducted 
con+dential interviews of more than twenty sta,ers with key roles in each of 
these institutions to complement more than $& interviews with nonpartisan 
sta, conducted by one of the authors for an earlier study.3 We also 
interviewed twenty partisan sta,—congressional sta,ers who work outside 
of the bureaucracy, for members in personal o-ces or on committees—to 
mitigate the risk of interviewee bias and to ensure that our account re.ects 
how the work of Congress’s bureaucracy actually is perceived on the ground, 
including by those outside of it.4 
Why does Congress need this bureaucracy? What roles do the 
bureaucracy’s o-ces serve, together and apart? What does the bureaucracy 
teach us about how Congress works and about the distinctive features of 
modern lawmaking? There are more than ",&&& congressional bureaucrats in 
 
3 Gluck & Bressman, supra note !, at )#% (reporting interviews of twenty-eight sta'ers in the 
O-ces of Legislative Counsel as well as several sta'ers on the Joint Committee on Taxation). 
4 To preserve anonymity, we do not refer to interviewees by their institutional a-liation. 
Because institutional a-liation, in context, might compromise individual identity, all interviews are 
cited as “Sta'er Interview.” All quotes are based on extensive notes, reviewed by the authors and 
the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. All a-liations are on &le with the authors. 
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our nine nonpartisan institutions alone. Every drafter in the O-ces of 
Legislative Counsel is an attorney.5 Ninety percent of sta,ers at CRS have 
graduate degrees, as do most in JCT.6 Some o-ces, like JCT, interact with 
members; some, like OLRC, do not. Some communicate con+dentially, like 
Legislative Counsel; others are almost entirely transparent, like GAO. Some 
give procedural advice that while neutral e,ectuates signi+cant decisions, like 
the Parliamentarians; others o,er policy conclusions using de+ned 
methodologies, like JCT. Some work in the +eld of policy, like CBO; others 
do not, like OLRC. Some have come under political +re for a long time, like 
CBO; others have come under occasional political scrutiny more recently, like 
the Senate Parliamentarian and CRS; still others remain out of the fray, and 
largely unknown, like Legislative Counsel and OLRC. 
Our findings allow us to intervene in a variety of heretofore unconnected 
debates. First, the congressional bureaucracy is a tool of separation of powers. 
Classic bureaucracy literature focuses on the tradeoff of control for expertise—
the standard account is that Congress loses power when it delegates to the 
executive branch. In contrast, the congressional bureaucracy, as we will 
illustrate, was explicitly founded for the opposite reason: so that Congress could 
reclaim and safeguard its own powers against an executive branch that was itself 
using knowledge and expertise to encroach on the legislative process and 
congressional autonomy. For Congress, knowledge was power. 
Second, the congressional bureaucracy contributes to the already robust 
conversation about why institutions delegate and what bureaucracy typically 
looks like. Congress’s bureaucracy shares features with some traditional 
agencies, including a nonpartisan staff committed to the long-term mission of 
the agency over any particular politics or policy. But unlike many other 
 
5 Career Opportunities, OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, 
https://legcounsel.house.gov/HOLC/Careers/Careers.html [https://perma.cc/AFY$-SPC)] 
(stating that a law degree is required in order to work for House Legislative Counsel) (last visited 
August !, $%!*); Careers, OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, 
https://www.slc.senate.gov/Careers/careers.htm [https://perma.cc/G"CF-P)QH] (stating the same 
requirement for Senate Legislative Counsel) (last visited August +, $%!*). 
6 See Angela M. Evans, Demand for Masters of Public Policy in Public Service, $) J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS AND MGMT. #!), #$$ ($%%+) (reporting CRS percentage); Email from Sta'er to Abbe 
Gluck & Jesse Cross (Apr. $,, $%$%)(on &le with authors) (noting that, in JCT, all economists have 
doctorates except one with a masters, all accountants have CPA and some have double JD/CPA, and 
research assistants are only people without advanced degrees). Similarly, a large share of sta'ers at 
GAO, CBO, MedPAC, and MACPAC also hold advanced degrees. See GAO: WORKING FOR 
GOOD GOVERNMENT SINCE !*$!, GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. $, ($%%!) (noting that “GAO 
relies on a workforce of highly trained professionals who hold degrees in many academic 
disciplines”); Organization and Sta"ng, CONG. BUDGET OFF., 
https://www.cbo.gov/about/organization-and-sta-ng (reporting that most of the CBO’s sta' 
members are “economists or public policy analysts with advanced degrees”) (last visited July $(, 
$%!*); infra notes ,$#-,$" (listing MedPAC and MACPAC sta's and their advanced degrees). 
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agencies, Congress’s bureaucracy remains under Congress’s control, is not run 
by political appointees, is directly supportive of Congress’s work, and Congress 
can ignore many of its inputs if it wishes. We struggled with nomenclature: 
“bureaucracy” is not quite perfect. Some internal actors refer to the offices we 
study as Congress’s “scaffolding,” or the “institutional staff,” as opposed to the 
professional (political) staff—two alternative terms that may make clearer how 
Congress’s bureaucracy is part of, and a critical support to, Congress. 
Third, the bureaucracy o,ers something of an antidote to the rampant 
cynicism about Congress as an institution. Legal Process titans Henry Hart 
and Albert Sacks famously argued that courts should assume “that the 
legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes 
reasonably.”7 Modern thinkers about legislation, who laid the basis for today’s 
textualists, pushed that optimism aside decades ago for a view of an irrational 
and undeliberate Congress that courts could never hope to really understand 
and in which the public should not have much faith.8 
But despite the recent changes to the modern legislative process, the 
congressional bureaucracy still does its work—it just happens at points earlier 
in the process and further from the public eye. That work also highlights 
aspects of congressional lawmaking that are much less partisan than common 
accounts assume. Speci+cally, the bureaucracy helps Congress achieve a 
salutary internal separation of powers, too, even in the modern era of hyper-
polarization and party-leader dominance. Congress’s intentional 
decentralization of law-producing responsibilities among a collection of 
nonpartisan actors prevents any one aspect of the lawmaking process—
whether it is fact +nding, number crunching, legislative drafting, auditing, or 
parliamentary procedure—from coming under the control of either party, or 
any party leader. That today’s hyper-partisan Congress is still comfortable 
with these delegations paints an optimistic lining around Congress’s 
operations and also reveals some democratic bene+ts that the congressional 
bureaucracy brings. 
Cynicism about Congress is at the heart of the fourth and +nal arena in 
which our study intervenes—the enduring disagreement over the proper 
approach to statutory interpretation. Our previous work, including the 
 
7 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW !#!" (!*"+). 
8 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW ,$ (Amy Gutmann ed., !**)) (claiming that “with respect to **.** percent of the issues of 
construction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New 
Textualism, ,) UCLA L. REV. ($! (!**%) (reviewing this textualist movement); John F. Manning, The 
Absurdity Doctrine, !!( HARV. L. REV. $,+), $#!% n.+! ($%%,) (reiterating Max Radin’s argument 
against Congress possessing a “coherent ‘speci&c’ intent,” particularly one that could be reliably 
perceived, as a reason for textualism). 
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Gluck–Bressman studies of congressional drafting9 and the Gluck–O’Connell 
work on modern “unorthodox lawmaking,”10 have provoked new debates 
about the relevance of the realities of congressional lawmaking to the 
doctrines and theories of legislation and statutory interpretation.11 
Detractors’ arguments have centered on the kinds of claims that ushered in 
textualism in the +rst place: claims based on Congress’s irrationality and its 
purported inability to act collectively. Those claims are o,ered as reasons to 
eschew a focus on Congress itself in favor of textualist presumptions—
”linguistic conventions”—that detractors assume Congress shares, or at least 
accepts, when it drafts.12 But those assumptions are fundamentally empirical 
and are largely unsubstantiated. 
The structures of congressional lawmaking, including Congress’s 
intentional delegations to the bureaucracy, are indeed a form of collective 
congressional action—and collective delegation—that produces information 
about Congress’s intentions. Congress is also an “it,” not just a “they.”13 When 
Congress enacts a law requiring all statutes to be scored for their impact on 
the budget, delegates that scoring to a congressional nonpartisan institution, 
and enacts statutory text re.ecting the score, we can say that Congress 
thought the words it was enacting would produce a statute that cost that 
 
9 See Bressman & Gluck, supra note !; Gluck & Bressman, supra note !. 
10 See generally Bressman & Gluck, supra note !; Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect 
Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, !$* HARV. L. REV. ($ 
($%!"); Gluck & Bressman, supra note !; Gluck, O’Connell & Po, supra note !. Victoria Nourse also 
has importantly written on the value of understanding Congress’s own enacted rules. Victoria 
Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Operative Legal History by the Rules, !$$ YALE 
L.J. )%, *$-*) ($%!$). 
11 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, !,% HARV. L. REV. !%)*, 
!!$!-!!$+ ($%!)) (arguing that the Gluck–Bressman &ndings hold implications for “canons of 
language” but not “canons of law”); Ryan D. Doer.er, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 
(( DUKE L.J. *)*, *+"-+( ($%!)) (arguing that “the nuances of the legislative process are largely 
irrelevant for the purpose of interpretation”); John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, !!" COLUM. 
L. REV. !!!* ($%!") (concluding “the new empiricism does not undermine the intent skepticism”); 
John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, !,% HARV. L. REV. $,*), $#$*-,! ($%!)) 
(arguing the judiciary’s “institutional role[]” undermines utility of the Gluck–Bressman work for 
doctrine). 
12 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS "!, (! ($%!$) (“The canons in.uence not just how courts approach texts but also 
the techniques that legal drafters follow in preparing those texts.”); Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 
supra note !!, at !*$( (discussing the position that “shared . . . linguistic conventions“ enable “the 
relevant linguistic community to convey meaning”). 
13 See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as 
Oxymoron, !$ INT’L REV. L. & ECON $,* (!**$) (arguing against concept of single legislative 
intent—Congress as an “it” not a “they”—among "," legislators). 
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amount of money, regardless of the fact that individual members of Congress 
may have di,erent reasons for voting for or against the legislation.14 
Congressional naysayers, for their part, have not o,ered any justi+cation 
for why this concept of collective congressional intent is any more +ctitious 
than opting—as textualists do—to deploy interpretive conventions that the 
Gluck–Bressman study has shown Congress does not in fact agree with or, 
sometimes, even know. Nor do textualists explain why their own refusal to 
consider legislative history because it is the work of “sta,” is any di,erent 
from their willingness to consider how statutes are organized in the U.S. 
Code—another task that we will show is likewise performed by “sta,” after 
the statute has passed; or how textualists can argue that a text-focused 
approach is more member-focused than sta,-focused, when in fact members 
themselves always read other documents produced by “sta,” and virtually 
never read statutory text. And to say that the public, or a member of 
Congress, is any more on notice of the judiciary’s hundred-plus interpretive 
presumptions than it would be of which committee drafted a particular 
statute, what that statute cost, or whether it was subject to the special 
restrictions for budget legislation, is unrealistic and unproven. 
This is not to say we think there is no way to justify a textualist approach. 
Rather, it is to say that the grounds on which textualism has done so—
democracy, nondelegation, fear of judicial activism—do not hold. Textualism 
as currently deployed is too divorced from Congress to be justi+ed on 
grounds of legislative supremacy. Nor is textualism passive or objective, as it 
claims, but rather puts the role of active interpretation squarely on courts, 
which impose their own values and presumptions to interpret text. That those 
presumptions have “rule of law” bene+ts—like linguistic consistency—does 
not mean that they are not creations of judicial power or the imposition of 
judicial values on legislative language that was not crafted in their shadow. 
Such an approach must be justi+ed as judicial activism, even if in benign 
form, and not as passive, legislative-supremacy-furthering interpretation. 
Studying congressional lawmaking, we believe, also provides low-hanging, 
doctrinal fruit that even textualists might accept. Sources like the budget 
score, parliamentary rulings on committee jurisdiction, or the special 
legislative history Congress uses only for appropriations (and the only 
legislative history partly drafted by professional drafters) are examples of 
objective outputs that Congress has voted to generate. The congressional 
bureaucracy helps us to see this. Even non-textualist judges, who look more 
frequently than textualists do to congressional purpose or extra-textual 
materials, typically overlook how the objective structures of congressional 
 
14 For a similar point, see Nourse, supra note !%, at +,-+" (arguing the legislative intent debate 
is a distraction if one focuses on legislative rules under which Congress as a whole operates). 
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lawmaking inform statutory meaning or which materials have the marker of 
collective action, expertise, or nonpartisanship.. 
We have introduced some of Congress’s bureaucratic institutions in other 
work—including the O-ces of the Legislative Counsel, the Congressional 
Budget O-ce (CBO), and the O-ce of the Law Revision Counsel 
(OLRC).15 That work has happily invigorated a new branch of the +eld 
focused more broadly on the legislative process, with follow-on articles 
emerging to o,er descriptive accounts of the work of individual institutions,16 
and with courts beginning to recognize how the realities of the legislative 
process and the actors within it may a,ect how courts interpret and adjudicate 
statutes.17 Here we move beyond deep description of any one institution and 
consider more broadly and as a matter of theory what it means for Congress 
to have set itself up this way.18 
We also introduce, but in briefer fashion, two additional nonpartisan 
institutions—the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) and 
 
15 See, e.g., Bressman & Gluck, supra note !, at )(,-(" (discussing CBO); Cross, Legislative 
History, supra note !, at **-!%% (overviewing the nonpartisan o-ces in Congress); Cross, Sta!er’s 
Error, supra note !, at *(-*) (discussing rise of Legislative Counsel’s drafting role); Cross, When 
Courts Should Ignore Statutory Text, supra note !, at #(*-+" (discussing Legislative Counsel and 
illustrating the use of its drafting manual in statutory interpretation); id. at "%,-%" (discussing 
CBO); Gluck, Statutory Interpretation, supra note !, at $%+ (calling attention to the role of the Law 
Revision Counsel and Congressional Budget O-ce in drafting statutes); Gluck & Bressman, supra 
note !, at *() (discussing Legislative Counsel); Gluck, CBO Canon, supra note ! (introducing CBO 
canon). 
16 At the time of the Gluck–Bressman study, we noted that the political science literature on 
“Unorthodox Lawmaking” had not been cited in case law and barely in legal scholarship. Gluck & 
Bressman, supra note !, at *!)-!+. Since that time, it has been cited in nearly two hundred articles. 
Some of this newer and important descriptive work began to emerge at the end of our two-year 
study and thus far includes detailed descriptions of two institutions. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Gould, 
Law Within Congress, !$* YALE L.J. !*#( ($%$%) (interview study examining parliamentary precedent 
in Congress); Jarrod Shobe, Codi#cation and the Hidden Work of Congress, () UCLA L. REV. (#% 
($%$%) (arguing that the failure to examine the statute codi&cation process has left gaps in 
understanding and interpreting statutory law). Speci&c o-ces also have occasionally drawn 
sustained attention. See, e.g., infra note !*, (showing George K. Yin’s series of studies of JCT). 
17 See, e.g., Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, !,+ S.Ct. )(), )+, ($%!+) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“I do not think it is wise for judges to close their eyes to reliable legislative history—
and the realities of how Members of Congress create and enact laws—when it is available.”); Council 
for Urological Interests v. Burwell, )*% F.,d $!$, $,, (D.C Cir $%!") (Henderson, J., dissenting in 
part) (citing Gluck–Bressman work to argue it “blinks reality” to ignore that Congress often uses 
legislative history, rather than the text, to restrain agencies.”); King v. Burwell, )"* F.,d ,"+, ,)+ 
(#th Cir. $%!#) (Davis, J., concurring in part) (“Neither the canons of construction nor any empirical 
analysis suggests that congressional drafting is a perfectly harmonious, symmetrical, and elegant 
endeavor.”); Loving v. IRS, )#$ F.,d !%!,, !%!* (D.C. Cir. $%!#) (Kavanaugh, J.) (citing the Gluck-
Bressman study for the proposition that “[L]awmakers, like Shakespeare characters, sometimes 
employ overlap or redundancy so as to remove any doubt”). 
18 George Yin also has considered multiple nonpartisan congressional o-ces, in the context of 
whether nonpartisan committee sta's could reduce legislative gridlock. See George K. Yin, 
Legislative Gridlock and Nonpartisan Sta!, ++ NOTRE DAME L. REV. $$+), $$*$-*, ($%!,). 
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the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC)—
which were mentioned by multiple interviewees as having important 
similarities to the nine institutions we initially set out to study. Indeed, 
MedPAC and MACPAC are likewise nonpartisan institutions, legally 
structured as distinct legislative agencies, and tasked with providing Congress 
with expert information about important health statutes. Another important 
example, mentioned frequently by our interviewees but that we do not discuss 
in great detail because it no longer exists (some have recently suggested 
reviving it), is the O-ce of Technology Assessment (OTA). OTA was a 
nonpartisan o-ce that served Congress from !)'* to !))"19 and was charged 
with using its highly specialized experts to help Congress incorporate 
technological and scienti+c expertise into its crafting of legislative policy.20 
All three agencies’ histories substantiate our broader narrative: they were 
each founded out of a congressional desire to develop in-house expertise to 
preserve autonomy in the face of potential executive branch overreach and 
resist interest group encroachment.21 We invoke them as relevant. 
We left out of this initial inquiry other institutions that may be 
nonpartisan and have their own particular expertise but that do not contribute 
to Congress’s legislative work, such as the O-ce of Senate Legal Counsel and 
O-ce of the General Counsel of the House of Representatives—which 
litigate on behalf of Congress—and the Government Printing O-ce—which 
prints o-cial legislative documents.22 Finally, we have mostly left out the 
 
19 See Technology Assessment Act of !*)$, Pub. L. No. *$-#+#, +( Stat. )*) (creating OTA); 
see also Legislative Branch Appropriations Act of !**(, Pub. L. No. !%#-",, !%* Stat. "!# (!**") 
(slashing OTA funding for &scal year !**( to /,.( million “to carry out the orderly closure” of the 
o-ce). 
20 OTA was designed to function “as an aid in the identi&cation and consideration of existing 
and probable impacts of technological application.” +( Stat. )*), )*). Recent appropriations debates 
about whether to reopen OTA apparently led to the creation of the STAA team within GAO to 
serve similar functions. See IDA. A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R#")"" LEGISLATIVE 
BRANCH: FY$%$% APPROPRIATIONS !"-!( ($%$%), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R#")"" [https://perma.cc/+YEE-KN,X]; Our Teams, 
GAO https://www.gao.gov/about/careers/our-teams/ [https://perma.cc/WS$F-RRHX] (last visited 
May !%, $%$%). 
21 See infra notes $*" & ,%#. Congress also utilizes temporary advisory commissions that may 
bear similar characteristics, see STRAUS & EGAR, infra note $*+, but we do not discuss those here 
because we are primarily interested in Congress’s permanent operating structure. 
22 We similarly omit numerous other support o-ces in Congress that are even further removed 
from shaping legislation, such as the Architect of the Capitol, the Capitol Police, each chamber’s 
Sergeant at Arms, and each chamber’s chaplain. On these o-ces, see IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R#,",$, OFFICES AND OFFICIALS IN THE SENATE: ROLES AND DUTIES 
($%!"); IDA. A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL,,$$%, SUPPORT OFFICES IN THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ROLES AND AUTHORITIES ($%$%). Of these, the strongest case 
for inclusion perhaps was for the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate—but despite 
their roles in ensuring each chamber’s smooth operation and preservation of documents, they d% not 
shape legislative product with su-cient regularity to ultimately warrant inclusion in this initial 
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political sta, in Congress—the sta,ers in members’ individual o-ces, on 
committees, and in leadership o-ces who do the bulk of constituent and 
policy work. The work of political sta, is critical to understanding Congress 
as an institution and the support that members receive. These sta,s are the 
key actors tasked with policy development inside Congress, and their role can 
magnify (arguably to the detriment of nonpartisan o-ces) on controversial, 
high-visibility legislation.23 However, each of us has detailed their role 
elsewhere,24 and they lack some of the de+ning features of the “bureaucracy” 
as we conceptualize it here. In particular, political sta, are partisan, and many 
are young, nonexpert, and relatively transient. The average tenure of a 
political o-ce sta,er is three years; the average sta, tenure in the nonpartisan 
institutions is much longer—for example, the average at CRS and JCT is 
about twelve to thirteen years, and in Legislative Counsel, double that.25 Of 
course, a di,erent way to look at this is to see Congress as actually having a 
double layer of bureaucracy in its political and nonpolitical sta,, just of very 
di,erent kinds.26 
 
foray. See BRUDNICK, SUPPORT OFFICES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra, at , 
(“[B]ill clerks receive introduced bills and amendments; enrolling clerks prepare the o-cial engrossed 
copy of House-passed bills, transmit messages to the Senate regarding approved legislation, and 
prepare the o-cial enrolled copy of any House-originated bill or resolution; journal clerks compile 
the minutes of proceedings in the House, ful&lling the requirement in Article I, Section V of the 
Constitution that ‘each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings’; reading clerks read all of the 
bills, resolutions, and amendments before the House; and the tally clerks operate the electronic roll 
call voting system.”). 
23 On nonpartisan o-ces potentially receding on “hot” political issues, see Yin, supra note !+, 
at $$*$-*,. 
24 See Bressman & Gluck, supra note !; Cross, Legislative History, supra note !; Gluck & 
Bressman, supra note !. 
25 See infra notes #,)-##! (length of tenure for the institutions); see also Kevin R. Kosar, 
Legislative Branch Support Agencies: What They Are, What They Do, and Their Uneasy Position in Our 
System of Government, in CONGRESS OVERWHELMED: CONGRESSIONAL CAPACITY AND 
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM ch. +, at $ (Timothy LaPira, Lee Drutman, & Kevin Kosar eds.) 
(forthcoming $%$%) (on &le with authors) (observing that “the [GAO] reports an annual retention 
rate of employees of *( percent (not counting retirements) each of the past six years”). On tenures 
of partisan sta', see R. ERIC PETERSEN & SARAH J. ECKMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R##(+$, 
STAFF TENURE IN SELECTED POSITIONS IN HOUSE MEMBER OFFICES, $%%(–$%!(, at )-+ 
($%!(); R. ERIC PETERSEN & SARAH J. ECKMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R##(+#, STAFF 
TENURE IN SELECTED POSITIONS IN SENATORS’ OFFICES, $%%(–$%!(, at )-+ ($%!(). 
26 There has indeed been much written (mostly in political science) about the “delegation” of 
subject matter expertise to the various congressional committees. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. 
DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS $%, (!**)) (describing a 
“specialization norm” in which members of Congress historically deferred to committee members 
based on expertise developed while serving on a committee); GEORGE GOODWIN, THE LITTLE 
LEGISLATURES #"-#* (!*)%) (explaining the need for subcommittees to enable members of 
Congress to specialize further); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Positive Theories of 
Congressional Institutions, !* LEG. STUD. Q. !#*, !", (!**#) (recounting the body of scholarship 
viewing committees “as specialists who, given the right incentives, would collect and reveal 
information that could improve the parent chamber’s decisions”). 
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Importantly, we do not challenge Congress’s ability to set itself up this 
way. Some academics and judges have argued that reliance on congressional 
sta,—any sta,—impermissibly delegates members’ lawmaking power,27 and 
some textualists use such arguments as justi+cation for ignoring the copious 
material that Congress produces and relies on alongside enacted text. These 
arguments about the illegitimacy of delegation have been quite imprecise. 
Among other things, they do not delve into di,erent kinds of sta, or the 
accountability mechanisms that accompany the various delegations. For 
example, political sta, is accountable directly to the members and visible to 
the public as the key policy personnel, but each member is ultimately 
responsible for his or her own votes or decision, like a CEO. The nonpartisan 
bureaucracy, by contrast, are expert sta, who o,er much less visible inputs, 
whose duties for Congress are de+ned ex ante by statute, and who largely 
cannot be dismissed by any single member or election outcome. 
We are most interested here in that nonpartisan staff and the relatively 
autonomous process that Congress winds up for that staff around the 
lawmaking process. But both layers of the congressional bureaucracy are the 
result of how Congress has chosen to organize itself. This is not illegitimate: 
the Constitution gives Congress sole control over its own structures and 
procedures.28 And it is Congress itself that has put this whole process in 
motion. 
In the end, we emerge with a much more holistic view of the lawmaking 
process than we had before. As even textualists acknowledge, statutes are not 
just words—a concept is meaningless without context. The words Congress 
does pass are the result of the lawmaking context—a highly dialogic process 
that is triggered by and includes assumptions based on critical inputs from 
the bureaucracy, including cost and revenue estimates from CBO and JCT, 
procedural rulings from the Parliamentarians, and explanatory materials 
written by many of the nonpartisan o-ces. Members and sta, are concerned 
with the substance of legislation at the macro level, much more so than the 
speci+c words chosen in the end at the micro level. Arguably, even those 
statute-modifying processes that Congress sets up to occur after the vote—
such as OLRC’s work to edit and signi+cantly rearrange the words passed 
and the organization in which they originally appeared—are part of the “text” 
 
27 See SCALIA, supra note +, at ," (“Congress can no more authorize one committee to ‘&ll in 
the details’ of a particular law in a binding fashion than it can authorize a committee to enact minor 
laws.”). See generally John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, *) COLUM. L. REV. 
(),, ()) (!**)) (arguing that reliance on legislative history, because it is produced by committee, 
“makes it far too attractive for legislators to bypass the constitutionally prescribed process of 
bicameralism and presentment”). 
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ ", $, ", +. 
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as Congress itself intends it to be understood, precisely because Congress has 
set itself up this way. 
So understood, the words on the page, and the snapshot moment of the vote, 
are only a small slice of “lawmaking.” Thus seeing the congressional bureaucracy 
and its inputs provocatively deconstructs the very concept of a “statute.” 
Even interpreters who insist on focusing only on “enacted text” are 
getting it wrong when enacted text is viewed in light of the bureaucracy. 
Textualists, for example, are interested in where statutes are placed in the 
U.S. Code and focused on literal aspects of text such as grammar: but if 
textualists understood how OLRC works—making these changes after 
enactment for many statutes—textualists might not rely on these textual 
techniques. They instead would be looking only to the public laws—the 
versions of statutes actually passed by Congress. But those public laws have 
a lot of stuff in them that textualist courts typically ignore or even 
purposefully discount, including purpose clauses and findings, which 
OLRC, in its post-vote organizing work, typically moves out of the Code 
text and into statutory notes. 
Text is also being manipulated when courts ignore assumptions of 
procedural rulings or the CBO or JCT estimates, treat reconciliation laws like 
linguistically coherent pieces of legislation, or overlook that Congress’s siloed 
workforce develops consistent statutory vocabularies only within subject 
matter areas, not across the U.S. Code, and much more. Make no mistake: 
when judges—instead of looking to these indications from Congress itself—
resolve ambiguities using their own presumptions about policy or linguistic 
consistency, they are bringing in legal values from the outside. That is 
justi+able, but not on the “we-are-faithful-agents-to-Congress” terms upon 
which it has always been justi+ed. 
We aim to tackle both this description de+cit and this legitimacy de+cit. 
Part I introduces the institutions of the congressional bureaucracy, their 
functions, and their strikingly common origins in Congress’s desire to reclaim 
its own lawmaking power from the executive. Part II analyzes features and 
structures that Congress’s bureaucracy shares and does not share with typical 
executive branch agencies, including how it separates powers internally. Part 
III turns to legislation and statutory interpretation theory, making a positive 
case for the relevance of understanding the bureaucracy. We illustrate how 
the bureaucracy informs our account of Congress’s rationality and how 
changes in the modern lawmaking process—the rise of “unorthodox 
lawmaking”—have likewise a,ected the bureaucracy’s work in ways that 
impact how statutes look. Statutes have more errors, are much longer, have 
less legislative history, and have a less transparent amendment process. All of 
this should be of interest to interpreters of all stripes. Finally, Part IV 
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illustrates how understanding the bureaucracy provocatively deconstructs 
common understandings of what statutory “text” is. That Part also o,ers 
some initial, concrete doctrinal takeaways for doctrine, including new 
canons—and anti-canons—based on the objective outputs of the bureaucracy. 
Regardless of whether one cares about the statutory interpretation wars, 
statutes comprise the majority of federal law today. But lawyers and judges 
remain mostly uninterested in and unknowledgeable about how Congress 
works—a curious de+cit given how much lawyers, judges, and legal academics 
study the structures and decision-making processes of the other key 
lawmaking institutions, especially the judiciary and administrative agencies. 
Congress’s own lawmaking machinery produces the lion’s share of modern 
American law and deserves at least as much attention. And it is time to 
relinquish the +ctitious bases of prevailing interpretive theories and come up 
with something better. Let’s enter the sausage factory.29 
I. THE BUREAUCRACY’S INSTITUTIONS: COMMON ORIGINS IN 
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND PRESENT-DAY OPERATIONS 
This Part introduces the bureaucracy’s institutions and summarizes their 
origins, structures and present-day functions. One overarching theme that is 
essential to understanding the history and motivations for the bureaucracy, 
yet not a story we have found in other bureaucracy literature, is the role of 
bureaucracy in the congressional context as a tool to safeguard Congress’s 
lawmaking and separate that power from the executive branch. 
The notion of knowledge as power is common, and much has been written 
about separation of powers in the context of executive branch delegations.30 
But Congress’s bureaucracy story is di,erent. Creating a bureaucracy inside 
Congress did not pose the same kind of tradeo, between knowledge and 
control which external delegation is normally understood to pose.31 
Instead, for Congress, bureaucracy was power. Despite their di,erent 
functions, Congress’s nonpartisan institutions were each created and molded 
for the common, overarching purpose of protecting congressional autonomy. 
Each of the bureaucracy’s institutions we study was created or strengthened 
during the same three periods—the !)*&s, !)#&s and !)'&s—and the latter 
two especially were periods in which Congress was openly concerned that it 
 
29 Robert Pear, If Only Laws Were Like Sausages, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. #, $%!%), 
https://www.nytimes.com/$%!%/!$/%"/weekinreview/%"pear.html [https://perma.cc/#GTY-X)LN] 
(repeating the famous quote from Von Bismarck, “If you like laws and sausages, you should never 
watch either one being made.”). 
30 See infra Part II (outlining the standard account of bureaucracy developed in the executive-
branch context, and discussing its relevance for the congressional bureaucracy). 
31 For sources outlining the typical view of this tradeo' in the executive-branch context, see 
infra notes ,,)-,#*. 
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was ceding too much ground to the executive branch. Establishing its own 
bureaucracy to draft, research, organize, estimate, and audit legislation was 
viewed as key to safeguarding its legislative autonomy. The alternatives—
seeking executive branch or third-party assistance for information-gathering 
and drafting help—had already been tried and deemed unacceptable. They 
had created a sense inside Congress that it was losing its status as a coequal 
branch because it was neither a self-su-cient policymaker nor could it 
adequately check an executive whose power continued to expand.32 
The !)#&s was the +rst key period. The years leading up to and through 
the New Deal had seen an explosion of legislative activity—and a 
concomitant explosion in the size of the executive branch—yet Congress’s 
own sta, had remained relatively small and almost entirely partisan.33 Even 
the partisan sta,s at the time were not substantive experts; their work usually 
was con+ned to only clerical tasks.34 It was estimated that, in !)#!, there were 
“not more than two hundred persons [on congressional sta,s] who could be 
considered legislative professionals.”35 Without in-house expertise, Congress 
had to rely on the executive branch for expertise, information, and drafting 
assistance.36 
 
32 For an argument that Congress’s use of rulemaking power to repeatedly restructure in ways 
that “enhance the chambers’ power vis-à-vis the executive,” JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S 
CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS $+! ($%!)), is a 
continuation of similar early English parliamentary practices, see id. at $()-,%!. It is also true that 
committees still do try to send some draft legislation to agency sta' for technical review. 
33 Harrison W. Fox, Jr. & Susan Webb Hammond, The Growth of Congressional Staffs, ,$ PROC. 
ACAD. POL. SCI. !!$, !!"-!!) (!*)") (recounting historical evolution of staffing in different staff 
categories); Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 
!!# COLUM. L. REV. +%), +$$ ($%!#) (on Legislative Counsel being limited to formatting duties); id. 
at +,# (on Congressional Research Service’s narrow original responsibilities). For information on 
personal and committee staff levels between !*)) and the present, see R. ERIC PETERSEN & AMBER 
HOPE WILHELM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R#,*#( SENATE STAFF LEVELS IN MEMBER, 
COMMITTEE, LEADERSHIP, AND OTHER OFFICES, !*))–$%!( ($%!() (reporting Senate staff levels 
by staff category from !*)) through $%!(); R. ERIC PETERSEN & AMBER HOPE WILHELM, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R#,*#), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF LEVELS IN MEMBER, COMMITTEE, 
LEADERSHIP, AND OTHER OFFICES, $%&&–'($) ($%!(), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R#,*#) (reporting the same for the House of 
Representatives). 
34 HARRISON W. FOX & SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS: THE 
INVISIBLE FORCE IN AMERICAN LAWMAKING !" (!*))) (explaining that “[s]ta-ng began in both 
Senate and House [in !++"-!*#(] as clerical assistance”). 
35 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY PRESS, HOW CONGRESS WORKS !+* ("th ed. $%!,). 
36 See GLADYS MARIE KAMMERER, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE STAFFING SINCE !*#(, 
at ! (!*"!) (“The new enlarged and quali&ed sta' [created by the !*#( Act] was to perform such 
research and analytical services for all committee members as had never been available to our 
national legislators except on loan from executive departments.”); Cross, Sta!er’s Error Doctrine, 
supra note !, at +*-*, (describing the “agency-delegation model” of statutory drafting that prevailed 
during the period); Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative 
State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, $*%(–$%+(, !$, YALE L.J. $((, ,,+ ($%!,) (“[I]t 
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Congress increasingly came to view this executive-branch dependence as 
intolerable. In a !)#* .oor speech entitled What Is Wrong with Congress, 
Representative Everett M. Dirksen voiced these frustrations: 
[W]e are constantly !shing with the bureaus and we put on a great quiz 
program, and they tell us what they think we ought to know and not a great 
deal more. How can the Aegean stables be cleansed unless we are equipped 
and sta"ed to secure basic information? Do you think the legislative branch 
of the Government can function independently and properly with the kind 
of prestige it ought to enjoy on that kind of a basis? The Congress today, in 
my judgment, needs a great, big dose of B, in the form of a sta" or an 
instrumentality so we can make out a case after gathering information and 
rebut cases that are so often presented to us .	.	.	. 
What is wrong with Congress? It is not implemented; it is not sta"ed; it does 
not have the weapons with which to do the best kind of job. So I say to you 
now: Let us spend a little money on ourselves; let us provide legislative tools 
to get the facts, the data, the information, and then control, supervise, and 
survey the operations of the Government.37 
Dirksen’s calls for legislative action translated into the most notable 
reform of the period: the Legislative Reorganization Act of !)#%. In addition 
to providing the +rst authorization for committees to retain professional 
political sta,,38 the !)#% Act expanded the size and role of Congress’s internal 
nonpartisan institutions, as detailed below.39 Explaining the logic of these 
!)#% reforms, Representative Monroney observed: 
Today we are confronted and confounded by the problems of a 
#$%,&&&,&&&,&&& government trying to do the job with tools so absolutely 
obsolete and antiquated that '$% saints could not possibly do with our present 
equipment and organization .	.	.	. 
We cannot be coequal; we cannot do this fundamental task of supervision 
that the framers of the Constitution had in mind unless the Congress is virile, 
strong enough and well equipped enough to handle this magnitude of work 
that is dumped on us. 
Five hundred and thirty-one men that compose the membership of the 
House and Senate are going to have a pretty hard time in handling, in 
 
seems probable that the New Deal and World War II saw the greatest executive-branch dominance 
of congressional drafting and deliberations that America has ever witnessed.”). 
37 ++ CONG. REC. )(*(, )(**-))%% (!*#$) (statement of Rep. Dirksen). 
38 FOX & HAMMOND, supra note ,#, at !#; KAMMERER, supra at ,(. Professional aides to 
Representatives would not be recognized until !*)%. FOX & HAMMOND, supra note ,#, at !$. 
39 Legislative Reorganization Act of !*#(, Pub. L. No. )*-(%!, §§ $%,-$%", (% Stat. +,(. 
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supervising, in surveying the work of over $,&&&,&&& men scattered 
throughout the executive department. It is like trying to move a battleship 
with a jeep or a model T Ford.40 
The committee report for the Act reiterated these goals. As the report 
put it: 
When [the branches] were created, they were more or less equal. But the 
executive branch of the Government has mushroomed into the greatest 
governmental bureaucracy not only this country but any other country in the 
world has known. The legislative branch of the Government has relatively 
stood still.41 
Notably, the Administrative Procedure Act was also passed in !)#%, the 
same year as the Legislative Reorganization Act. As Joseph Postell writes, 
although the two acts “advanced di,erent aspects of the solution—increasing 
congressional capacity and e-ciency versus applying legal constraints on 
agencies—they were designed to address the same problem, namely the 
inevitable arrival of the modern administrative state.”42 
The !)'&s brought another wave of reform. During this period, rising 
disenchantment with the executive branch (which culminated mid-decade 
with the Watergate scandal) brought fresh concerns about congressional 
dependence on the executive and a desire for a more democratic and 
transparent lawmaking process in Congress. These frustrations generated a 
number of laws to augment Congress’s resources. Most notable among these 
was the Legislative Reorganization Act of !)'&.43 Describing the motivation 
for the Act, numerous members made comments similar to this one, from 
Representative Fred Schwengel: “The e-ciency and e,ectiveness of our 
operation has decreased to the point where many people consider us to be a 
rubberstamp for the Executive.”44 In response to this frustration, the !)'& Act 
 
40 *$ CONG. REC. !%%,* (!*#() (statement of Rep. Monroney). 
41 S. Rep. No. )*-!#%%, at (""+ (!*#() (report of the Special [Joint] Committee on the 
Organization of Congress). 
42 Joseph Postell, The Other New Deal Settlement: The Relationship Between the Administrative 
Procedure Act and the Legislative Reorganization Act !) (on &le with authors); see also DAVID H. 
ROSENBLOOM, BUILDING A LEGISLATIVE-CENTERED PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ($%%%) 
(arguing for viewing the LRA and APA as part of a coherent e'ort in !*#( to make agencies operate 
as extensions of Congress); Postell, supra, at $$ (“The debates over the APA and LRA indicate that 
Congress, like the Court, was in a sense making its peace with the New Deal, but establishing a 
baseline set of principles that would govern how the New Deal would operate in practice.”). Postell 
argues, however, that the LRA’s intention to strengthen substantive committees and increase 
oversight has been mostly a failure. Postell, supra, at $). 
43 See Legislative Reorganization Act of !*)%, tit. V, Pub. L. No. *!-"!%, +# Stat. !!#% (codi#ed 
at $ U.S.C. § $+!-$+$e) (describing the O-ce of Legislative Counsel). 
44 !!( CONG. REC. $,*!# (!*)%) (statement of Rep. Schwengel); see also, e.g., !!( CONG. REC. 
$(%,! (!*)%) (statement of Rep. Waldie) (“The power of the executive branch is awesome today 
 
*&*&] #e Congressional Bureaucracy !"") 
provided Representatives with statutory acknowledgment of their ability to 
retain professional partisan sta, and made changes to the committee system 
to empower the use of expert committee sta,ers.45 At the nonpartisan level, 
it signi+cantly expanded and empowered Congress’s internal bureaucracy.46 
Of interest, while these reforms may have returned power to Congress 
vis-à-vis the executive branch, they also dispersed power within Congress. 
After all, Congress could have built its bureaucracy simply by adding experts 
into existing centers of congressional power. It could have added partisan sta, 
positions to members and committees, for example. It also could have 
consolidated research, drafting, accounting, procedural, budget, and revenue 
expertise beneath the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader. 
Instead, Congress dispersed these roles across a collection of nonpartisan 
institutions that, because of their statutory authority and hardwiring into 
congressional procedures, often are not easily manipulated or cowed by any 
particular power center in Congress. It is di-cult to determine to what extent 
this decentralization was intentional, but its e,ect has continued even as 
Congress itself dramatically changed and generally became more centralized. 
Several interviewees explicitly volunteered—without prompting—this 
internal separation of powers bene+t, which we shall return to in Part II. 
It is also of interest that the history of the congressional bureaucracy is 
not a story unique to the American legislature. Historians of parliamentary 
bureaucracies sound much the same theme. Parliaments and legislatures in 
presidential systems have increasingly come to develop their own internal 
bureaucracies and professional sta,s, in part because service to legislatures 
requires unique skills—including drafting expertise—as well as insulation 
from the executive’s political control.47 
Studies of parliaments in countries as diverse as Slovenia, India, and 
Canada have emphasized the importance of independent parliamentary sta, 
to “implement[] the principle of autonomy,”48 and to “e,ectively carry out its 
 
compared to the legislative branch.”); !!( CONG. REC. $#%(! (!*)%) (statement of Rep. Hanna) 
(“Mr. Chairman, in the almost $%% years since the Constitution was rati&ed, the executive branch 
of the Government and the court system have undergone radical changes, adapting themselves to 
the changing society in which they operate. Unfortunately, very little has been done in this regard 
in the third coequal branch of our Government, the Congress.”). 
45 Pub. L. No. *!-"!%, §§ ,%!-%", +# Stat. !!#%, !!)"-+! (!*)%); see also FOX & HAMMOND, supra 
note ,#, at $#. 
46 On the !*#( and !*)% Acts as expansions of Congress’s “institutional capacity,” see also 
CHAFETZ, supra note ,$, at $*#-*". 
47 DAVID BEETHAM, An E!ective Parliament (I): The National Level, in INTER-
PARLIAMENTARY UNION, PARLIAMENT AND DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A 
GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE !!"-"# ($%%(), http://archive.ipu.org/dem-e/guide/contents.htm 
[https://perma.cc/YMC*-MJXF] (examining how parliamentary organization contributes to 
parliamentary e-cacy). 
48 Id. at !!+-!* (discussing submission by Slovenian parliament to Inter-Parliamentary Union). 
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functions within the framework of the separation of powers.”49 In Canada, as 
noted by the Canadian parliament (in a submission to the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union): “operational independence of the Canadian Parliament is provided 
for in the Constitution and by legislation that guarantees that the Senate, the 
House of Commons and the Library of Parliament each have access to a non-
partisan professional sta, distinct from the public service.”50 
We now introduce in detail our nine main institutions. We also brie.y 
summarize the origins of MedPAC and MACPAC at the end of this Part. 
A. Congressional Research Service 
“What good does [the Library] do, unless we have senior experts to digest 
[information] when legislation is before the committees?” 
CRS is often described as Congress’s “think tank.”51 It is directed by 
statute “to advise and assist . . . in the analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of 
legislative proposals,” to collect and analyze “data having a bearing on 
legislation,” and “to prepare and provide information, research, and reference 
materials. . . to assist [members and committees] in their legislative and 
representative functions.”52 
Statutory authority for CRS is provided by the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of !)#%53—but CRS’s origins are much earlier. In !)&!, 
Wisconsin had been spurred by Charles McCarthy, a University of Wisconsin 
librarian, to create a nonpartisan reference bureau for the state legislature, 
and other states followed suit.54 Wisconsin Senator Robert LaFollette added 
an appropriations bill amendment to fund a similar congressional bureau in 
 
49 Id. (quoting submission by Indian parliament to Inter-Parliamentary Union). We note that 
in parliamentary systems many laws are likely to be introduced (and drafted) by the executive. See 
Legislative Drafting, AGORA: PORTAL PARLIAMENTARY DEV. (Nov. $), $%!*), https://agora-
parl.org/resources/aoe/parliamentaryinstitution/legislative-drafting [https://perma.cc/#EQZ-
(NR$] (on parliamentary systems generally, noting that “it is the executive branch of government 
that produces most of the draft laws”); Legislative Drafting Process Guide, FINLEX, 
http://lainvalmistelu.&nlex.&/en [https://perma.cc/,DQD-AHAX] (on Finland, stating that 
“[l]egislative bills are drafted by the Government”) (last visited Nov. $), $%!*); La Procédure 
Legislative [The Legislative Procedure], SENAT.FR, 
http://www.senat.fr/role/&che/procedure_leg.html [https://perma.cc/*#VS-N#AS] (on France) (last 
visited Nov. $), $%!*). 
50 BEETHAM, supra note #), at !!+-!* (quoting submission by Canadian parliament to Inter-
Parliamentary Union). In Canada, the perceptions that the nonpartisan legislative o-ces had 
become politicized contributing to their $%%( closures. See Marcus Moore, The Past, Present and 
Future of Law Reform in Canada, ( THEORY & PRAC. LEGIS. $$", $,+-#% ($%!+). 
51 See STEPHEN W. STATHIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS AT !%%: THE CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE $" ($%!#). 
52 $ U.S.C. § !(((d)(!), (#), (") ($%!+). 
53 Legislative Reorganization Act of !*#(, § $%,, Pub. L. No. )*-(%!, (% Stat. +!$. 
54 See Yin, supra note !+, at $$*$-*,. 
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!)!#.55 Pursuant to that funding, the Legislative Reference Service was 
established in the Library of Congress in !)!# via administrative order, 
enabling the Library to perform the reference functions Congress required.56 
In !)#%, Congress realized the need to transform and empower LRS. 
Again, from Representative Dirksen: 
What good does [the Library] do, unless we have senior experts to digest [the 
information in the collection] when legislation is before the committees?57 
The !)#% Act increased the size and scope of LRS58 and established it as 
a separate department in the Library of Congress. These reforms transformed 
LRS from a service that handled about !,!&& research requests per year in its 
early years59 and roughly ",&&& annual requests in the late !)$&s60 to one that 
handled $%,&&& requests per year by !)"&.61 
Still, the mid-century LRS primarily provided reference services to 
Congress rather than the independent policy analysis that—as federal 
programs became increasingly complex—Congress found it needed.62 
Consequently, LRS was transformed again by the Legislative Reorganization 
Act of !)'&, which remade it into a formidable center for research and policy 
analysis—a transformation signaled by its renaming as the “Congressional 
Research Service.”63 Explaining the impetus behind the project, the Chair of 
the House Rules Committee remarked: “Congress needed, but did not have, 
the capacity to evaluate the policy results of its work.”64 In the decade 
 
55 See id. 
56 For original congressional funding and direction to establish LRS, see Legislative, Executive, 
and Judicial Fiscal Year !*!" Appropriations Act, June !,, !*!#, 
https://www.visitthecapitol.gov/exhibitions/artifact/amendment-hr-!"$)*-legislative-executive-and-
judicial-&scal-year-!*!" [https://perma.cc/E$SR-(CLX]. On administrative action to create LRS 
pursuant to this congressional action, see STATHIS, supra note "!, at !$-!,: (“Two days after the bill 
was signed by the president, the Librarian of Congress established the Legislative Reference Service 
(LRS) by administrative order on July !+, !*!#.”); see also Gilbert Gude, Congressional Research 
Service: The Research and Information Arm of Congress, $ GOV’T INFO. Q. ", ) (!*+") (describing and 
providing legislative context for CRS’s initial appropriations and the resulting administrative order). 
57 *$ CONG. REC. !%%#*-"% (!*#() (statement of Rep. Dirksen). 
58 Pub. L. No. *!-"!%, §§ ,%!-%", +# Stat. !!#%, !!)"-+! (!*)%). 
59 Gude, supra note "(, at ). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 STATHIS, supra note "!, at $#-$(. 
63 Legislative Reorganization Act of !*)%, Pub. L. No. *!-"!%, § ,$!, +# Stat. !!+!. For renaming 
of the Service, see id. at § ,$!. See also STATHIS, supra note "!, at $" (describing e'ect of Act on CRS 
and providing history of renaming proposal); Walter Kravitz, The Advent of the Modern Congress: The 
Legislative Reorganization Act of $%&(, !" LEGIS. STUD. Q. ,)", ,)( (!**%) (describing the newly 
renamed Congressional Research Service’s charge to provide “objective, nonpartisan, in-depth 
analysis and appraisals to determine the advisability of enacting legislative proposals”). 
64 !!( CONG. REC. $,*%$ (!*)%) (statement of Rep. Colmer). 
!"%* University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !%(: !"#! 
following the passage of the Act, one CRS publication observes, “CRS sta, 
more than doubled.”65 
Today, CRS has approximately %*& employees.66 Ninety percent of its 
analysts have advanced graduate degrees, and analysts have relatively long 
tenures, with an average of thirteen years.67 The Director is appointed by the 
Librarian of Congress after consultation with the Joint Committee on the 
Library—an enduring feature of CRS’s continued organizational location 
within the Library of Congress.68 The Director is required by statute to be 
appointed without regard to partisan a-liation.69 The Librarian is required 
by law to “grant and accord to the Congressional Research Service complete 
research independence and the maximum practicable administrative 
independence.”70 
CRS analysts produce several types of written products. The most well-
known writings are its o-cial CRS Reports, which provide “[c]omprehensive 
research and analysis” on major policy issues.71 Committee reports regularly 
copy and paste material from these reports.72 CRS also sometimes writes the 
important explanatory statement in conference reports—the portion that sets 
forth the House and Senate provisions and describes the disposition of those 
items by the conference committee. It also writes the bill summaries found 
on congress.gov, an annotated version of the Constitution that contains legal 
analysis,73 summaries of legal and policy topics,74 congressional distribution 
memoranda,75 and blog posts for members and sta,.76 In response to requests 
from members or their sta,, CRS also provides tailored con+dential 
memoranda and email responses77 as well as in-person and telephone 
consultations, sta, brie+ngs, policy seminars and workshops, and 
 
65 STATHIS, supra note "!, at $(. 
66 Email from Sta'er to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Apr. $), $%$%) (on &le with authors). 
67 See id. 
68 Legislative Reorganization Act of !*#(, § $%,(b)(!), Pub. L. No. *!-"!%, +# Stat. !!#% 
(codi&ed at $ U.S.C. § !(((c)). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at § !(((b)($). 
71 MARY B. MAZANEC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR $%!+, at !% ($%!*); see, e.g., CASSANDRIA 
DORTCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF!%""#, POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION OF NATIVE 
AMERICANS ($%!*). 
72 Sta'er Interview. 
73 Constitution Annotated, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE (Aug. $(, $%!)), 
https://www.congress.gov/content/conan/pdf/GPO-CONAN-$%!).pdf [https://perma.cc/AP(E-
LKHL]. 
74 MAZANEC, supra note )!, at !% (discussing CRS Insights, Legal Sidebars, and In Focus). 
75 Id. 
76 Sta'er Interview. 
77 Id. 
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congressional testimony.78 CRS +elded more than '!,&&& research requests in 
+scal year *&!), and virtually every member and standing committee o-ce 
consults with it every year.79 CRS’s research may be conducted either in 
response to requests from members or committees of Congress, or on issues 
proactively selected by CRS as topics of likely interest to Congress (these 
latter reports are often referred to internally as “anticipatories” because they 
are issued in anticipation of a hot issues for Congress or after CRS receives a 
pattern of questions about the same issue). CRS reports that had been 
generally accessible to Congress (as opposed to less formal research requests 
CRS does for members con+dentially) were not allowed to be made publicly 
available until *&!( (but they often leaked), when Congress passed a bill 
expressly requiring them to be made public.80 
CRS told us that it now views its work as providing information to 
safeguard congressional autonomy not only from the executive, but also from 
outside interest groups. As recently as June *&!), the President of the 
Congressional Research Employees Association testi+ed before the 
Committee on House Administration that an important role of CRS is to 
“help sort through the facts and opinions and provide an unbiased overview” 
of the various interest group positions lobbying Congress.81 
B. O!ces of the Legislative Counsel 
“To help draft the bill it was necessary to seek technical assistance from the 
executive branch.” 
The O-ces of the Legislative Counsel are the nonpartisan sta, who draft 
the bulk of statutory text. They had their origin largely outside of Congress. 
In !)!!, the Legislative Drafting Research Fund was established at Columbia 
University to promote the “scienti+c study and investigation of legislative 
drafting.”82 This included a commitment to “laboratory work” whereby the 
 
78 MAZANEC, supra note )!, at +, !). 
79 Mary B. Mazanec, Director, Congressional Research Service, Statement Before the 
Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch Committee on Appropriations U.S. House of 
Representatives (Feb. $), $%$%), 
https://www.congress.gov/!!(/meeting/house/!!%",$/witnesses/HHRG-!!(-AP$#-Wstate-
MazanecM-$%$%%$$)-SD%%!.pdf 
80 Consolidated Appropriations Act, $%!+ Pub. L. No. !!"-!#!, !,$ Stat. ,#+. 
81 Susan Thaul, President, Cong. Research Employees Ass’n, Statement to Committee on 
House Administration (June $%, $%!*), 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HA/HA%%/$%!*%($%/!%*((,/HHRG-!!(-HA%%-Wstate-
ThaulPhDS-$%!*%($%.pdf [https://perma.cc/L)TM-G"XG]. 
82 Letter from Joseph P. Chamberlain to Nicholas Murray Butler, President, Columbia Univ. 
(April $), !*!!). On Chamberlain’s role in starting the fund, see John M. Kernochan, A University 
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Fund would provide drafting work for governments.83 To this end, the Fund 
sent Middleton Beaman, a law professor at Columbia University as well as 
Library of Congress law librarian, to Congress in !)!%.84 
By the time of Beaman’s arrival to Congress, various states—spurred on 
by the Progressive movement—already had created their own professional 
legislative drafting o-ces.85 Congress had begun to consider adding drafting 
o-ces,86 but all such proposals had failed.87 Beaman, however, found a 
receptive audience in the Ways and Means Committee, which was grappling 
with the rise of statutory complexity in federal taxation, and he soon became 
a trusted drafting resource relied upon throughout the Congress.88 
In the Revenue Act of !)!(, Congress decided to create a permanent o-ce 
modeled on Beaman’s service. A product of the congressional desire for self-
su-ciency, the new o-ce resulted partly from the fact that “[t]he Committee 
on Ways and Means felt that Congress should not be a mendicant on 
Columbia University nor receive favors at its hand, however gladly o,ered.”89 
The !)!( Act dispersed statutory drafting expertise inside Congress, 
mandating that the new o-ces be divided into two separate branches—one 
serving each chamber of Congress—largely out of concern that the Senate 
would otherwise dominate drafting resources at the House’s expense.90 The 
Act also provided that the head of each drafting o-ce was to be appointed 
“without reference to political a-liations,” a phrase that would reappear, in 
various iterations, in the organic statutes for subsequent nonpartisan 
congressional institutions. 
 
83 See Kernochan, supra note +$, at ($#-$"; see also Frederic P. Lee, The O"ce of the Legislative 
Counsel, $* COLUM. L. REV. ,+!, ,+! (!*$*). 
84 Lee, supra note +,, at ,+!, ,+". 
85 For state-level antecedents, see, for example, WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, 
https://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb (last visited Mar. !*, $%!*) (on the !*%! founding of the Wisconsin 
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88 See Lee, supra note +,, at ,+( (describing Beaman’s origins with the Ways and Means 
Committee). 
89 "* CONG. REC. ++$* (!*$%) (statement by Rep. Treadway). The o-ces o-cially launched 
in !*!*, which is when the Revenue Act of !*!+ (which created the o-ces) actually was enacted. 
90 Revenue Act of !*!+, § !,%,(a), Pub. L. No. $"#, #% Stat. !%"), !!#!-$. Originally called the 
“Legislative Drafting Service,” the Revenue Act of !*$# renamed it the O-ce of Legislative 
Counsel. Revenue Act of !*$#, § !!%!, Pub. L. No. (+-!)(, #, Stat. ,", (!*$#). On the decision to 
create separate branches, see Lee, supra note +,, at ,+). 
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In !)#%, Congress increased appropriations for the o-ces, allowing for 
more hires.91 But in the succeeding decades, Congress largely failed to expand 
Legislative Counsel’s capacity to meet the growing drafting needs that 
accompanied the ambitious New Deal and Great Society agendas.92 As a 
result, executive agency o-cials stepped into the gap, taking leading roles in 
drafting congressional legislation during this period.93 By the time of the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of !)'&, Congress had grown frustrated with 
this imbalance of power in bill drafting. As a member of the Joint Committee 
on the Organization of the Congress put it: 
In the past $( decades we have seen a persistent—if sometimes sporadic—
accretion of power to the executive branch .	.	.	. [Even in a bill that originated 
in Congress,] the irony of the situation is that to help draft [the bill] it was 
necessary to seek technical assistance from the executive branch; .	.	. [This] 
re)ects executive rather [than] legislative branch oversight, power, allocation 
of funds, and precedence.94 
State legislatures were even ahead of Congress. Representative Thomas 
Rees, for example, explained that, as a member of the California Senate, he 
“had a legislative counsel’s o-ce in the California Legislature that had #% 
attorneys. I think we have !# attorneys in the Legislative Counsel O-ce for 
the House of Representatives.”95   
The resulting !)'& Reorganization Act created a new charter for the 
House Legislative Counsel that was understood to embody a commitment to 
increases in funding and resources for both drafting o-ces.96 Pursuant to that 
commitment, Congress in !)'* provided the House o-ce with increased 
funding for hires,97 and both o-ces steadily expanded.98 The House o-ce 
 
91 Legislative Reorganization Act of !*#(, § $%#, Pub. L. No. )*-(%!, (% Stat. +!$. 
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(statement of Rep. Hall). 
95 !!( CONG. REC. $,*$$ (!*)%) (statement of Rep. Rees). 
96 Legislative Reorganization Act of !*)%, tit. V, Pub L. *!-"!%, +# Stat. !!#% (codi&ed at $ 
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97 H.R. REP. NO. *$-$,(, at ) (!*)!). 
98 See Shobe, supra note !(, at +$, (reporting o-ces’ growth over four-year increments). 
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has quadrupled in size since !)'", and the Senate o-ce has nearly tripled.99 
Today, the House o-ce employs +fty-six attorneys as drafters,100 and the 
Senate o-ce thirty-four.101 All drafters are required to be attorneys admitted 
to practice.102 Each o-ce is led by a Legislative Counsel who is appointed by 
the House Speaker or the Senate President pro tempore, respectively, and 
who is required by law to be appointed without regard to partisan 
a-liation.103 By tradition, the Legislative Counsel is promoted from within 
the o-ce and is one of its longest-tenured members.104 
Use of the o-ces’ drafting services is optional, but members and 
committees now use them with respect to nearly every bill, resolution, and 
amendment introduced in Congress.105 As the Gluck–Bressman study 
emphasized, and our twenty additional interviews of policy sta, for this 
paper corroborated, members are generally not involved in the actual drafting 
of legislation; even senior policy sta, do not usually write the words of 
statutory text. Instead, partisan sta, submit policy decisions and outlines to 
Legislative Counsel—often provided in the form of bullet points—that 
Legislative Counsel must transform into “clear, concise, and legally-e,ective 
language.”106 After Legislative Counsel drafts such language, there is 
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drafts considered so formulaic or ministerial that they do not involve signi&cant drafting work. 
103 See $ U.S.C. §§ $+$, $)$ ($%!+). 
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[https://perma.cc/BV*T-LC#$] (last visited Aug. !, $%!*). 
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sometimes, but not always, a back-and-forth with sta, (especially sta, who 
are attorneys) to +nalize the text.107 
In a testament to the shift of inter-branch responsibilities brought about 
by the rise of these drafting o-ces, the executive branch now sometimes 
borrows Legislative Counsel’s drafters for major legislative proposals, rather 
than vice versa (but policy sta, also often consult with agencies while 
drafting, especially for technical guidance).108 Legislative Counsel also 
provides Congress with a measure of independence from interest groups, 
which often o,er partisan, lobbyist-drafted legislative text as a roadmap or 
starting point for new legislation.109 
Going beyond the legislative text, the o-ces are also brought in to draft 
several non-statutory-text documents—a signal of the especially legally and 
regulatorily signi+cant import of those documents. These include conference 
committee reports, important portions of appropriations bills’ legislative 
history,110 special portions of committee reports that show redlines of changes 
a bill makes to existing law,111 and certain motions in the House.112 The work 
of the o-ces is wholly con+dential.113 
C. O!ce of the Law Revision Counsel 
“The bulk of the revision done is done by lawyers in the executive branch.” 
Tasked by its organic statute to “develop and keep current an o-cial and 
positive codi+cation of the laws of the United States,”114 OLRC functions as 
the custodian of the U.S. Code. Before the existence of the Code, private 
companies and agencies prepared some compilations of updated federal laws, 
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but these collections were not authoritative, and they could contain errors.115 
As a result, the only way to determine current law was “slogging through all 
of the session laws” of Congress.116 It was not enough to know that a law had 
been passed a century ago; one had to search all laws passed since that time 
to ensure no amendments had been made in the intervening years. The U.S. 
Code was deemed necessary because this research process became 
“increasingly cumbersome” as the number of laws exploded.117 
By creating the U.S. Code in !)*%,118 Congress joined many state 
legislatures that had begun to prepare and adopt topically-arranged legal 
codes.119 Unlike several such states, however, Congress did not create a 
governmental o-ce to maintain its Code.120 Instead, Congress entrusted 
management and oversight of the Code to the House Committee on the 
Revision of Laws—and it did not provide the Committee with any signi+cant 
sta, to perform this task.121 
Throughout the !)"&s and !)%&s, even as the federal statutory landscape 
was expanding, the work of preparing codification bills was assigned to only 
two individuals.122 As a result, Congress often outsourced this work to non-
congressional actors. With respect to the updating and publishing of the 
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states adopted revisions or codes around that time [of the U.S. Code’s creation] that took similar 
form—topical arrangement, sequential numbering, indexing, incorporation of other sections by 
reference, and so on”). These state projects also built on a prior wave of state-level codi&cation that 
had been catalyzed partly by Field’s Code in New York in !+#+, and that by !+*# had led roughly a 
quarter of the states to embody some statutes in a code. See id. at !!,*. 
120 When Congress ultimately moved to create the O-ce of the Law Revision Counsel, its 
primary advocate, Representative William Steiger of Wisconsin, cited the success of such an o-ce 
established by Wisconsin in !*%*, for example. See Markup of House Resolution, Committee Reform 
Amendments of $%&,, *,rd Cong. ("* (!*)#) [hereinafter $%&, Markup] (statement of Rep. Steiger) 
(remarking that “I have an interest in this obviously, because Wisconsin was the &rst State, in !*%*, 
to establish a Law Revision Counsel” and referring to this as the “Wisconsin system”). See also H.R. 
REP. NO. $+-)$+, at +* (!*)#) [hereinafter !*)# Committee Report] (“State practices vary but most 
have a revision capability and employ a small sta' located in a revisor of statutes bureau. 
121 On the evolution of this committee assignment, see Will Tress, Lost Laws: What We Can’t 
Find in the U.S. Code, #% GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. !$*, !#,-#" ($%!%). 
122 See !*)# Committee Report, supra note !$%, at ++. 
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Code, Congress often relied on services offered by the West Publishing 
Company.123 With respect to the preparation of codification bills, most work 
was done by executive-branch attorneys, because executive agencies had 
more staff.124 
The House addressed these concerns about the lack of institutional 
capacity for codi+cation as part of its review of its committee structure in 
!)'#.125 The result was a House resolution that, among other reforms,126 
created OLRC.127 The committee report echoed the same concerns for the 
lack of congressional self-su-ciency that drove the creation of the other 
nonpartisan o-ces, lamenting that: “To assist in the Judiciary Committee’s 
codi+cation and revision work the West Publishing Company has, for some 
"& years, more or less donated its services to the committee.”128 The report 
also documented Congress’s prior dependence on executive-branch 
codi+cation resources, noting that: “One title was codi+ed after a large e,ort 
by the Defense Department which put together a team of "* lawyers . . . and 
budgeted roughly /$ million to prepare the bill for the codi+cation of Title 
!&, Armed Forces.”129 OLRC would enable Congress to perform this work for 
itself. 
A few months later, Congress passed a bill that declared the provision 
creating OLRC to be “permanent law,” rather than just the creature of a 
House resolution.130 In so doing, Congress ensured that OLRC could not be 
abolished via unilateral action by the House.131 
 
123 Id. at ++. 
124 See $%&, Markup, supra note !$%, at ((% (statement of Rep. Ketcham) (“The bulk of the 
revision done [was] done by lawyers in the executive branch.”). 
125 See !*)# Committee Report, supra note !$%, at +) (explaining that the production of the 
Code had become a “massive task”); id. at ) (describing the exceedingly “large body of Federal laws”). 
The House considered proposals from a bipartisan Select Committee on Committees tasked with 
looking at House Rules X and XI. These rules “establish[ed] the standing committees of the House, 
de&ne[d] their jurisdictions, and regulate[d] their procedures.” Id. at ,. 
126 The !*)# Amendments also undertook a broader restructuring of the responsibilities, 
jurisdictions, and resources available to House committees. See generally Committee Reform 
Amendments of !*)#, H.R. Res. *++, *,d Cong. (!*)#). For a detailed description of its reforms, 
and of their evolution in Congress, see JUDY SCHNEIDER & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, RL,!+,", 
REORGANIZATION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: MODERN REFORM EFFORTS !)-,( 
($%%,) at !)-,(. 
127 Committee Reform Amendments of !*)#, H.R. Res. *++, *,d Cong. § #%" (!*)#). 
128 !*)# Committee Report, supra note !$%, at ++. Reference is made to the Judiciary 
Committee because, in !*#(, the House Committee on the Revision of Laws was absorbed into the 
House Judiciary Committee as a subcommittee. See Tress, supra note !$!, at !##. 
129 See !*)# Committee Report, supra note !$%, at +*. 
130 Pub. L. No. *,-""#, ++ Stat. !))!, !))) (!*)#) (codi&ed at $ U.S.C. § $+"c ($%!+)). 
131 Largely to its origin in a House resolution, OLRC still submits its codi&cation bills 
speci&cally to the House Judiciary Committee. See H.R. Res. *++, *,d Cong. § #%"(c)(!) (!*)#) 
(requiring submissions of titles to House Judiciary Committee); id. § #%"(c)($), ()) (requiring 
submissions of recommendations to House Judiciary Committee). 
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The o-ce currently employs thirteen individuals—a signi+cant increase 
over earlier numbers,132 but one dwarfed by increases in many other 
congressional o-ces. OLRC employees are all attorneys.133 They are divided 
into two teams, with nine working on classi+cation and four on codi+cation 
(a distinction explained below). OLRC is headed by an individual known as 
the Law Revision Counsel who must be appointed by the House Speaker 
without regard to partisan a-liation.134 The Law Revision Counsel typically 
is selected through internal promotions of existing employees. 
For its work on the U.S. Code, OLRC now performs several tasks. First, 
it performs “codi+cation” work, where it prepares codi+cation bills for 
Congress.135 This work requires surveying the myriad already-enacted federal 
statutes and determining which statutes fall within general cohesive subject-
matter areas; those subject-matter areas are re.ected in the +fty-three titles 
of the U.S. Code. OLRC occasionally creates new titles or repurposes old 
ones, but most of the subject matter areas were organized by Congress itself 
when it adopted the Code in !)*%. (The Code was less than *&&& pages long 
then; now it is more than "&,&&&.) 
OLRC then takes those statutes apart from the form in which they were 
passed and reassembles them—moving and reorganizing sections around to 
integrate those statutes into a single, coherent subject-matter title in the 
Code.136 OLRC inserts that newly prepared title into a bill, which it presents 
to Congress for formal enactment of the title into what is known as “positive 
law.” To transform a title of the U.S. Code into positive law, Congress must 
pass the codi+cation bill repealing the myriad underlying statutes and 
enacting the codi+cation bill itself (and the title contained therein) as the sole 
governing law in their place.137 Through its codi+cation work, OLRC 
therefore conceptualizes, creates, and organizes a title of the Code.138 
 
132 Compare STAFF OF J. COMM. ON PRINTING, !!"TH CONG., OFFICIAL CONG. DIRECTORY 
#(# ($%!+) with STAFF OF J. COMM. ON PRINTING, *#TH CONG., OFFICIAL CONG. DIRECTORY 
#,) (!*)() (reporting that the O-ce employed three attorneys in !*)(). 
133 See Tress, supra note !$!, at !$!n.!#$. 
134 Pub. L. No. *,-""#, tit. I, ch. III, § !%!, ++ Stat. !))) (!*)#) (enacting the terms of a House 
Resolution, H. Res. *++, *,rd Congress, that established the OLRC) (codi&ed at $ U.S.C. § $+"c). 
135 See Positive Law Codi#cation, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL, 
https://uscode.house.gov/codi&cation/legislation.shtml (last visited May !*, $%$%) (“Positive law 
codi&cation by the O-ce of the Law Revision Counsel is the process of preparing and enacting a 
codi&cation bill to restate existing law as a positive law title of the United States Code.”) 
136 Frequently Asked Questions and Glossary, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL, 
https://uscode.house.gov/faq.xhtml (last visited May !*, $%$%) (noting that the Code is a 
“consolidation and codi&cation by subject matter”). 
137 See Positive Law Codi#cation, supra note !,". 
138 See $ U.S.C. $+"b(!) ($%!+) (requiring that the o-ce shall “prepare, and submit to the 
Committee on the Judiciary one title at a time, a complete compilation, restatement, and revision 
of the general and permanent laws of the United States”). 
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In preparing a codi+cation bill, OLRC may make editorial changes to 
clarify presumed congressional intent in the prepared title, including 
grammatical changes or even the insertion of substantive textual provisions 
such as de+nitions. OLRC’s work to draft codi+cation bills includes a formal 
review and comment period whereby the o-ce invites feedback and analysis 
on the bills from those with expertise in the relevant area of law, including 
administrative agencies, congressional committees, and academics. Congress 
has enacted twenty-seven titles of the U.S. Code into positive law, with the 
most recent enacted in *&!#.139 
There are twenty-seven additional subject-matter-cohesive titles of the 
U.S. Code that most lawyers perceive as indistinguishable from the enacted 
titles (for instance, Title #* of the U.S. Code, which contains the Civil Rights 
Acts, Medicare, and Medicaid). OLRC also conceptualizes and organizes 
those titles (most of which were originally organized by Congress in !)*%) by 
rearranging provisions from enacted statutes (or retaining the work done by 
prior codi+ers to that end). But those titles have not been formally enacted 
as codi+ed law by Congress—that is, Congress has not voted on those OLRC 
edits at all—in many instances simply because Congress has not acted on 
requests for codi+cation and has little interest in doing so, as we elaborate in 
Part II. As a result, those twenty-seven titles do not have the status of positive 
law (in other words, the governing law is still the originally-enacted public 
laws not the title of the Code). 
A key practical e,ect of the di,erence between positive and non-positive 
titles goes to how a law is properly amended. To amend a law that is part of 
the enacted Code, one needs to amend to the Code itself (e.g., “Title *(, United 
States Code, is amended . . .”). If instead, Congress accidentally amends with 
a public law that says “the Judiciary Act of !'() is amended,” that amendment 
becomes something of a free .oating piece of law because it is not “where” it 
belongs, as the provisions of the Judiciary Act were formally repealed when 
they were codi+ed into the Code. Surprisingly, as we detail in Part IV, such 
mistakes in amending are not rare and they create challenges for those trying 
to +nd the most up-to-date versions of the law. To amend to one of the 
twenty-seven titles not enacted as positive law, Congress does have to amend 
to the underlying non-codi+ed statute (e.g., “The Social Security Act is 
amended . . .”), not to the Code, because the Code for those sections is not 
enacted law to amend. These distinctions have caused much confusion and 
numerous mistakes, as we elaborate in Part IV. The big point for now is how 
little most lawyers and judges understand about any of this. 
 
139 See Browse the United States Code, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL, 
https://uscode.house.gov/browse.xhtml [https://perma.cc/BD,Q-RXRL] (last visited Aug. !, $%!*) 
(titles marked with an asterisk are positive law). 
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For all titles, whether or not voted on by Congress, OLRC also performs 
“classi+cation” work.140 Here, it prepares and publishes updated versions of 
the Code that incorporate recent amendments.141 This includes updating the 
o-cial online version of the Code throughout the legislative year, which 
OLRC typically does approximately thirty to forty times per year.142 For non-
positive titles, this classi+cation work requires OLRC decisions about where 
to locate newly enacted provisions in the Code. This work also can entail 
certain edits to statutory text—such as modifying cross-references and 
inserting headings in non-positive titles. As non-positive titles grow unwieldy 
over time with repeated classi+cations, OLRC also periodically revisits them 
to rearrange them—work that it labels as “editorial reclassi+cation.”143 
As noted, OLRC has signi+cant editorial discretion in the performance 
of these functions, a fact unknown to most lawyers and courts. In codi+cation 
bills, it may alter or even add statutory text in order to correct errors, resolve 
ambiguities, and make the Code easier to understand and navigate. In all 
aspects of its work, it has signi+cant discretion to omit those provisions from 
the Code entirely that it deems not “general and permanent,”144 such as most 
parts of appropriations bills. It also has discretion to move full provisions 
outside the text of the Code and into the side notes—a determination that 
surprisingly often includes some important provisions, like pilot programs, 
statutory e,ective dates, and legislative +ndings.145 To appreciate the 
 
140 See About Classi#cation, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL, 
https://uscode.house.gov/about_classi&cation.xhtml (last visited May !*, $%$%) (“The O-ce . . . 
reviews every provision of every public law to determine whether it should go into the Code, and if 
so, where. This process is known as U.S. Code classi&cation.”). The statutory charter only uses the 
term “classi&cation” with respect to non-positive titles, but it requires OLRC to perform this 
updating work for all titles. See $ U.S.C. § $+"b(#) ($%!+) (listing a function of the OLRC as “[t]o 
classify newly enacted provisions of law to their proper positions in the Code where the titles 
involved have not yet been enacted into positive law”). 
141 See Frequently Asked Questions and Glossary, supra note !,( (noting “updates are made 
throughout a congressional session on an ongoing basis as public laws are enacted. For the print 
version of the Code, each title is updated once a year to include all of the laws enacted during the 
latest session of Congress”). 
142 Email from Sta'er to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Apr. $+, $%$%) (on &le with authors). 
143 See Editorial Reclassi#cation, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL, 
https://uscode.house.gov/editorialreclassi&cation/reclassi&cation.html (last visited May !*, $%$%) 
(stating that OLRC “must occasionally undertake editorial reclassi&cation projects to reorganize 
areas of law that have outgrown their original boundaries, or to eliminate organizational units that 
are no longer e-cient”). OLRC typically views it as the job of Congress, not OLRC, to further 
modify the text of positive law titles, and so OLRC does not make all the same types of edits when 
classifying in positive law titles. Instead, OLRC will submit to Congress a bill that, if enacted by 
Congress, would implement its proposed edits (such as reorganization of a title). See Email from 
Sta'er to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (on &le with authors). 
144 $ U.S.C. § $+"b(!) ($%!+). 
145 See infra Part IV.B for elaboration; see also About Classi#cation, supra note !#% (“While the 
decision to classify a freestanding provision as a section or a statutory note is an editorial judgment, 
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signi+cance of this discretion, as we discuss in Part IV, more than half of the 
enacted text of the U.S. Code is now in statutory notes—that is, not visible as 
inline text in print sources and not readily accessible at all on secondary 
electronic sources, even for those who know to look for them.146 These 
changes often create situations in which the statute as encountered by the 
general public appears di,erent—or at least less complete—from the text that 
was enacted. 
D. Congressional Budget O!ce (CBO) 
“[T]he Congress has, in the eyes of many, lost the power of the purse to the 
Executive Branch.” 
In the half-century preceding the creation of CBO, the o-ce that now is 
Congress’s economic and budgetary analyst, budgetary power rested heavily 
with the executive branch. The Budget and Accounting Act of !)*! required 
the President to submit an annual budget proposal, and so largely entrusted 
the President with responsibility for budget planning.147 The !)*! Act also 
established the Bureau of the Budget, later renamed the O-ce of 
Management and Budget (OMB), which gave the President signi+cant 
control of data and analysis relating to the budget.148 In the following decades, 
economic analyses of legislative issues, such as cost estimates for bills, 
typically were produced by executive agencies.149 Those calculations, it often 
was suspected, would vary based on the President’s level of support for the 
underlying legislation.150 This era of “presidential dominance” over the 
budget process continued unabated throughout the !)%&s.151 
Congress became increasingly concerned about this allocation of 
budgetary power in the !)%&s. The Vietnam War and the Great Society 
 
there are certain types of provisions that are normally classi&ed as notes in both positive and non-
positive law titles, such as e'ective dates, short titles, savings, and statutory construction. Statutory 
notes also include provisions that are somewhat less than general or less than permanent, but still 
relate to existing Code sections, such as those requiring studies and reports, implementation of 
regulations, or the establishment of a task force.”); Email from Sta'er to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross 
(Apr. $+, $%$%) (on &le with authors) (“Sometimes [placement in a note] is by Code custom. Other 
times [OLRC has] no other choice—as when a freestanding provision belongs in a positive law title 
based on subject matter.”). 
146 On this point, see also Shobe, supra note !(. 
147 PHILIP G. JOYCE, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE: HONEST NUMBERS, 
POWER, AND POLICYMAKING !" ($%!!); History, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
https://www.cbo.gov/about/history [https://perma.cc/,ZJS-"QP,] (last visited Aug. +, $%!*). 
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policies placed new strain on the federal budget, and Congress grew 
dissatis+ed with executive-branch budgetary tactics that it viewed as 
coercive.152 These inter-branch tensions reached a boiling point when, in !)'*, 
President Nixon threatened to withhold signi+cant appropriations from 
certain federal programs that con.icted with his policies.153 These 
impoundments, along with a post-Watergate concern among some about the 
trustworthiness of OMB,154 led to new congressional interest in reclaiming 
its budgetary and economic powers. 
In response, Congress formed a joint committee in !)'* that was directed 
to develop recommendations “for the purpose of improving congressional 
control of budgetary [procedures].”155 Drawing on the template of California’s 
Joint Legislative Budget Committee, it recommended the creation of a 
nonpartisan joint sta, and director to work beneath two new budget 
committees, one for each chamber.156 This approach, the committee hoped, 
might +nally “give Congress its own center of congressional budgetary 
operations.”157 
A year later, Congress enacted the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of !)'#, which acted upon the joint committee’s 
recommendations.158 The conference committee’s explanatory statement 
observed: “[T]he Congress has, in the eyes of many, lost the power of the 
purse to the Executive Branch.”159 It further stated: “[C]ongressional 
enactments [have] permitted the Executive to achieve a great concentration 
of +nancial and policymaking authority . . . . Yet the Congress did little to 
improve its own budget capabilities.”160 
To reclaim control, the Act established a series of new procedures and 
practices—including presidential procedures for impoundments161 and 
procedures for the new congressionally driven budget process.162 To manage 
the latter process, it also created several new congressional institutions. These 
included the new budget committee in each chamber—a division of labor 
partly designed to allow for specialized attention to aggregate federal 
 
152 JOYCE, supra note !#), at !". 
153 Id. at !"-!(. 
154 Waxman, supra note !#*. 
155 Pub. L. *$-"**, § ,%!(b)(!), +( Stat. !,$# (!*)$). 
156 H.R. Rep. No. *,–!#), at $-, (!*),). 
157 Id. 
158 Pub. L. No. *,-,##, ++ Stat. $*) (!*)#). 
159 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference on H.R. &$-(, *,rd Cong. ! (!*)#). 
160 Id. at $. 
161 Pub. L. No. *,-,##, tit. X. 
162 Id. tit. III. 
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spending163 and partly the byproduct of bicameralism traditions in 
Congress164—a structure that separated budget power across the two 
chambers. It was also partly an e,ort to navigate and appease existing 
committee-level con.icts inside Congress.165 Rather than leave issues of 
budgetary expertise and calculation to these new committees, however, the 
Act also created the CBO.166 
The Act made the CBO a nonpartisan legislative o-ce, not committee 
sta, as had been proposed.167 Representative Frank Annunzio said that the 
CBO would “aid in redressing the imbalance of information which the 
executive branch commonly uses to its advantage and our embarrassment.”168 
Senator Edmund Muskie similarly commented that the o-ce would “provide 
Congress with the kind of information and analyses it needs to work on an 
equal footing with the executive branch.”169 
In subsequent years, CBO accreted authority, largely by proactively 
looking to analyze major legislative proposals and taking a firmly 
nonpartisan stance. President Carter’s energy policy was the important first 
milestone. As CBO historian Philip Joyce put it, CBO proactively involved 
itself by “proposing to do an analysis of the plan, and by generating requests 
for this analysis from the committees of jurisdiction.”170 Ultimately, CBO 
determined that the Carter estimates of the policy’s intended effects were 
 
163 See Public Law %---,,: Legislative History, Committee on Governmental Operations, United 
States Senate, *,rd Cong. $* (!*)#) (“The Budget Committee is being created to guide the Congress 
in . . .tasks that no other standing committee now performs . . ..By performing e'ectively the new 
&scal policy and priority-setting functions that no other legislative committee now performs it 
should enable other committees . . .to work with greater focus and e'ect.”). 
164 See id. at ,% (“Congress needs the legislative mechanism to make &scal policy, and 
legislation under the Constitution is the product of a bicameral system. Thus each House needs a 
Budget Committee to formulate and prepare its &scal policy decisions, legislating such decisions in 
the same manner as all other such decisions.”). 
165 See ALAN J. ABRAMSON, BROKEN PURSE STRINGS: CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETING 
!*)# TO !*++, at !!-!, (!*++) (providing context on conflict between appropriations and 
authorizing committees). 
166 Pub. L. No. *,-,##, tit. II. 
167 Id. at §$%!. 
168 Public Law *,-,##: Legislative History, supra note !(, at !*(#. 
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changes to the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), the predecessor of the OMB, involved “an attempt to 
channel departmental relations with Congress through the White House and to tailor departmental 
needs to the president’s programmatic goals”). 
170 Phillip G. Joyce, The CBO at Middle Age, BROOKINGS (Feb. !!, $%!"), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/$%!(/%(/PJ_WorkingPaper*_Feb!!_Final.pdf 
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overly generous.171 Despite the controversy generated by this conclusion, 
CBO’s critique of President Carter’s plan helped establish the office’s 
independence, especially because the entire federal government, including 
CBO, was headed by Democrats.172 CBO continued to display this 
independence from majority leadership with controversial forecasts relating 
to President Reagan’s budget policy173—particularly in projecting a deficit 
when Reagan promised his budget would balance174—as well as unfavorable 
forecasts that contributed to the failure of President Clinton’s proposed 
health reform legislation in !))#.175 
The creation of the office angered some members by drawing power 
away from the very influential committees with control over the budget, 
including House Ways & Means and Senate Finance. CBO similarly has 
maintained independence from the budget committees of Congress. One of 
the most important early CBO directors, Dr. Alice Rivlin, openly embraced 
this internal separation of powers function for the office, famously stating: 
“[T]he CBO was not set up to work solely for the budget committees. I 
work for the whole Congress and have responsibilities to all committees and 
indeed to all members.”176 
Today, CBO has approximately *"& employees, which it reports are 
“mostly economists or public policy analysts with advanced degrees,” and a 
few attorneys.177 The o-ce is headed by a Director who is jointly appointed 
by the House Speaker and Senate President pro tempore (with 
recommendations from the Budget Committees) and who legally must be 




173 Id.; see also CONG. BUDGET OFF., AN ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN’S BUDGET 
REVISIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR !*+$ (!*+!) (“[T]he CBO estimates of the economic e'ects of the 
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175 See Paul Starr, What Happened to Health Care Reform?, AM. PROSPECT (!**"), 
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176 Congressional Budget O"ce Oversight: Hearing before S. Comm. on the Budget, *#th Cong. # 
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the main &nancial committees. Sta'er Interviews. 
177 Organization and Sta"ng, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
https://www.cbo.gov/about/organization-and-sta-ng [https://perma.cc/N"E,-C*VJ] (last visited 
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Director can be removed earlier by a resolution in either chamber. $ U.S.C. § (%!(a)(,)–(#) ($%!+). 
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Senate Budget Committees have alternated in recommending candidates for 
the position, and the Committees’ recommendations have been followed.179 
The o-ce provides analyses, reports, and studies designed to inform 
Congress about the +scal impacts of policies, legislative proposals, and 
enacted law.180 Its analyses include: (!) a cost estimate for nearly every bill 
that is approved by a committee;181 (*) ten-year and thirty-year forecasts of 
the budgetary and economic outcomes anticipated to result under 
continuation of current law; ($) economic analysis of the President’s budget; 
(#) examination of the options to reduce the federal de+cit; and (") analysis 
of the economic impacts of federal mandates upon state, local, and tribal 
governments and the private sector, as required by the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act of !))".182 CBO often proactively assists legislative sta, in 
designing legislation that will not exceed desired expenditure levels.183 The 
o-ce performs these functions particularly with respect to spending 
legislation (i.e., non-tax legislation), due to the complementary role played 
by JCT for tax bills.184 
Congress also has hardwired use of the o-ce’s cost estimates into the 
routine legislative process, with rules and laws requiring committee-reported 
legislation to be cost-estimated (and for committee reports to publish those 
estimates).185 In most instances, Congress also has required that legislation 
meet certain budgetary goals—and while most of these rules provide the 
Budget Committees with the option to determine their own cost estimates, 
use of CBO estimates occasionally is mandated, and even when they are not, 
congressional convention dictates the use of CBO estimates regardless of 
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§ (", ($%!+) (noting that “to the extent practicable,” cost estimates shall be provided to “any 
committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate (except the Committee on Appropriations 
of each House)”), but CBO still works very closely with appropriators, including providing 
substantial analyses of appropriations bills. See Sta'er Interview. 
182 Pub. L. !%#-#, § #$#, !%* Stat. "" (codi&ed at $ U.S.C. § ("+c ($%!+)); Products, CONG. 
BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/about/products [https://perma.cc/Z$M(-SG,S] (last visited 
Aug. !, $%!*). 
183 Bressman & Gluck, supra note !, at )(# (reporting interviews with current and former CBO 
sta'). 
184 See infra note $%( and accompanying text. 
185 See Congressional Budget Act of !*)#, § ,%+(a), Pub. L. No. *,-,##, ++ Stat. $*); RULES 
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, !!(th Cong., Rule XIII.,(c)(,). 
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such speci+cation.186 As a result, the “CBO score”—the estimated cost of a 
bill—often plays a pivotal role in a bill’s success or failure.187 
CBO publishes its formal cost estimates and analytic reports,188 materials 
outlining its underlying data and analytical methods,189 comparisons of its 
projections with a variety of sources,190 and chart books, slide decks, and 
infographics about the budget and the economy to make its projections more 
accessible.191 Any preliminary analyses CBO conducts at the behest of 
members or committees to assist in the development of legislation are 
con+dential.192 
E. Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) 
“Congress ought not to be dependent absolutely on what may be reported to 
it by the o*cials and people engaged in the administration side alone.” 
Created in !)*%, the JCT emerged in part from the enactment of the 
Sixteenth Amendment which, by providing legislative authority to impose an 
income tax, created a growing need for expertise in taxation. More concretely, 
however, it also emerged from a personal feud between congressional and 
executive actors. As George K. Yin, who has written extensively on JCT, has 
 
186 The House’s PAYGO rule requires use of a CBO-calculated baseline to measure a bill’s 
impact on the de&cit. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, !!(th Cong., Rule 
XXI(!%)(a)($). See also Pub. L. No. !!!-!,*, !$# Stat. + ($%!%) (codi&ed at $ U.S.C. §*,,(c)($)(B) 
($%!+)) (specifying CBO role in statutory PAYGO rule). Otherwise, chamber budget rules typically 
provide the budget committees with discretion to determine compliance with budgetary rules, and 
convention alone dictates use of CBO estimates. See Congressional Budget Act of !*)#, § ,!$; RULES 
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, !!(th Cong., Rule XXI; H.R. Con. Res. )!, § #!%(, !!"th 
Cong. ($%!)); See also infra note $#" (on reconciliation process and the Byrd rule); Ellen P. Aprill & 
Daniel J. Hemel, The Tax Legislative Process: A Byrd’s Eye View, +! L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. **, !%" 
($%!+)(explaining JCT and CBO role in Byrd rulings); CBO’s Role in Budget Resolutions, CONG. 
BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/publication/"!,)* (last visited May !", $%$%) (describing CBO 
role for budget resolutions). 
187 See, e.g., Robert King, Following GOP Criticism, CBO Revamps Insurance Coverage Estimates, 
WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. $!, $%!+), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/healthcare/following-gop-criticism-cbo-revamps-
insurance-coverage-estimates [https://perma.cc/SD+#-#BVY] (describing how the repeal of the 
ACA died in part due to “the CBO’s high estimates of coverage losses.”). 
188 Processes, CONG. BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/about/processes0release 
[https://perma.cc/LZ(H-(#FF] (last visited Aug. !, $%!*). 
189 Transparency, CONG. BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/about/transparency 
[https://perma.cc/R#KM-B*)B] (last visited Aug. !, $%!*). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Processes, supra note !++. If these relate to publicly available legislative proposals, they will 
be made available only to members of Congress; if not, they will remain wholly con&dential. Id. 
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chronicled,193 Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon proposed in !)*# to reduce 
surtax rates and Senator James Couzens responded with well-publicized 
critiques of the proposal. This dispute turned personal and culminated in a 
Senate investigation into the Bureau of Internal Revenue.194 As Yin observes, 
the investigation awoke Congress to broader concerns about the drafting and 
implementation of tax policy.195 
In the Finance Committee’s hearing on the Couzens investigation, 
Senator Andrieus Jones lamented, with respect to tax oversight: “[T]he 
Congress ought not to be dependent absolutely on what may be reported to 
it by the o-cials and people engaged in the administration side alone.”196 
Arguing that the committee should have experts of its own, Jones said: “I am 
not an expert engineer; I am not an expert auditor; nor have I the time to do 
the work myself.”197 
With respect to drafting “recommendations for legislation,” Jones added: 
“[Congress] has had to rely solely upon recommendations which came from 
the Secretary of the Treasury. I submit that that is not a proper basis for the 
framing of legislation. You see only one side of it.” To avoid “becom[ing] mere 
rubber stamps” of the Bureau, Jones concluded: “We want an agency under 
our jurisdiction so we know what is going on.”198 
This desire for congressional autonomy from executive-branch tax 
analysis translated into the committee’s proposal for a “Joint Committee on 
Internal Revenue Taxation,” which was enacted into law by the Revenue Act 
 
193 Yin, a former head of the JCT, has pro&led the Committee and its sta' in a number of 
excellent articles. See George K. Yin, Crafting Structural Tax Legislation in a Highly Polarized Congress, 
+! J. L. & CONTEMP. PROB. $#!, $"!-"# ($%!+); George K. Yin, How Codi#cation of the Tax Statutes 
and the Emergence of the Sta! of the Joint Committee on Taxation Helped Change the Nature of the 
Legislative Process, )! TAX L. REV. )$,, )$"-$( ($%!+); George K. Yin, James Couzens, Andrew Mellon, 
the “Greatest Tax Suit in the History of the World,” and the Creation of the Joint Committee on Taxation and 
Its Sta!, (( TAX L. REV. )+) ($%!,)George K. Yin, The Joint Committee on Taxation and 
Codi&cation of the Tax Laws (Feb. $%!() (unpublished draft), https://uschs.org/wp-
content/uploads/$%!(/%$/USCHS-History-Role-Joint-Committee-Taxation-Yin.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XK,(-J$DS]. 
194 Yin, James Couzens, supra note !*,, at +!#-+,+ (describing the escalating feud that 
included Mellon perhaps accessing Couzens’s con&dential tax information for purposes of attacking 
him, Couzens proposing a Senate investigation that threatened to examine Mellon’s management of 
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and Bureau o-cials attempting to coerce Couzens into paying /!% 
million in alleged back taxes). 
195 Id. at +,+-#$ (explaining that “[d]espite its controversial origins, the Couzens investigation 
ended up playing an important role in de&ning the need for and functions of the JCT”). 
196 Id. at +#+ (citing Revenue Act of $%'): Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Fin., (*th Cong. $!,-
!# (!*$()). 
197 Id. (same). See also Michael A. Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative 
History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, (* TEX. L. REV. +!*, +$*-,% (!**!) (noting the role of 
tax law complexity in giving rise to JCT). 
198 Yin, James Couzens, supra note !*,, at +#*. 
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of !)*%.199 The resulting institution, the JCT and its sta,, quickly became 
essential to Congress’s tax process and remains so today. There is no “tax 
committee” in Congress; instead, JCT provides the tax expertise for the 
House Ways & Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, as 
well as any other committee working on tax-related issues in Congress. As 
one commentator remarked, its Chief at times has exerted “more in.uence 
[on tax legislation] than the President, the Secretary of State, the assistant 
secretary in charge of taxation, [and] the chairmen of the tax-writing 
committees in Congress—separately or combined.”200 The JCT sta, now 
assists Congress at every step of the tax-related legislative process. It 
contributes legal, policy, behavioral, administrative, and economic analysis 
with respect to tax legislation. 
Unlike most committee sta,—but like the other o-ces of the 
congressional bureaucracy—JCT’s nonpartisan sta, serves both chambers of 
Congress and aids all members and committees.201 For example, JCT sta, 
works with members and committees to develop tax policies and then 
collaborates with Legislative Counsel to translate these policies into statutory 
text.202 It also supports the committees at markups, .oor debates, and 
committee meetings, and drafts the legislative history for tax bills.203 It 
prepares summaries of the bill and its proposed amendments at each stage of 
the legislative process, provides hearing testimony and produces “hearing 
pamphlets” that summarize and analyze potential reforms,204 and describes 
the proposals before the committee at markup.205 
If the legislation reaches either chamber .oor, JCT sta, provides an 
o-cial revenue estimate for the legislation—a function analogous to CBO’s 
role on spending legislation.206 At conference committee, the sta, drafts the 
 
199 Revenue Act of !*$(, Pub. L. No. (*-$%, § !$%,, ## Stat. *. 
200 Compare E.W. Kenworthy, Colin F. Stan: A Study in Anonymous Power, in ADVENTURES IN 
PUBLIC SERVICE !%)-%+ (Delia & Ferdinand Kuhn eds., !*(#) with Michael A. Livingston, What’s 
Blue and White and Not Quite as Good as a Committee Report: General Explanations and the Role of 
“Subsequent” Legislative History, !! AM. J. TAX POL’Y *! (!**#) (criticizing extent of JCT power). 
201 About Us—Overview, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, https://www.jct.gov/about-
us/overview.html (last visited Apr. !!, $%$%). 
202 Sta'er Interview. 
203 Joint Committee Role in the Tax Legislative Process, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 




206 Congressional Budget Act of !*)#, as amended by the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
De&cit Control Act of !*+" (commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), Pub L. No. 
!!(-*#, § $%!(f); Congressional Budget Act of !*)#, Pub. L. No. *,-,##, § ,%+, ++ Stat. $*). These 
JCT estimates are calculated by reference to the CBO revenue baseline. Although the cost estimates 
in committee reports for tax bills may nominally be attributed to CBO, they are produced in practice 
by JCT sta'. Sta'er Interview. 
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markup document, conference report, and revenue table.207 At various points 
in the legislative process, JCT also prepares distributional analyses of tax 
provisions,208 generates macroeconomic analysis of tax bills, and analyzes 
these bills’ impact on GDP, unemployment rates, and the budget.209 It also 
ghostwrites committee reports for Ways and Means, Finance and other 
committees insofar as they relate to tax. JCT also supports the Senate Foreign 
Relations committee on treaties. 
Outside the legislative process, JCT sta, also conducts oversight 
functions, including ensuring that the IRS implements federal tax legislation 
in compliance with congressional intent.210 JCT almost never holds hearings 
of its own but, rather, works with partisan sta, on other committees. Certain 
aspects of policy work, we were told, “are viewed by other sta, as JCT 
stu, . . . . You will hear, ‘this is for Joint Tax. Joint Tax will go through 
it.’  . . . They talk with us about their policy. We put together bullet-point 
specs of the bill, then JCT and Legislative Counsel writes the bill.”211 
JCT sta, also publishes the in.uential “Blue Book,” a document “written 
for the tax bar” and widely used by it, that provides explanations of the tax 
legislation enacted by each Congress.212 It also annually produces a 
description of the revenue provisions in the President’s most recent budget 
proposal,213 a tax expenditures budget enumerating spending through tax 
 
207 About Us—Overview, supra note $%!; see also Sta'er Interview. 
208 JOINT COMM. TAXATION, JCX-!-%", OVERVIEW OF REVENUE ESTIMATING 
PROCEDURES AND METHODOLOGIES USED BY THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
TAXATION # ($%%"). 
209 See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, !!(th Cong., Rule XIII.+(b)-(c) 
(outlining the provision on “estimates of major legislation”); Rule XIII.,(h), id. at $(-$) (requiring 
JCT-prepared tax complexity analysis); Publications on Tax Expenditures, JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func1select&id1" [https://perma.cc/D$JB-
FYSG] (last visited Aug. !, $%!*) (containing reports on Tax Expenditures); Sta'er Interview 
(discussing provision of distributional analyses, budgetary analysis, and assessments of impact on 
GDP and unemployment). 
210 See I.R.C. §§ +%$!–+%$, ($%!+). This oversight work includes monitoring the IRS and 
Treasury for compliance with congressional intent, consulting with these agencies to explain such 
intent, reviewing unusually large tax refunds, collaborating with GAO to conduct studies of IRS 
implementation, and conducting speci&c reviews at the request of Members. Id. To this end, the 
Joint Committee has authority to hold hearings, issue subpoenas, and take testimony under oath. 
See id. 
211 Sta'er Interview. 
212 Sta'er Interview. In the development of the Blue Book, JCT sta' consult with Treasury, 
the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, and the IRS. Sta'er 
Interview. 
213 Description of the President’s Budget Proposals, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func1select&id1) [https://perma.cc/,JBA-P(L$] (last 
visited Aug. !, $%!*). 
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subsidies,214 and an annual overview of expiring tax provisions, among other 
materials.215 
These published materials notwithstanding, JCT sta, interacts with 
members and sta, con+dentially.216 Much like CBO, JCT sta, will develop 
revenue estimates for early tax proposals, and it will collaborate with 
members to assist them in developing bills to reach members’ revenue goals. 
As part of its routine work, the sta, receives approximately %,&&& to ',&&& 
requests from members each year, the majority of which are requests for 
revenue estimates, and all of which are con+dential unless released by the 
member.217 As JCT sta, put it, “revenue estimates are part of our routine 
work because revenue estimates are bound up in design of provisions; 
members care about budgetary e,ects. It’s part of the policy design.”218 
Under its statutory authorization (now located in the Internal Revenue 
Code),219 JCT can appoint the Chief of Sta, and additional sta,.220 In 
practice, the Chief of Sta, is selected alternately by the chair of the House 
or Senate committee with jurisdiction over tax issues (with the other chair 
assenting), and the Chief of Sta, selects all additional committee sta,.221 
Currently, JCT has sixty-nine sta, members, and while its organic statute 
does not mandate that hiring of sta, (or Chief of Sta,) be conducted in a 
nonpartisan manner, in practice the JCT explicitly seeks “nonpartisan legal 
professionals” and economists when hiring.222 
 
214 Pub. L. No. **-!)), § $), (codi&ed at $ U.S.C. § (%!(f) ($%!+)) (requiring CBO use of JCT 
estimates for revenue e'ects); Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act Of !*)#, Pub. 
L. No. *,-,##, § ,%!(e)($)(E), ++ Stat. $*) (requiring tax expenditures budget); see also JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-""-!*, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL 
YEARS $%!*-$%$, at $, n. # ($%!*) (explaining JCT production of tax expenditures for CBO 
publication). 
215 See Expiring Provisions, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func1select&id1!% [https://perma.cc/WJG+-PQHY] (last 
visited Aug. !, $%!*) (containing publications of Expiring Provisions). 
216 See Sta'er Interview (“[W]e treat all our work for members as con&dential . . . .”). 
217 Joint Committee Revenue Estimation Process, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
https://www.jct.gov/about-us/revenue-estimating.html [https://perma.cc/#LGN-MFLB] (last 
visited Aug. !, $%!*). 
218 Sta'er Interview. 
219 $( U.S.C. § +%%!, et seq. ($%!+). 
220 Id. at § +%%#. 
221 John M. Samuels, The Joint Committee Sta'—From the Outside Looking In " 
(unpublished manuscript) (Feb. $%!() (on &le with authors) (explaining that the “Chief of Sta' is 
selected by the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Taxation,” which rotates between the Chairmen 
of House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, and that the “Chief of Sta' is an 
experienced and highly respected tax lawyer or economist and is responsible for hiring and managing 
the rest of the JCT Sta' ”). 
222 See About Us, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, https://www.jct.gov/about-us/overview.html 
[https://perma.cc/YMX)-KF#M] (last visited Aug. !, $%!*) (describing itself as a nonpartisan 
committee); Current Sta!, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, https://www.jct.gov/about-us/current-
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F. O!ces of the Parliamentarians 
“We are the procedural navigators. Our knowledge isn’t replicated 
anywhere else.” 
The Parliamentarians’ O-ces are each chamber’s “keeper of the 
precedents”; they have responsibility for collecting, maintaining, and 
knowing volumes of congressional procedural history.223 Even prior to the 
creation of the Parliamentarians’ O-ces, Congress relied on nonpartisan 
experts for procedural guidance. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
chamber clerks and messengers assisted members with .oor procedures and 
provide point-of-order clari+cations.224 The work of these informal advisors, 
combined with the procedural knowledge of the members themselves, was 
su-cient for many decades to “keep some semblance of uniformity” in each 
chamber, as one Parliamentarian has put it.225 
By the !)*&s, however, the emergent committee system had channeled 
members away from the chamber .oors, particularly in the House, and thus 
reduced their familiarity with their own procedures.226 The new institution 
of Parliamentarians’ O-ces—created by the House in !)*' and by in the 
Senate in !)$"—was to compensate for the diminution in member procedural 
knowledge and save members from having to master procedural rules.227 
Freeing up members to focus more on substantive policymaking, it was 
thought, would empower Congress to better resist executive encroachments 
 
sta'.html [https://perma.cc/"LA+-"""P] (last visited Aug. !, $%!*) (providing a list of current sta' 
members); Jobs at JCT, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func1startdown&id1!!), [https://perma.cc/)NPE-MA+*] 
(last visited Aug. !, $%!*); Sta'er Interview (discussing the importance of candidates not touting 
partisan background). 
223 Sta'er Interview. 
224 See James I. Wallner, Parliamentary Rule: The U.S. Senate Parliamentarian and Institutional 
Constraints on Legislator Behavior, $% J. LEG. STUD. ,+%, ,++ ($%!#) (“The clerk advised the presiding 
o-cer and individual members on parliamentary questions using compilations such as Gilfry’s 
Precedents to assist them in this e'ort.”); Parliamentarians of the House, OFFICE OF THE HOUSE 
HISTORIAN, https://history.house.gov/People/O-ce/Parliamentarians/ [https://perma.cc/$#$K-
"YUZ] (last visited May !$, $%$%) (describing the history of the Parliamentarians of the House); see 
also FLOYD M. RIDDICK, SENATE PARLIAMENTARIAN !*#)-!*)#, ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS (!-
($ (!*)+), http://senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Riddick_interview_,.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J#SD-#LUG] (noting that “in the !+%%’s some clerk tried to keep the presiding 
o-cer advised as to the practices and precedents of the Senate”). 
225 See RIDDICK, supra note $$#, at ($. 
226 See Gould, supra note !(, at !*(# (“The proliferation of committees meant that legislators 
began to spend less time on the .oor, and, consequently, they developed less individual knowledge 
of parliamentary procedure.”); Sta'er Interviews. 
227 Gould, supra note !(, at !*(# (noting years of creation and that o-ces were created in 
response to Members ”develop[ing] less individual knowledge of parliamentary procedure” than in 
prior years). 
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into such policymaking.228 Moreover, members wanted a professional 
parliamentarian to play an internal separating powers role—namely, to curb 
the increasing consolidation of procedural power in both chambers, as was 
occurring under Speaker Joseph “Boss” Cannon in the House229 and under 
Vice President John Nance Garner in the Senate.230 
The initial use of the Parliamentarians’ O-ces to disperse power within 
Congress has continued to shape the o-ces’ work. For instance, the 
Parliamentarians’ adjudicatory function is separated from the legislative 
leadership; they will issue rulings that accord with chamber precedent even 
if at odds with leadership preferences. A distinct Parliamentarian’s O-ce for 
each chamber, accomplished in their separate establishment and continuing 
into the present, further disperses power in Congress. This separation is 
largely the product of an internal form of separation of powers mandated by 
the Constitution. Article I, Section " provides that “Each House may 
determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”231 As a result, each chamber has 
amassed a distinct body of rules and precedents. 
But the two Parliamentarians’ O-ces exist upon di,erent legal 
foundations. The House Parliamentarian’s O-ce is statutorily authorized by 
the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act for !)'(.232 By contrast, the Senate 
Parliamentarian’s O-ce has never been given separate statutory 
authorization; instead it operates as a chamber appointment under the 
authority of the Secretary of the Senate, technically sitting beneath the 
Secretary.233 As a result, while federal statute provides that the House 
 
228 See Michael S. Lynch & Anthony J. Madonna, Procedural Uncertainty, the 
Parliamentarian, and Questions of Order in the United States Senate !!-!$ (unpublished 
manuscript), http://spia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/ajmadonn/Parliamentarian.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/*SNY-"Y+A] (arguing that the long-term gains from avoiding inter-party 
procedural con.ict were worth “sacri&c[ing] the short-term partisan gains resulting from a favorable 
ruling”). For the argument that procedural and precedential sophistication itself helps buttress 
legislative power against executive encroachments, see CHAFETZ, supra note ,$, at $)!. 
229 Gould, supra note !(, at !*(,; see also CHAFETZ, supra note ,$, at $++; DAVID C. KING, 
TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION +) (!**)). 
230 See Timothy Noah, Romancing the Parliamentarian, SLATE (Sept. $, $%%*, ):!% PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/$%%*/%*/romancing-alan-frumin-the-senate-
parliamentarian.html [https://perma.cc/MK#C-$EVK] (noting that the Senate parliamentarian was 
“created in !*," in revolt against John Nance Garner”). 
231 U.S. CONST. art. I, § ". 
232 Pub. L. No. *"-*# §!!", *! Stat. (",, ((+ (!*))) (providing that “House Resolution "%$, 
Ninety-&fth Congress, relating to the establishment and administration of the O-ce of the 
Parliamentarian, shall be the permanent law with respect thereto”). 
233 $ U.S.C. § (",!, et seq. ($%!+); see also VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RS$%"##, THE OFFICE OF THE PARLIAMENTARIAN IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE $ ($%!+) 
(explaining that “[o]rganizationally, the o-ce of the Senate Parliamentarian is within the o-ce of 
the Secretary of the Senate”); UNITED STATES SENATE, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/brie&ng/secretary_senate.htm (last visited 
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Parliamentarian will be appointed by the House Speaker and chosen “without 
reference to political a-liations,” no comparable statute provides for the 
method of selecting the Senate Parliamentarian.234 In practice, however, both 
chambers have selected Parliamentarians via internal promotions of existing 
employees—the last three new Senate Parliamentarians, for example, each 
began the job with an average of over a dozen years’ work experience in the 
o-ce before assuming its leadership.235 The selection of the Senate 
Parliamentarian typically is made by the Senate Majority Leader.236 Although 
the Senate Parliamentarian has occasionally been removed for politically-
motivated reasons,237 each successor has resisted partisan pressure,238 and the 
Senate Parliamentarian has in recent years survived partisan turnover.239 
As the smallest of Congress’s nonpartisan institutions, the Senate o-ce 
currently employs just two attorneys and one clerk, and the House o-ce 
employs six attorneys and two clerks. The House o-ce maintains one 
subsidiary o-ce, the O-ce of Compilation of Precedents.240 Both o-ces 
publish a number of materials related to chamber rules and precedents.241 
The Parliamentarians make procedural recommendations on 
consequential matters. First, they make committee referral decisions for each 
 
May !$, $%$%) (explaining that “[a]mong other Senate .oor sta' who report to the secretary are the 
parliamentarian”). 
234 $ U.S.C. § $+)a ($%!+). 
235 See Gould, supra note !(, at $%%(; see also Brian Palmer, So, You Want to Be a Parliamentarian?, 
SLATE (Mar. !+, $%!%), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/$%!%/%,/how-to-become-the-senate-
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histories of various Parliamentarians). 
236 See ANDREA C. HATCHER, MAJORITY LEADERSHIP IN THE U.S. SENATE ,$ ($%!%) 
(outlining Majority Leader’s selection of Parliamentarian and other Senate o-ce heads). 
237 See id. (describing the change of Parliamentarians that accompanied changes of party 
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change of Parliamentarians by Lott). 
238 See STUART ALTMAN & DAVID SHACTMAN, POWER, POLITICS, AND UNIVERSAL 
HEALTH CARE ,!)-$% ($%!!) (describing Parliamentarians installed after removal subsequently 
issuing rulings frustrating the installing majority). 
239 See Gould, supra note !(, at !**) n.$,,-,# (discussing Parliamentarians’ survival of party 
turnover); id. at #$-#, (same). 
240 See Parliamentarian of the House, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
https://www.house.gov/the-house-explained/o-cers-and-organizations/parliamentarian-of-the-
house [https://perma.cc/)G"+-ZYCR] (last visited Aug. +, $%!*) (noting that the O-ce of 
Compilation of Precedents is a subsidiary of the O-ce of the Parliamentarian). 
241 The House O-ce publishes the House Rules and Manual; House Practice; Precedents of the 
U.S. House of Representatives; and How Our Laws Are Made. Id. The Senate O-ce periodically 
publishes Standing Rules of the Senate, and it also publishes Riddick’s Senate Procedure. See 
HEITSHUSEN, supra note $,,, at !. 
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introduced bill—referrals that determine the allocation of power across 
congressional committees (and often a bill’s chance of success). Committee 
referrals are high stakes and often hotly contested decisions within 
Congress.242 The o-ces handle approximately ten thousand referrals over the 
course of each Congress.243 
Second, the House Parliamentarian makes important determinations on 
the “germaneness” (and hence allowability) of proposed amendments to bills. 
Under the germaneness rule, an amendment must address the same subject 
as the matter being amended. While the rule itself is a single sentence, it has 
generated “thousands of precedents.”244 
Third, because budget reconciliation bills cannot be filibustered in the 
Senate, they are an increasingly popular mode of legislating in times of intense 
partisan gridlock. The Senate Parliamentarian has the authority through 
application of the so-called “Byrd rule” to determine which bills comply with 
six important budgetary rules that must be met to satisfy the conditions for 
reconciliation.245 Analogous fast-track procedures existing in current law also 
are providing fertile new battlegrounds for procedural battles.246 
To advise Congress on the application of these and other rules, the o-ces 
perform both public and private functions. In their public-facing role, 
members of the o-ce will advise the presiding o-cer of a chamber on the 
correct responses to procedural issues that arise in real-time on the chamber 
 
242 See generally KING, supra note $$* (explaining how jurisdictional areas for committees are 
created and changed in Congress); Bressman & Gluck, supra note !, at )$+, )#+; Sta'er Interview. 
243 See Gould, supra note !(, at !*(* (noting that the parliamentarians’ o-ces “process all of 
the new bills that are introduced, totaling roughly ten thousand in each Congress”). 
244 RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, !!(th Cong., Rule XVI()); see also 
CHARLES W. JOHNSON, JOHN V. SULLIVAN & THOMAS J.WICKHAM, JR., HOUSE PRACTICE "#,–
(%$ ($%!)) (discussing how the germaneness rule “has been interpreted through thousands of 
precedents since its adoption”); Sta'er Interview. 
245 $ U.S.C. § (## ($%!+). A provision is de&ned as “extraneous” if it: 
a) does not produce a change in outlays or revenues; 
b) produces an increase in outlays or decrease in revenues that does not follow the reconciliation 
instructions in the budget resolution; 
c) is not in the jurisdiction of the committee that reported the provision; 
d) produces changes in outlays or revenues that are merely incidental to the non-budgetary 
components of the provision; 
e) increases the de&cit in any &scal year after the period speci&ed in the budget resolution; 
f) recommends changes to Social Security. 
246 See Gould, supra note !(, at !*(! nn.#"-#); see also "% U.S.C. §§ !"##–!"#( ($%!+) (describing 
special procedures for the War Powers Resolution); IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL,,)#,, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE 
POLICY ($%!") (explaining how Congress has granted the President fast-track authority with trade 
agreements). 
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.oor.247 In private, they also deliver advice through consultations with 
members and their sta,s in advance of a bill’s consideration on the .oor. 
Procedural recommendations by the Parliamentarians’ O-ces carry no 
inherent, binding authority over members. Chamber rules bestow the 
presiding o-cer in each chamber with the power to make procedural 
rulings—and custom alone dictates that, in making these rulings, the 
presiding o-cer follow the recommendations of the relevant 
Parliamentarian’s O-ce.248 Nonetheless, these recommendations are almost 
always followed by the presiding o-cer—and the presiding o-cer’s ruling, 
in turn, is almost never appealed or overturned by a chamber majority, 
especially in the House.249 (A notable, modern exception has occurred in the 
context of the “nuclear option,” which we further detail in the notes250 and in 
Part II). 
G. Government Accountability O!ce (GAO) 
“The committees of Congress have no way of getting down to the actual 
facts	.	.	.	we have no check at all.” 
 
247 See HEITSHUSEN, supra note $,,, at ! (noting that the parliamentarians may “convey their 
advice verbally to the presiding Representative or Senator—for example, when that Member needs 
to respond to a parliamentary inquiry or rule on a point of order”). 
248 See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, !!(th Cong., Rule I(") (providing that 
“[t]he Speaker shall decide all questions of order, subject to appeal by a Member, Delegate, or 
Resident Commissioner”); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, !!(th Cong., Rule 
XII($) (discussing the procedures for receiving and referring bills, resolutions, and other matters); 
FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. !%!-$+, 
at *+* (Alan S. Frumin, ed., rev. ed. !**$). 
249 See Email from Former Sta'er to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Jan. $(, $%$%) (on &le with 
authors); see also Gould, supra note !(, at !*)( n.!$", $%%%. 
250 The “nuclear option” is a method to require only a simple majority for the Senate to act. 
The procedural obstacle to this is Senate Rule XXII, which requires a two-thirds vote to modify 
chamber rules. Under the “nuclear option,” a complex series of procedural maneuvers can allow 
Senators to raise a point of order that reinterprets the rule as requiring only a bare majority for some 
or all such matters, and to raise it on a question (viz., a cloture motion) that, because non-debatable, 
itself requires only a simple majority. Through a ruling of the chair supporting this point of order, 
or a Senate vote to overturn a ruling of the chair, this reinterpretation is then upheld as binding 
precedent, even if in plain contradiction of the rule it ostensibly interprets. See VALERIE 
HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R##+!*, SENATE PROCEEDINGS ESTABLISHING 
MAJORITY CLOTURE FOR SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS: IN BRIEF ! ($%!)) (explaining that 
the “‘nuclear option’ . . . require[s] actions arguably at variances with established principles 
underlying Senate procedure”); Li Zhou, Senate Republicans Have O"cially Gone “Nuclear” in Order 
to Con#rm More Trump Judges, VOX (Apr. ,, $%!*), https://www.vox.com/$%!*/#/$/!+$+(**!/senate-
republicans-nuclear-option-rules [https://perma.cc/AL"X-Z+)L] (detailing how Senate Republicans 
have gone “nuclear” and changed Senate rules so they can con&rm Trump nominees more 
expeditiously). 
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GAO is the “congressional watchdog.”251 It is easily the largest of the 
nonpartisan institutions, with a whopping $,&&& employees (once as many as 
!",&&&!) spread across its Washington, D.C. headquarters and eleven +eld 
o-ces.252 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, responsibility for the 
auditing and oversight of federal expenditures belonged to the Comptroller 
of the Treasury. In the debate over the legislation that ultimately would create 
GAO, the bill’s sponsor, Representative James W. Good, shared a story 
highlighting his concern for the Comptroller’s executive-branch dependence: 
[T]he President desired to use a certain appropriation for a given purpose, 
and was told by his Comptroller of the Treasury, who happened to be a little 
independent of this system, that he could not do it. But the President insisted 
and !nally said, “I must have that fund, and if I can not change the opinion 
of my comptroller, I can change my comptroller.” With less independence all 
comptrollers, no matter to which political party they owe allegiance, have 
been forced to face the same practical situation.253 
In !)*&, Congress passed a bill to create a new o-ce to address the 
Comptroller’s independence and relocate the auditing and oversight 
functions from the executive branch. President Wilson vetoed it, claiming the 
bill’s provisions allowing Congress to remove the new Comptroller General 
through concurrent resolution or to impeach were unconstitutional. But 
members continued to voice displeasure with the Comptroller’s relationship 
to the executive. Representative Good again explained: 
We believe that the Committee on Appropriations and the committees on 
expenditures and on revenue that are investigating matters under their 
jurisdiction should have at all times something more than an ex parte 
statement with regard to expenditures.	.	.	.	Every bureau chief who is worth 
anything wants his department to grow	.	.	.	.	So year after year they come and 
ask for new activities and additional money to perform those activities, and 
most frequently Congress and the committees of Congress have no way of 
getting down to the actual facts, except as we dig them out from an unwilling 
witness, a witness naturally unwilling because he wants the money, and in his 
attempt to get the money will cover up all the defects of his o*ce, all the 
 
251 About GAO: Overview, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, https://www.gao.gov/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/PA,B-DA(E] (last visited Aug. !, $%!*). 
252 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-!+-!SP, SERVING THE CONGRESS AND 
THE NATION: STRATEGIC PLAN $%!+-$%$, !$ ($%!+), (noting that GAO is comprised of 
approximately ,,%%% employees). 
253 () CONG. REC. *+$ (May ,, !*$!) (statement of Rep. Good). 
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shortcomings of his organization, simply to get the appropriation for his 
department. We have no check at all upon this method.254 
With the Budget and Accounting Act of !)*!, Congress proposed a 
“General Accounting O-ce” to address these concerns. The statute charged 
the o-ce to “investigate, at the seat of government or elsewhere, all matters 
relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds” and to 
“make such investigations and reports as shall be ordered by either House of 
Congress or by any committee of either House having jurisdiction over 
revenue, appropriations, or expenditures.”255 The Act allowed for removal of 
the Comptroller by joint resolution or impeachment.256 
Describing this proposed o-ce, Representative Jo Byrns remarked: “The 
[proposed] comptroller general is the representative of Congress. He does 
not represent the Executive in any sense of the word, and the whole idea of 
the Budget Committee was to make him absolutely and completely 
independent of the Executive.”257 Representative Simeon Fess similarly 
explained: “This bill removes from the spending department the right to 
audit its own books . . . .”258 And the House committee report for the Act 
expressly discussed the o-ce’s role in the separation of powers, observing 
that: 
The Executive having the power to initiate the budget, certainly an 
independent audit is necessary to insure at all times a businesslike execution 
of the budget.	.	.	.	The creation of this o*ce will, it is seen, serve as a check, 
not only on useless expenditures but will keep the bureau more keenly alive 
to a rigid performance of its duties and obligations.259 
Nonetheless, to secure the signature of the new President, Warren G. 
Harding, the bill made compromises. GAO would also have some 
independence from Congress; its head, the Comptroller General, would be 
appointed by the President (with Senate advice and consent).260 GAO’s 
creation ultimately came as part of a larger set of tradeo,s with the executive 
 
254 Id. 
255 The Budget and Accounting Act of !*$!, Pub. L. No. ()-!, § ,!$, #$ Stat. $%. 
256 This removal power would become central to the Court’s conclusion in Bowsher v. Synar 
that GAO belonged to the legislative branch. See #)+ U.S. )!#, )$) (!*+() (“The critical factor lies 
in the provisions of the statute de&ning the Comptroller General’s o-ce relating to removability.”). 
257 () CONG. REC. !%+! (May ", !*$!) (statement of Rep. Byrns). 
258 () CONG. REC. *)) (May ,, !*$!) (statement of Rep. Fess). 
259 NATIONAL BUDGET SYSTEM: REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, 
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TO ACCOMPANY H. R. ,%, at )-+ (!*$!). 
260 See ROGER R. TRASK, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/OP-,-HP, GAO HISTORY: 
!*$!-!**!, at , (!**!) (“The congressional debate led to a consensus that the functions of the 
Comptroller General were semijudicial and that his independence, like that of judicial o-cials, 
should be assured.”). 
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over power, including over the budget. The bill creating GAO also required 
the President to submit an annual budget proposal (thereby entrusting 
budgetary planning to the President) and established the Bureau of the 
Budget, later renamed the O-ce of Management and Budget (thereby 
entrusting budgetary analysis to the President).261 As one historian wrote, 
“Many congressmen, probably most, viewed the independent audit as the 
‘quid pro quo’ for instituting an executive budget.”262 
GAO’s early work focused mostly on clerical review of “vouchers”—forms 
used by executive branch o-cials to document expenditure details.263 By the 
!)#&s, however, GAO supervised the creation and holistic auditing of 
accounting systems in administrative agencies.264 Congress also reasserted its 
control over the o-ce, declaring it o-cially part of the legislative branch in 
!)#"265 and giving it additional powers to oversee executive branch 
implementation of the budget.266 In !)#%, GAO’s workforce consisted of 
nearly !",&&& employees.267 
By the !)'&s, Congress had more than tripled GAO’s budget and, in the 
!)'& Legislative Reorganization Act, mandated that it carry out full-.edged 
“program evaluation.”268 The o-ce transitioned from hiring only accountants 
to hiring scientists, policy specialists, and technical experts to aid in its 
modern mission of monitoring the substance and e,ectiveness (rather than 
just the accounting) of executive programs.269 The !))&s’ Republican 
 
261 See supra notes !$#-$" and accompanying text. 
262 FREDERICK C. MOSHER, THE GAO: THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT #* (!*)*). 
263 See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO: WORKING FOR GOOD 
GOVERNMENT SINCE !*$!, at $ ($%%!), 
https://www.gao.gov/pdfs/about/GAO%$%Working%$%for%$%Good%$%Government%$%Since%$%
!*$!.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ#"-YBBK]. 
264 See MOSHER, supra note $($, at !$!-$$ (noting that “GAO established o-ces within the 
various agencies to carry on what were then called comprehensive audits”). 
265 Reorganization Act of !*#", Pub. L. No. $(,, § ), "* Stat. (!, (asserting that “the 
Comptroller General of the United States [and] the General Accounting O-ce . . . are a part of the 
legislative branch of the Government”); see also MOSHER, supra note $($, at !%#-%" (discussing that 
in enacting the Reorganization Act of !*#", “Congress not only exempted the Comptroller General 
and the GAO from presidential authority but also described them as ‘a part of the legislative branch 
of the government’”). 
266 Legislative Reorganization Act of !*#(, Pub. L. No. )*-(%!, § $%(, (% Stat. +!$, +,) 
(authorizing and directing GAO to conduct “expenditure analysis of each agency in the executive 
branch . . . to determine whether public funds have been economically and e-ciently administered 
and expended”). 
267 See id. at !$# (highlighting that “GAO had reached a peak of almost !",%%% in !*#(”). 
268 MOSHER, supra note $($, at !)(. 
269 See GAO: WORKING FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT SINCE !*$!, supra note $(, at !+ (“In the 
!*)%s, GAO started recruiting physical scientists, social scientists, computer professionals, and 
experts in such &elds as health care, public policy, and information management.”). The Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act, passed in !*+", additionally gave the Comptroller authority to bind the 
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Revolution signi+cantly pared back GAO’s budget and personnel, 
inaugurating its transition away from work initiated by GAO itself—and 
instead mostly toward congressionally initiated projects.270 However, GAO 
remains the largest nonpartisan congressional institution.271 
Present-day GAO oversees and evaluates federal programs and federal 
expenditures,272 and undertakes traditional +nancial audits to ensure that 
agencies are spending funds in an e-cient manner.273 A broader range of 
investigations also fall within the o-ce’s ambit, including examining 
redundancies in federal programs and possible illegalities.274 GAO issues 
legal decisions addressing issues of appropriations law—i.e., the body of laws 
governing agencies’ use of and accountability for public funds.275 The 
majority of GAO’s studies, investigations, and legal decisions now result from 
speci+c congressional requests, although it retains latitude to undertake 
 
President to reduce federal spending for de&cit-reduction purposes, but the Supreme Court struck 
down this arrangement in Bowsher v. Synar, #)+ U.S. )!# (!*+(). 
270 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Auditing Politics or Political Auditing (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley 
Pub. Law Research, Paper No. *(#("(, $%%)) (manuscript at (), 
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Sweetland Edwards, The Big Lobotomy, WASH. MONTHLY (Summer $%!#), 
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budget cuts). See also Walker v. Cheney, $,% F.Supp.$d "! (D.D.C. $%%$) (challenging GAO’s 
authority to issue demand letters of executive agencies); Walker v. Cheney: District Court Decision and 
Related Statutory and Constitutional Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. ($%%#) (explaining role of Walker 
regarding GAO’s continued demand letter authority); T. J. Halstead, “The Law: Walker v. Cheney”: 
Legal Insulation of the Vice President from GAO Investigations, ,, PRES. STUD. Q. (," ($%%,) (same). 
271 See BROOKINGS, VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS tbl."-+, !+ ($%!*) (listing the number 
of GAO employees at almost ,,%%% while listing the Congressional Budget O-ce and Congressional 
Research Service as having $," and (%*, respectively). For sta' numbers of all the nonpartisan 
congressional o-ces, see infra Table !. 
272 Today, its primary work is conducting of “performance audits,” whereby the O-ce 
examines whether government programs are meeting their objectives. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF., GAO AT A GLANCE ($%!*), 
https://www.gao.gov/pdfs/about/gao_at_a_glance_$%!*_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQ+#-
MARX] (noting that “GAO examines how taxpayer dollars are spent”); see also Gene L. Dodaro, 
The Work of the U.S. Government Accountability O"ce on Contemporary Issues, $( RES. ACCT. REG. !,$, 
!,+ ($%!#) (noting that “[m]ost” GAO work is “performance audits in which we are trying to improve 
the e'ectiveness and e-ciency of federal programs and activities”). 
273 See ALISSA M. DOLAN, ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, RL,%$#%, 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL +$ ($%!#) (stating one of GAO’s goals is “auditing agency 
operations to determine whether federal funds are being spent e-ciently and e'ectively”). 
274 See id. (reporting GAO’s goals of identifying “opportunities to address duplication, overlap, 
waste or ine-ciencies in the use of public funds” and “investigating allegations of illegal and 
improper activities”). 
275 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-%(-!%(#SP, PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES 
FOR LEGAL DECISIONS AND OPINIONS ($%%() (outlining procedures and practices for legal 
decisions and opinions of the Comptroller General). 
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audits, investigations, and legal decisions at its own behest.276 A recent, 
prominent example—at the center of e,orts to impeach President Trump—
was GAO’s determination that OMB violated the Impoundment Control Act 
when it withheld Ukrainian military aid that had been appropriated by 
Congress. The decision stated: “GAO’s role under the ICA—to provide 
information and legal analysis to Congress as it performs oversight of 
executive activity—is essential to ensuring respect for and allegiance to 
Congress’ constitutional power of the purse.”277 
GAO also submits policy recommendations for legislative action to 
Congress.278 These proposals can include recommendations that Congress 
enter into entirely new areas of legislation.279 The congressional solicitation 
of these recommendations is not simply pro forma—Congress regularly acts 
on GAO’s recommendations. In *&!(, for example, Congress adopted GAO’s 
recommendations to direct the Veterans Health Administration to research 
overmedication, update the Department of Defense’s prescription drug 
buying programs, and develop “performance metrics” on border security for 
the Department of Homeland Security.280 
The head of GAO is still known as the Comptroller General and is still 
appointed by the President and subject to Senate con+rmation,281 now after 
a congressional commission recommends a list of at least three possible 
candidates to the President.282 Although it is unclear whether the President 
is required to choose a name from the provided list, all three Comptrollers 
General selected since the institution of this process have been so selected.283 
 
276 See ,! U.S.C. § )!)(b) ($%!+) (requiring the Comptroller General to evaluate government 
programs “on the initiative of the Comptroller General”); Sta'er Interview (stating that, today, *"% 
of work is done at request of committee chairs and ranking members). In &scal year $%!+, GAO 
received requests from *%% of the standing committees. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-
!*-#%,T, FISCAL YEAR $%$% BUDGET REQUEST $) ($%!*) (reporting standing committee 
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277 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., B-,,!"(#, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET—
WITHHOLDING OF UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE * ($%$%). 
278 Reports & Testimonies: Recommendations Database, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
https://www.gao.gov/reports-testimonies/recommendations-database/ (last visited Apr. !$, $%$%) 
(collecting recommendations GAO makes to Congress). 
279 See Sta'er Interview (noting that “sometimes [GAO] recommend[s] Congress to step into 
a completely new area”). 
280 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-!*-!SP, GAO PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT $%!+, at $-, ($%!+) (listing GAO recommendations that Congress 
adopted). 
281 ,! U.S.C. § )%,(a)(!) ($%!+). 
282 Id. at ($)–(,). 
283 See FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL,%,#*, GAO: GOVERNMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE AND GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE $! ($%%+) (“On the two 
occasions since the !*+% enactment when a vacancy in the o-ce of Comptroller General arose, 
Presidents Reagan in !*+! and Clinton in !**+ each selected a nominee from the initial congressional 
list.”); About GAO: Comptroller General: Biography, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
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The Comptroller General is still considered a legislative o-ce because only 
Congress can remove it,284 and the person heading this position serves a non-
renewable term of +fteen years. 
GAO’s main work products are detailed reports, which typically range 
from !& to !&& pages in length.285 The o-ce also issues a “high-risk list,” which 
notes federal programs that GAO believes are susceptible to signi+cant 
+nancial loss.286 Among other things, it also publishes its “Red Book,” an 
in.uential guide to appropriations law and rulings cited numerous times by 
the federal courts, including this past term by the Supreme Court.287 With 
respect to its analyses and methodology, the o-ce’s work is structured by 
transparency. GAO publishes nearly all of its reports and studies for public 
consumption—even if members of Congress would prefer the reports to be 
suppressed.288 
GAO carries out a variety of additional responsibilities less immediately 
tied to the legislative process. Each year, it adjudicates thousands of bid 
protests—challenges to awards or solicitations of government contracts.289 
Per the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, the Comptroller General noti+es 
Congress, the President, and the O-ce of Personnel Management if an acting 
o-cial has served longer than the *!&-day allowance without o-cial 
appointment and con+rmation.290 Congress also periodically requests GAO 
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programs where they think Congress is at risk of high loss”). 
287 Its o-cial name is Principles of Federal Appropriations Law. The Red Book, GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/legal/red-book/overview [https://perma.cc/EDB*-
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288 See Sta'er Interview (noting that most of the work of GAO is available to public). The 
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of intelligence community. Id. 
289 Bid Protests at GAO: A Descriptive Guide, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE at !, # (May 
$%!+), https://www.gao.gov/assets/)%%/(*!"*(.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z+UM-DK*)] (providing an 
overview of the bid protests); see also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-!+-"!%SP, BID 
PROTESTS AT GAO: A DESCRIPTIVE GUIDE, at ! ($%!+) (noting that in the $%!+ &scal year, GAO 
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290 See GAO PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT $%!+, supra note $+%, at #) 
(stating that the Federal Vacancies Reform Act “requires the Comptroller General to report to the 
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views (in the form of legal opinions) assessing whether the Congressional 
Review Act applies to certain agency actions.291 
In +scal year *&!(, GAO “received '(% requests for work from the 
standing committees of the Congress, . . . issued %$$ reports[,] and made 
!,%"& recommendations.” 292 Senior GAO o-cials testi+ed ninety-eight times 
before forty-eight separate committees or subcommittees. According to 
GAO, agencies implemented seventy-seven percent of GAO’s 
recommendations in +scal year *&!( (an increase from seventy-three percent 
in +scal year *&!%).293 
GAO sta,, in interviews, repeatedly volunteered that the o-ce’s primary 
role continues to be safeguarding “Congress’s constitutional prerogatives.”294 
H. MedPAC and MACPAC 
“Each of them are incredibly necessary, so that you take the decision-making 
and put it in the hands of professionals and take it out of the hands of 
Congress and the lobbyists.” 
MedPAC and MACPAC likewise had their origins in congressional 
distrust of executive-branch administration. Like JCT, MedPAC and 
MACPAC stand out as nonpartisan institutions designed to support 
Congress in areas of particular policy and +nancial import in which the 
executive had become dominant. In this sense, they perform a specialized 
version of the kind of work that GAO also sometimes performs in other 
subject-matter areas. 
But the history of MedPAC and MACPAC also illustrates a more modern 
story of interest group encroachment as another, and growing, threat to 
congressional autonomy that the congressional bureaucracy may guard 
against. In the early !)(&s, Congress grew distrustful of the Health Care 
Financing Administration (the predecessor to the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services that administered these federal health care programs in 
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293 See Id. at $$ (“We fell short of our target of +% percent for past recommendations 
implemented by , percentage points, at )) percent . . . .”). 
294 Sta'er Interview. 
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the executive branch).295 This distrust moved Congress to create two 
Medicare advisory commissions. The +rst, the Prospective Payment 
Assessment Commission (ProPAC), was created in !)($ to advise Congress 
on Medicare payment policies for hospitals.296 The second, the Physician 
Payment Review Commission (PPRC), was created in !)(% to assist Congress 
on Medicare payment policies for physicians.297 In the Balanced Budget Act 
of !))', Congress merged these advisory commissions into MedPAC—an 
entity that retained the label of “commission” but that, unlike most 
congressional commissions, had no statutory expiration date.298 Building on 
the model provided by MedPAC, Congress established MACPAC in the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of *&&)299 and 
provided it with funding (and expand its mandate) under the Patient 
Protection and A,ordable Care Act.300 
Lobbyists were also a cause for concern. Describing the impetus behind 
the creation of MedPAC, CRS chronicled: “Congress [by creating MedPAC] 
was able to obtain its own source of objective expertise on Medicare payment 
policy and bu,er members of Congress from pressures from interest 
 
295 See HOLLY STOCKDALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R#%*!", AN OVERVIEW OF 
PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OR BOARD IN MEDICARE " ($%$%), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R#%*!" [https://perma.cc/UDT*-,U"Z] (noting 
that the two advisory commissions that would be merged to form MedPAC “were established, at 
least in part, because Congress had become increasingly distrustful of the executive branch and 
HCFA” and operated to “bu'er members of Congress from pressures from interest groups”). 
296 See Social Security Act Amendments of !*+,, Pub. L. No. *+-$!, § (%!, *) Stat. (" (creating 
the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission). 
297 See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of !*+", Pub. L. No. **-$)$, § *,%", 
!%% Stat. +$ (creating the Physician Payment Review Commission); see also Thomas R. Oliver, 
Analysis, Advice, and Congressional Leadership: The Physician Payment Review Commission and the Politics 
of Medicare, !+ J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. !!,, !#$-!"$ (!**,) (detailing PPRC establishment, role 
in !*+* Medicare reform, and role in providing congressional autonomy from executive). 
298 On MedPAC as merging of ProPAC and PPRC, see Balanced Budget Act, Pub. L. !%"–,,, 
§ "%$$(c), !!! Stat. $"! (!**)) (stating that “[t]he MedPAC shall be responsible for the preparation 
and submission of reports required by law to be submitted . . . by the ProPAC and the PPRC, and, 
for this purpose, any reference in law to either such Commission is deemed, after the appointment 
of the MedPAC, to refer to the MedPAC”). On congressional advisory commissions, see JACOB R. 
STRAUS & WILLIAM T. EGAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R#%%)(, CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMISSIONS: OVERVIEW AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS , ($%!*), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R#%%)( [https://perma.cc/V+S#-TKMJ] 
(“Congressional commissions are established to perform speci&c duties, with statutory termination 
dates linked to task completion.”). 
299 Pub. L. No. !!!-,, § !*%%(a), !$, Stat. +. 
300 Pub. L. No. !!!-!#+, § $+%!, !$# Stat. !!* ($%!%). The creation of MedPAC is viewed by 
some to have been more bipartisan in nature than the creation of MACPAC, see Sta'er Interview, 
since MACPAC’s creation was a function of the extension of the Children’s Health Program and 
the enactment of the ACA, both “basically a partisan exercise.” Id. But the Commission has evolved 
to be viewed as more bipartisan since. Id. 
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groups.”301 The chair of the Finance Committee’s Subcommittee on Health 
Care, Senator Jay Rockefeller, said: “Each of [MedPAC and MACPAC] are 
incredibly necessary, so that you take the decision-making and put it in the 
hands of professionals and take it out of the hands of Congress and the 
lobbyists.”302 The commissions continue to provide a counterweight to 
lobbyists; partisan congressional sta,ers view MACPAC as a resource to help 
them get “outside the lobbyist bubble,” for example, providing “an objective 
take” that can inform the sta,ers of whether interest group information is 
accurate.303 
Interestingly, several of the interviewees who sta, the older nonpartisan 
institutions likewise mentioned interest groups as a common modern 
problem for them too. We were told that, if not for their o-ces, lobbyists 
would have more power. One former member of the Legislative Counsel’s 
o-ce recounted that o-ce’s e,orts to resist pressure from partisan sta, to 
simply incorporate legislative language drafted by lobbyists rather than draft 
its own version of the text. As noted earlier, the now-defunct independent 
technology agency, OTA, was founded at least in part for the same 
reasons304—interest group in.uence had become a more pressing problem for 
congressional autonomy over time. 
 
301 STOCKDALE, supra note $*"; see also Oliver, supra note $*), at !#* (noting that “the 
commission’s own research and analysis made it possible to test the empirical claims of the interest 
groups with greater rigor” and that the “expertise of the PPRC commissioners and sta' diminished 
the informational power of lobbyists”). 
302 John Reichard, Make Way for MacPAC, the New Kid on Washington’s Health Policy Block, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Aug. $, $%!%), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletter-article/make-way-macpac-new-kid-
washingtons-health-policy-block [https://perma.cc/+EDR-DF*(]; cf. ANDREW B. WHITFORD & 
GARY MILLER, ABOVE POLITICS: BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENT 
("-(( ($%!() (describing their “credible commitment” theory which outlines the conditions under 
which it is logical for political actors to visibly and convincingly delegate power to a bureaucracy 
insulated from the political actors’ in.uence). 
303 Sta'er Interview. 
304 See Technology Assessment Act of !*)$, Pub. L. No. *$-#+#, § $(c), +( Stat. )*); see also 
CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE ($%%") (“In OTA’s absence, however, the 
new Republican majority in Congress freely called upon its own favorable scienti&c ‘experts’ and 
relied upon analyses prepared by lobbyists and ideologically committed think tanks . . . .”); 
Katherine Tully-McManus, House Members Call for O"ce of Technology Assessment Revival, ROLL 
CALL (Apr. $, $%!*), https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/house-members-call-o-ce-
technology-assessment-revival [https://perma.cc/VCZ"-CSME] (noting House members 
complaining about Congress’s use of “non-governmental groups that are often advocating a position 
on technological issues, rather than an unbiased perspective”). On the OTA and executive branch 
encroachment, see Tully-McManus, supra (referring to House members complaining about 
Congress’s use of executive branch experts); Kim Zetter, Of Course Congress Is Clueless About Tech—
It Killed Its Tutor, WIRED (Apr. $!, $%!(), https://www.wired.com/$%!(/%#/o-ce-technology-
assessment-congress-clueless-tech-killed-tutor [https://perma.cc/))UM-E(TJ] (stating that 
“Congress’ need for the OTA is more glaring in light of the fact that the White House recently 
engaged two lauded technical experts to advise the executive branch”). 
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MedPAC and MACPAC continue to advise Congress on the federal 
health programs within their purview.305 Like GAO, each commission also 
makes policy recommendations to Congress relating to the health care 
programs it monitors.306 These policy recommendations are made by the body 
of commissioners itself (as opposed to by its permanent professional sta,), 
and also may be shared with executive agencies or states.307 The permanent 
sta, also operates as a continual informational resource for Congress, 
producing explanations of federal programs (like CRS) and of real-world 
implementation experience (which may be based on data they proactively 
collect, like GAO).308 The professional sta,s also provide Congress with 
technical feedback on policy ideas or proposed statutes (like JCT).309 Unlike 
the commissioners themselves, the permanent sta, does not advance its own 
policy recommendations in the performance of its functions.310 
Like GAO, MedPAC and MACPAC also emphasize transparency.311 Both 
are required by statute to make their reports publicly available.312 Both also 
meet in public, provide opportunity for public comment at their meetings, 
and publish transcripts of their meetings.313 As with Congress’s other internal 
agencies, however, more informal technical feedback provided to 
congressional sta,ers is con+dential—to the point that even commissioners 
have access only to aggregate data regarding the extent and nature of the 
feedback that professional sta, provides to congressional members and 
sta,.314 Unlike GAO, the work that the Commissions perform in response to 
congressional requests does not dominate their workload; much of the 
 
305 RICK MAYES & ROBERT A. BERENSON, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE 
SHAPING OF U.S. HEALTH CARE !#% ($%%+) (noting that MedPAC counsels Congress in 
determining Medicare’s payment levels); MACPAC, https://www.macpac.gov/about-macpac/ (last 
visited Apr. !!, $%$%) (MACPAC “provides policy and data analysis and makes recommendations to 
Congress, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the states on 
a wide array of issues a'ecting Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program”) 
306 Social Security Act §§ !+%"(b)(!)(B), #$ U.S.C. § !,*"b-(; id. § !*%%(b)(!)(B), #$ U.S.C. 
§ !,*(-!. 




311 While the members of MedPAC and MACPAC are appointed by the Comptroller General, 
they retain important autonomy from GAO: they exist under their own statutory authorizations, 
Social Security Act §§ !+%"(c) & !*%%(c), and while their funds must be requested in the same 
manner as those of GAO, §§ !+%"(f)(!) & !*%%(f)(!), they are appropriated separately, id. 
312 Social Security Act §§ !*%%(b)()), !+%"(b)("). 
313 Public Meetings, MEDPAC, http://www.medpac.gov/-public-meetings-/january-$%$%-
public-meeting [https://perma.cc/+PQT-EULD] (last visited May $, $%$%); Public Meetings, 
MACPAC, https://www.macpac.gov/meetings/ [https://perma.cc/Z*QZ-,US*] (last visited May $, 
$%$%). 
314 Sta'er Interview. 
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Commissions’ work continues to be self-initiated and proactive, anticipating 
issues that will be salient to Congress.315 
MedPAC and MACPAC each submit two annual reports to Congress 
reviewing the federal health programs.316 If the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services submits a report to Congress, the commissions must submit 
written comments on the report to the relevant congressional committees,317 
and MACPAC also is statutorily encouraged to submit reports to committees 
commenting on agency regulations.318 MACPAC also produces MACStats, 
which compiles data on the Medicaid program, annotated versions of the 
Medicaid and CHIP statutes, and a variety of issue briefs and fact sheets. 
Beyond submitting reports, the commissions communicate with Congress in 
various ways, including through testimony, brie+ngs, and informal sta,er 
conversations.319 
The two commissions share the same organizational structure. Each 
consists of seventeen commissioners who are appointed by the Comptroller 
General. These commissioners must be drawn from a representative mix of 
individuals and professions involved with the applicable federal health 
programs.320 This structure was meant to bring a variety of perspectives to 
Congress that it might otherwise lack.321 The commissioners serve three-year 
terms, and their appointments are staggered.322 The Comptroller General 
also designates the Chair and Vice Chair of each commission.323 
In addition to the commissioners, MedPAC has a permanent sta, of 
thirty individuals, including nineteen policy analysts;324 MACPAC has a 
permanent sta, of twenty-nine employees, including +fteen analysts.325 
 
315 Id. 
316 See Social Security Act §§ !+%"(b)(!)(C), !+%"(b)(!)(D), !*%%(b)(!)(C), !*%%(b)(!)(D); see 
also id. at §!+%"(b)($) (describing dimensions to be reviewed by MedPAC); id. at §!*%%(b)($) (same 
for MACPAC); About MedPAC, MEDPAC http://www.medpac.gov/-about-medpac- 
[https://perma.cc/"BFT-DVFZ] (last visited May ,, $%$%) (describing these as “the primary outlet 
for Commission recommendations”). MedPAC’s reports review various statutorily-identi&ed 
dimensions of the Medicare program, Social Security Act § !+%"(b)(!)(C), and “contain[] an 
examination of the issues a'ecting” the program, id. at § !+%"(b)(!)(D). 
317 Social Security Act §§ !+%"(b)(,), !*%%(b)("). 
318 Id. at § !*%%(b)(")(b). 
319 About MedPAC, supra note ,!(. 
320 Social Security Act §§ !+%"(c)(!)-($)(A), !*%%(c)(!)-($)(A). 
321 Sta'er Interview. 
322 Social Security Act §§ !+%"(c)(,)(A), !*%%(c)(,)(A). 
323 Id. at §§ !+%"(c)("), !*%%(c)("); Sta'er Interview. 
324 See Commission Sta', MEDPAC, http://www.medpac.gov/-about-medpac-/commission-
sta' [https://perma.cc/NSV*-KWJ,] (last visited May ,, $%$%) (listing the names of MedPAC 
Commission Sta'). 
325 See Commission Sta', MACPAC, https://www.macpac.gov/about-macpac/commission-
sta'/ [https://perma.cc/FN)H-SHCN] (last visited May ,, $%$%) (listing the names of MACPAC 
Commission Sta'). 
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As a point of contrast, the entire full-time sta, of the Senate Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee specializing in healthcare is seven 
sta,ers and three fellows.326 All analysts in MedPAC and MACPAC have 
advanced degrees.327 
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326 The seven includes someone on detail from FDA. The full-time fellows are paid for by 
outside organizations. 
327 See supra notes ,$#-,$" (listing degrees of analysts). 














































II. THE BUREAUCRACY’S FEATURES AND FUNCTIONS 
Bureaucracy as a subject of study has captured the interest of theorists of 
government and law for decades. But that literature has focused primarily on 
executive branch agencies, not legislative agencies, and the legal arena has 
been dominated by leading scholars of administrative law and the 
presidency.328 We brie.y lay out the standard account of the bureaucracy, 
what it looks like, and classic tradeo,s it entails. We then detail how the 
congressional bureaucracy intervenes in that account and, in substantial ways, 
diverges from it. 
A. The Standard Account 
The congressional bureaucracy substantiates the mainstream account in 
part, but also offers some important divergences. Max Weber’s classic 
analysis of the bureaucracy describes the ideal-typical bureaucracy as 
containing a number of key elements, including specialization and training, 
hierarchical relations of authority and compensation, ideological 
impartiality, and continuous fulfillment of duties by fully committed 
 
328 For leading examples from the administrative law literature, see generally Anne Joseph 
O’Connell, Bureaucracy at The Boundary, !($ U. PA. L. REV. +#! ($%!#); Parrillo, supra note ,(. For 
an early classic study of the presidential bureaucracy, see generally Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, !!# HARV. L. REV. $$#" ($%%!). For more recent work, see generally Josh Chafetz, 
Constitutional Maturity, or Reading Weber in the Age of Trump, ,# CONST. COMMENT. !) ($%!*). 
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employees.329 Weber’s bureaucracies were staffed by appointed specialists 
with legal protections against arbitrary dismissal who received a regular 
salary, and who were expected to subordinate their personal or political 
goals to institutional ends.330 
 “Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination 
through knowledge,”331 he wrote, while emphasizing that “the question is 
always who controls the existing bureaucratic machinery.”332 Because in the 
ideal form the work of the bureaucracy is wholly rational, “dehumanized,” and 
thereby “eliminat[es] . . . all purely personal, irrational, and emotional 
elements,”333 it requires additional leadership to steer it toward larger moral 
goals—what Weber labels “charismatic” leadership.334 The political and the 
bureaucratic, as modern government experts have argued, are in a relationship 
of “conditional cooperation”; both need one another and the top does not have 
complete control over the bottom.335 Debates over the need to preserve 
bureaucratic autonomy have been a key focus of modern scholars.336 
Other work on bureaucracy has roots in rational choice theory, which has 
considered why Congress creates an executive branch bureaucracy and how it 
structures it.337 That work focuses mostly on Congress’s own de+ciencies as 
the reason why Congress turns to agencies—including limited time,338 lack of 
 
329 See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY *""-"+ (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 
!*)+) (!*$$) (describing the characteristics of modern bureaucracy). 
330 Id. at *(%-(,. 
331 Id. at $$". 
332 Id. at $$#. 
333 MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY $!( (H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills eds., !*#(). 
334 See id. at $#"-", (Weber outlining his “sociology of charismatic authority”). 
335 HUGH HECLO, A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS: EXECUTIVE POLITICS, !*,-*#, $,$-," 
(!*))) (de&ning conditional cooperation); see also Chafetz, supra note ,$+, at $# (“[P]olitics without 
bureaucratic pushback is no better [for Weber]. The politician can articulate ends, but she cannot 
e'ectuate them on her own, which is why modern governance ‘demands’ a bureaucratic element.”). 
336 See, e.g., Chafetz, supra note ,$+ at ," (arguing for the need to preserve bureaucratic 
autonomy); Kagan, supra note ,$+ at $,,!-,+, (arguing for greater presidential intervention in the 
bureaucracy). 
337 In characterizing this work as belonging to the domain of rational choice theory, we follow 
Terry Moe’s excellent overview of this literature. See Terry M. Moe, Delegation, Control, and the Study 
of Public Bureaucracy, !% FORUM !, ,-!% (tracing the origin and evolution of the use of rational choice 
theory in works on the theory of bureaucracy). 
338 See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Political Control of 
the Bureaucracy, in - NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW "%-"! (Peter 
Newman ed., !**+) (noting the “delegation dilemma” whereby “leaders have limited time and 
information, and so cannot take informed actions to solve every problem” and therefore “employ 
others to work for them”); Jonathan Bendor, Amihai Glazer & Thomas Hammond, Theories of 
Delegation, # ANN. REV. POL. SCI. $,", $"+ ($%%!) (noting models which propose that “[d]elegation 
occurs in these contexts because the boss lacks the time or expertise to carry out [the] search”), Craig 
Volden, Delegating Power to Bureaucracies: Evidence from the States, !+ J. L. ECON. & ORG. !+), !*! 
($%%$) (citing scholarship on the hypothesis that “[l]egislators will delegate to bureaucrats when 
they do not have the time or ability to specify every detail of their legislative goals”). 
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expertise,339 and desire to avoid accountability.340 The story is almost always 
one of Congress relinquishing policy control in the hope of receiving some 
countervailing bene+t, 341 such as increased e-ciency (and other time-related 
bene+ts),342 high-quality output (resulting, for example, from enhanced 
institutional memory343 or managerial experience344), greater political leeway 
to pursue additional policy achievement,345 or a convenient scapegoat that 
Congress can hide behind to avoid political blame for di-cult decisions.346 A 
 
339 See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A 
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS )+ 
(!***) (discussing delegation decisions as a weighing of costs where “the necessary information to 
make well-formed policy may be costly to obtain” for legislatures that lack expertise); JOHN D. 
HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION? $ ($%%$) (discussing the “well-known 
tension” politicians face in delegating to bureaucrats whose interests may di'er but who “have 
knowledge and expertise that politicians lack”); Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: 
Congressional Choices About Administrative Procedures, +* AM. POL. SCI. REV. ($, ($ (!**") (arguing 
that Congress chooses to delegate when the bene&ts of agency expertise in an area outweigh other 
potential costs). But see GEORGE A. KRAUSE, A TWO WAY STREET: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
DYNAMICS OF THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (! (!***) (noting that some have 
questioned whether information asymmetries always favor agents over principals). 
340 See Morris Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Form, ,* PUB. CHOICE ,,, #(-#) (!*+$) 
(identifying the transfer of accountability as a key motivation for delegation); Alberto Alesina & 
Guido Tabellini, Why Do Politicians Delegate? !* (NBER Working Paper No. !!",!, $%%"), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w!!",! (same). 
341 See Moe, supra note ,,) at !"-!( (observing theme in scholarship of the “trade-o' between 
expertise and political control”). But see Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation 
Diminishes the Collective Congress, *% N.Y.U. L. REV. !#(,, !#(, ($%!") (arguing that agency delegation 
allows some individual legislators to enhance their power and control). 
342 See JAMES W. FESLER & DONALD F. KETTL, THE POLITICS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS ,!+ (!**!) (identifying the competing goals of democratic rule and bureaucratic 
e-ciency); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT 
GOVERN? $)! (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson, eds. !*+*) (arguing that delegation improves 
policymaking expertise and economy of resources). This view goes back at least to Weber’s Theory 
of Social and Economic Organization. MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION ,,) (trans. A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons, !*(#) (“[T]he purely bureaucratic 
type of administrative organization . . . is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining 
the highest degree of e-ciency . . . .”). 
343 See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR $!+ (#th ed. !**)) 
(“[O]rganizations, to a far greater extent than individuals, need arti&cial “memories.”). 
344 See David Lewis, The Personnel Process in the Modern Presidency, #$ PRES. STUD. Q. ")), "+* 
($%!$) (arguing that career o-cials have more experience in managing particular agencies and public 
sector organizations generally). 
345 See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note ,,*. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of 
Powers, !!, HARV. L. REV. (,, ($%%%) (contrasting the policy achievements that bureaucracy enables 
in presidential versus parliamentary systems). 
346 See WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR. & STEVEN J. BALLA, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY 
") ($%%#) (identifying delegation of airline security as one area in which Congress has avoided blame 
for potential catastrophic outcomes); R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Blame Avoidance, ( J. PUB. POL. 
,)!, ,+(-+) (!*+() (explaining how legislators can craft delegation to shift blame to agencies for 
future unpopular decisions); see also EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note ,,*, at $$-$, (discussing 
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di,erent kind of bene+t identi+ed by scholars both past and present is the 
potential for a strong bureaucracy not only to check excessive presidential 
power, but also to serve as a bulwark against undue corporate in.uence.347 
But the most touted bene+t is expertise.348 Expertise gained from the 
bureaucracy, the theory goes, outweighs the loss of political control.349 
With respect to control, scholars emphasize Congress’s ex post tools, such 
as oversight power,350 as well as ex ante means, such as initial decisions about 
the structure of the bureaucracy that can orient it toward Congress’s political 
preferences or otherwise “stack the deck” in favor of Congress’s preferred 
outcomes.351 Some scholars have argued that the absence of active 
congressional oversight is actually a bene+cial sign that more e-cient control 
mechanisms are in use, not that bureaucracy has been left adrift.352 
More recent administrative law scholarship has also looked to separation 
of powers.353 Neomi Rao critiques administrative delegation as undermining 
 
the various forms of “blame shifting” and “shifting responsibility” between the legislative and 
executive branches). 
347 See JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS !%-#( (!*,+) (defending agency-
level bureaucratic autonomy as a tool to counteract executive and corporate power); see also Adrian 
Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust, !,% HARV. L. REV. $#(,, $#(* ($%!)) (“Conditional on the failure 
of the original Constitution to provide an adequate counterbalance to corporate power, [Landis 
believed that] concentrated administrative power that also counterbalances swelling executive power 
is the attainable second-best.”). 
348 See Moe, supra note ,,), at $+ (“At the heart of these delegation models is the agency’s 
advantage in expertise.”). 
349 Id. at !"-!( (noting that in trying “to strike the right balance between control and expertise[, 
i]t is clear . . . that total political control is an extreme solution that is usually not desirable”). 
350 See generally JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT ($%%!); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional 
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms, $+ AM. J. POL. SCI. !(" (!*+#) (focusing on how 
ex post congressional oversight can deter executive branch overreach). See also Moe, supra note ,,), 
at + (“The early theory of congressional dominance was a theory of ex post control.”). 
351 See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures 
as Instruments of Political Control, , J. L., ECON. & ORG., $#,, $(! (!*+)) (discussing how, “by 
controlling the details of procedures and participation, political actors stack the deck in favor of 
constituents who are the intended bene&ciaries of the bargain struck by the coalition”); Bawn, supra 
note ,,* at ($ (describing how Congress chooses procedures in order to e'ect their substantive 
policy preferences). These procedures often are thought to be designed speci&cally in the e'ort to 
insulate the bureaucracy from presidential in.uence, as that in.uence is assumed to undermine 
continued congressional control. See ABERBACH, supra note ,"%; Terry M. Moe & Michael Caldwell, 
The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary 
Systems, !"% J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. !)!, !*$ (!**#) (suggesting that certain 
outcomes are “program[med]” into congressional choices about agency structure). 
352 See WHITFORD & MILLER, supra note ,%$, at #$ ($%!() (summarizing this contribution). 
353 See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, !$# HARV. L. REV. 
!*,*, !*#$-(! ($%!!) (summarizing this scholarship); see also Harold H. Bru', The Incompatibility 
Principle, "* ADMIN. L. REV. $$", $$"-$( ($%%)) (same); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in 
Separation of Powers Law, +( VA. L. REV. !!$), !!,( ($%%%) (remarking on “lively debate” among 
separation of power scholars and surveying the literature). 
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separation of powers, in part because she concludes that Congress is unable 
to adequately police its delegations.354 Neal Katyal and Gillian Metzger have 
argued for a strong internal separation of powers within the executive branch 
itself—across and within agencies—to provide the kind of check on executive 
power that they worry Congress can no longer provide.355 
Much of this work points to arguments that, instead of formal constitutional 
structures, or a strong Congress, or even Supreme Court doctrine, sub-
constitutional strategies can and should be used to achieve the same checks and 
balances.356 Almost all of this literature, however, identifies those sub-
constitutional strategies, including how powers are internally separated, as 
located in the structure and operations inside the executive branch.357 
 
354 See, e.g., Rao, supra note ,#!, at !#++-!#*$ (arguing that Congress lacks the ability to police 
delegations due to factors such as regulatory speed, and that individual legislator incentives make 
Congress structurally unable to conduct policing). 
355 See Neal K. Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch 
from Within, !!" YALE L.J. $,!#, $,!+ ($%%() (arguing that “[w]ithout that checking function, 
presidential administration can become an engine of concentrated power”); Gillian E. Metzger, The 
Interdependent Relationship between Internal and External Separation of Powers, "* EMORY L.J. #$,, #") 
($%%*) (same). 
356 Cf. Bruce Ackerman, Good-bye, Montesquieu, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW !$+, 
!,! (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., $%!%) (noting, while focusing on executive-
branch actors, that “[a]lthough the traditional tripartite formula fails to capture distinctive modes 
of operation, these new and functionally independent units are playing an increasingly important 
role in modern government”); Ackerman, supra note ,#" (arguing that executive-branch bureaucracy 
advances the values of functional specialization and of shielding law implementation from 
politics);Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, !$( YALE 
L.J. ,#(, ,*! ($%!() (noting that there is a “complex ecosystem of intrabranch and entirely external 
actors not traditionally accounted for in the separation-of-powers literature”); Daryl J. Levinson & 
Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, !!* HARV. L. REV. $,!!, $,)(-+% ($%%() 
(“Instead of empowering the opposition party to oversee or check the majority party 
under uni&ed government (or in addition to doing so), constitutional engineering might focus on 
insulating the administrative bureaucracy more fully from the partisan pressures of uni&ed govern
ment. One way to ensure that government is never fully uni&ed is to protect this 
branch from falling into the hands of the majority party—by keeping it independent of both 
parties.”). See also WHITFORD & MILLER, supra note ,%$, at $) (“[W]hen legislative goals are 
themselves destructive, then bureaucratic de&ance . . . may actually prove to be a useful version of 
a Madisonian ‘check.’”); LANDIS, supra note ,#) at #( (“If the doctrine of the separation of power 
implies division, it also implies balance, and balance calls for equality. The creation of administrative 
power may be the means for the preservation of that balance . . . .”). 
357 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note ,"" at #$+ (observing that “the focus of internal separation of 
powers scholarship is overwhelmingly on the Executive Branch”). For more examples of this 
executive branch scholarship, see Katyal, supra note ,"" at $,!+; Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional 
Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, *! N.Y.U. L. 
REV. $$), $$* ($%!() (“[Traditional accounts] don’t capture the multidimensional nature of 
administrative control in which the constitutional branches (the old separation of powers) and the 
administrative rivals (the new separation of powers) all compete with one another to in.uence 
administrative governance.”); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: 
Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post %-$$ World, *# CALIF. L. REV. !("", !(+* ($%%() (“[T]he 
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B. How the Congressional Bureaucracy Intervenes in This Account 
The congressional bureaucracy, in many ways, re.ects Weber’s description 
of what an ideal bureaucracy looks like. Congress’ internal institutions, too, 
share a +erce commitment to objectivity and nonpartisanship; are each 
marked by their particular form of highly specialized knowledge; have long-
serving sta, who, on the whole, are more educated and older than Congress’s 
political sta,; share a commitment to the long-term interests of Congress as 
an institution rather than the political question of the day; and respect 
Congress’s rules and jurisdictional limits about the scope and extent of their 
powers. This comment from one of the longest serving counsels in Legislative 
Counsel captures the mood: “For Congress . . . it has been the curious 
marriage of the cool rationality that these auxiliary legislative institutions add 
(both from appearance as well as from reality) to the heat of raw politics that 
produces a stronger, more durable democratic system.”358 
Congress’s bureaucracy also aligns with the classic account that a 
paramount role for the bureaucracy should be the provision of technical and 
subject-speci+c expertise. Much has been written about how Congress uses 
delegations to executive agencies to avoid blame.359 We extend those insights 
now to the legislative-branch bureaucracy. Members use the bureaucracy’s 
expertise as a sword as well as a shield, including to shift blame. 360 One 
interviewee explained: “There is a lot of value to having a memo on CRS 
letterhead in support of a position” because it “can be used as leverage over 
other members or the public.”361 
 
most e'ective [national intelligence] structure probably would have redundant components as well 
as components that coordinate and centralize certain e'orts.”).” 
358 Email from Former Staffer to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Jan. $(, $%$%) (on file with authors). 
359 See; GORMLEY & BALLA, supra note ,#(, at ") (noting that “[b]y placing responsibility for 
aviation security in the hands of DOT, Congress has distanced itself from culpability should there 
be a catastrophic breakdown in the system.”);DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT 
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION !,-!* (!**,) 
(arguing that delegation undermines democracy, liberty, and protection of the public by allowing 
legislators to shift blame to agencies); Gluck et al., supra note !, at !+#!; Kenneth R. Mayer, Closing 
Military Bases Finally: Solving Collective Action Dilemmas Through Delegation, $% LEG. STUD. Q. ,*, 
(!**"); Weaver, supra note ,#(, at ,+(-+) (“Independent regulatory commissions are delegated 
responsibility for many of the most sensitive economic con.icts that pit one &rm or industry’s 
interests directly against others (e.g., mergers, rate-making).”); Morris Fiorina, Group Concentration 
and the Delegation of Legislative Authority (Social Science Working Paper !!$, California Institute of 
Technology, !*+$) (manuscript at !*), https://authors.library.caltech.edu/+!*()/ (explaining that 
delegation allows for blame avoidance by creating “political daylight between the legislators and 
those who feel the incidence of legislative actions”). 
360 See Sta'er Interview (“Members &nd us useful—and that’s kind of the key. Sometimes we 
can be useful and they can hide behind us.”). 
361 Sta'er Interview. 
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But there are some critical differences from the Weberian model. One 
is the lack of political leadership at the top of any of our bureaucratic 
institutions; as detailed in Part I, the heads of these institutions generally 
are appointed without regard to partisan affiliation. In many of the offices, 
the head is promoted from within and is a long-term staffer.362 One 
explanation for this structural difference is likely that these agencies are 
internal, not external, to Congress. The political leadership that we typically 
associate with the executive branch agency head is replicated in the 
congressional bureaucracy instead by members and their political staffs 
themselves; they decide how to utilize the information the bureaucracy 
provides. Further, removal power of the office heads often remains with 
political actors: three serve at the pleasure of the House,363 one is removable 
by a resolution in either chamber,364 one by joint resolution for certain 
specified reasons or impeachment,365 and four lack specification of any 
removal power or protections.366 
Importantly, the o-ces of Congress’s bureaucracy are not all the same. 
Like the executive branch literature emphasizes, Congress’s internal agencies, 
too, are a “they,” not an “it.”367 Some are policy experts, some are not. Some 
expertise they provide is con+dential, some is public. Some o,er their 
expertise before legislation is enacted, others’ expertise comes in ex-post. 
Some expertise is only suggestive and can be discarded by members at will; 
others’ is more constraining. Some nonpartisan o-ces in Congress have 
become the subject of political attention and, with visibility, criticism; others 
have escaped attention almost entirely. Members and sta, interact directly 
with some o-ces; for others, they never see them and may not even know 
they exist. Each of these di,erences contributes to how Congress controls its 
own bureaucracy. 
These descriptions illuminate two additional important distinctions 
from executive agencies at the outset: First, much of the congressional 
bureaucracy’s work is not binding on Congress. In practice, the 
congressional bureaucracy’s work-product is enormously influential—the 
budget score or a revenue estimate for legislation are good examples—and 
Congress is generally required to obtain those numbers. But Congress does 
 
362 Cf. HECLO, supra note ,," (noting that in executive branch paradigm agency heads 
typically are imported from without). 
363 $ U.S.C. § $+$ ($%!+) (House Legislative Counsel); $ U.S.C. § $+"(c) ($%!+) (OLRC); $ 
U.S.C. $+)(a) (House Parliamentarian). 
364 $ U.S.C. § (%!(a)(#) ($%!+) (CBO). 
365 ,! U.S.C. § ),$a(a)(!) ($%!+) (GAO). 
366 Senate Legislative Counsel, Senate Parliamentarian, CRS, and JCT. 
367 See Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, !$% YALE L.J. 
!%,$, !%,( ($%!!) (“Even casual observers of the administrative state recognize that agencies, like 
nearly all large organizations, are not unitary actors. They are fractured internally.”). 
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not necessarily have to act on the information. For instance, Congress can 
disregard the score and legislate outside of its financial targets. Congress 
can ignore research or drafted legislative language or decide not to act on a 
GAO audit, although the transparency and visibility of the congressional 
bureaucracy work-product on the ground makes at least some of it hard to 
ignore. Additionally, a good portion of Congress’s bureaucratic work is not 
substantive (in the classic sense of devising policy for Congress), but rather 
involves the execution of policy ideas—whether converting them into 
legislative text, scoring their financial impact, referring them to the proper 
committees, organizing them in the U.S. Code, or providing research on 
their implications. 
This may be another reason that the congressional bureaucracy has not 
been the same source of public and academic angst as its executive 
counterparts. While there are exceptions—CBO numbers had a large impact 
on several failed e,orts to repeal the A,ordable Care Act,368 and the 
Parliamentarian’s rulings generally constrained what the Senate could and 
could not do by reconciliation without +libuster369—the bureaucracy has 
generally seemed unthreatening to Congress. 
In fact, the very comfort that Congress takes in its bureaucratic structure 
offers another important theoretical contribution. Congress uses its own 
internal structures, and especially its bureaucracy, to separate powers inside 
of it and not just external to it. Members voluntarily cede power from 
themselves, or their own party, by winding up the congressional bureaucracy 
and setting it in motion. The congressional bureaucracy’s continued 
existence itself—because Congress can always abolish it—strongly suggests 
that Congress values the dispersal of power that its nonpartisan institutions 
accomplish. 
As we noted in the introduction, because of these di,erences, the term 
“bureaucracy” is not quite perfect. Congress’s “sca,olding” is another term 
we heard; or the “institutional sta,,” as opposed to the professional (political) 
sta,. We also considered Congress’s “Underbelly”—to connote an important 
support that is largely unseen. That term seemed too pejorative, given the 
bureaucracy’s value. 
We begin the discussion below with the internal separation of powers 
point and for the remainder of the Part detail the di,erent functions and 
 
368 See Dylan Matthews, The Republican War on the CBO, VOX (July !*, $%!), *:%% AM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/$%!)/)/!*/!"*()$$#/congressional-budget-o-ce-cbo-war-
explained [https://perma.cc/P*UY-KBAF] (detailing how CBO estimates “heavily a'ected 
congressional debates over the legislation” to repeal the A'ordable Care Act, angering Republicans). 
369 For a discussion of the “nuclear option” that provides workarounds of the typical methods 
of enforcing Parliamentarian determinations, see supra note $"%. 
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constraints of our bureaucratic institutions. There are many di,erent ways to 
provide nonpartisan legislative support. 
!. Internal Separation of Powers 
Part I of this article o,ered a new account of how the congressional 
bureaucracy contributes to the modern story of sub-constitutional separation 
of powers. The congressional bureaucracy adds a legislative component to 
that story that has been mostly overlooked. Congress’s decisions to 
restructure itself via nonpartisan o-ces in the !)#&s and !)'&s were primarily 
motivated by its desire to check executive power and reassert itself in the 
lawmaking, budget, tax, and oversight processes. Its establishment of more 
subject-matter oriented independent agencies like MedPAC, MACPAC, and 
OTA came later, but likewise were responses to threats of usurpation that 
arose from Congress’s perceived inability to e,ectively oversee the activities 
of parallel executive branch agencies (and later, lobbyists).370 
The congressional bureaucracy also deserves a place in the modern 
account of internal separation of powers. To the limited extent that scholars 
have remarked on how Congress decentralizes power internally, they have 
understandably focused on Congress’s outward-facing structures of which 
members are a part and how Congress disperses power among those 
members, such as committee organization, minority and majority leadership, 
bicameralism, and legislative veto gates.371 
But Congress’s internal institutions disperse lawmaking power within 
Congress even more, by removing swaths of it from members and political 
sta, entirely. Simultaneously, the congressional bureaucracy prevents that 
power from being centralized in any single political o-ce. Critically, in a 
context in which the president is not a threat, Congress is willing to set up ex 
ante processes that take power away from one kind of congressional actor or 
another in the interest of something greater. 
 
370 See supra note $! (detailing the separation-of-power origins of MedPAC, MACPAC, 
and OTA). 
371 See, e.g., Senate Committees, UNITED STATES SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/brie&ng/Committees.htm 
[https://perma.cc/X$V"-Y)QA] (last visited Aug. !, $%!*) (“Committee membership enables 
members to develop specialized knowledge of the matters under their jurisdiction.”); see also 
CHAFETZ, supra note ,$, at $+" (explaining how rise of standing committees “naturally tended 
toward a certain di'usion of power” especially when party leaders did not control appointments); 
M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, !"% U. PA. L. REV. 
(%,, ("! ($%%!) (“State power is di'used among an enormous, and diverse, array of decisionmakers 
who populate what we call the branches. Within Congress: a house committee chair; a ranking 
member of a Senate committee; and the deputy whip in the Senate or the majority leader in the 
House.”); Metzger, supra note ,"" (noting committees and parties achieve dispersion of power). 
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Consider the alternatives. Congress could have built its bureaucracy 
simply by adding experts into existing centers of congressional power. As 
several of our interviewees have noted, this could have been accomplished by 
adding expert sta, positions to the leadership sta,, committee sta,, or other 
partisan sta,under members’ direct control. Congress could have divided 
these positions between di,erent sta,s for majority and minority, with each 
side providing its own competing estimates, drafts, statutory re-
organizations, and so on. Or it could have consolidated research, drafting, 
accounting, procedural, budget, and revenue expertise under the Speaker of 
the House and the Senate Majority Leader. 
Instead, Congress dispersed these expert sta,ers across a collection of 
nonpartisan institutions whose mission is to serve the institution as a whole, 
including both parties—and that, because of their statutory authority and 
hardwiring into congressional procedures, cannot be removed by any one 
faction in Congress and often are not easily manipulated. In so doing, 
Congress decentralizes power within itself and removes a piece of the 
legislative process from partisan politics. As one high-level sta,er put it: “We 
do not want to have the collection of power where everyone functions under 
a single secretary general.”372 
By way of comparison, Whitford and Miller’s “credible commitment” 
theory posits that, in the executive branch, “[d]elegation to a (relatively 
neutral) professionalized bureaucracy serves as a natural con.ict-resolution 
mechanism” when legislators are not certain in advance their +rst-choice 
policy outcome will always prevail. Delegation “is the natural form of 
compromise between competing political perspectives.”373 They further posit 
that bureaucrats “have no discretion when politicians are united. It is only 
when politicians are divided into con.icting factions that bureaucrats +nd a 
zone of independent authority.”374 
The congressional bureaucracy +ts the Whitford and Miller account, but 
only to a point. Congress does commit ex ante to processes (such as revenue 
and cost scoring), procedural rules, rules on committee jurisdiction, and 
impartial legislative drafters and codi+ers that may not always give members 
their +rst-best policy outcomes, but at least ensure nonpartisan arbiters. But 
this happens regardless of whether one party is in control or when the 
Congress is bitterly divided. That kind of trust in the congressional 
bureaucracy is what makes this story di,erent from the typical executive 
branch story. Epstein and O’Halloran’s oft-cited work on delegation likewise 
argues that a congressional majority is less likely to delegate to an executive 
 
372 Sta'er Interview. 
373 WHITFORD & MILLER, supra note at ,%$, at !%$. 
374 Id. at !%$. 
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branch under a di,erent party’s control.375 But there is little evidence that 
utilization of the congressional bureaucracy changes depending on the 
composition of the government.376 
For another comparison, Jon Michaels posits an administrative 
(executive) state safeguarded by the division of power “among three sets of 
rivals” that are legally authorized to contribute to administrative 
policymaking: namely, “politically appointed agency leaders . . . politically 
insulated career civil servants . . . and the broader public.”377 The 
congressional bureaucracy does not perfectly +t Michaels’s view either. The 
congressional bureaucracy, as the next section details, so steadfastly insists on 
nonpartisanship and displays such a total lack of interest in aggregating power 
that it is hard to describe it, in Michaels’s terms, as a “counterweight.”378 That 
said, its institutions do in a sense function like Michaels’s “heterogeneous 
institutional” agencies—operating alongside the political sta, (what we may 
think of as a partisan bureaucracy), members, and interest groups all aiming 
to inform legislation.379 
Indeed, several of our interviewees emphasized that in the absence of 
these internal congressional institutions, power would inure even further to 
partisan politics and interest groups. The bureaucracy is a counterweight to 
hyper-partisanship. It provides some optimism that Congress—even during 
the modern period of increasing centralization and partisanship—still 
preserves aspects of its process at the institutional and nonpartisan level. That 
is, Congress has chosen not to fully center power over the design, writing and 
analysis of legislation, in the hands of any one party or senior member. 
Recall from our historical account in Part I that one motivating force for 
the creation of the O-ces of the Parliamentarians was to curb the internal 
consolidation of procedural power under the House Speaker Joseph “Boss” 
Cannon.380 On the Senate side, the parallel motivation was concern regarding 
the centralized procedural control of Vice President John Nance Garner.381 
 
375 See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note ,,*, at !") (“[N]on-executive actors . . . receive 
a greater percentage of delegations during divided government.”). 
376 See Russell D. Renka, Party Control of the Presidency and Congress $%--–'($(, http://cstl-
cla.semo.edu/rdrenka/ui,$%-)"/presandcongress.asp [https://perma.cc/(XZM-UX*S] (last visited 
Feb. $%, $%$%) (providing statistics regarding party control of the presidency and Congress between 
!*,, and $%!%). 
377 See Michaels, supra note ,"), at $,# (describing the division of power among the three 
groups). 
378 Id. at $($. 
379 Id. at $,". 
380 Gould, supra note !(, at !*(,; see also KING, supra note $$*, at +) (!**)) (“This revolt 
[against Speaker Cannon] is pivotal in the institutionalization of the parliamentarian as an 
institutional guardian.”). 
381 See Noah, supra note $,% (discussing John Nance Garner’s in.uence on the creation of the 
Senate Parliamentarian o-ce). 
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We have already noted how the creation of CBO initially threatened some 
members of Congress by pulling power away from the then-in.uential 
+nance-related committees and how CBO’s Alice Rivlin openly embraced 
this internal separation of powers function for the new o-ce.382 The !)'&s 
expansion of Legislative Counsel was similarly aimed at democratizing 
drafting resources in Congress—an attempt described to us by one longtime 
sta,er as “a movement of the Watergate class to gain more power” that gave 
rise to “things like the establishment of subcommittees to take power away 
from committee chairmen and increased support sta, to help individual 
members” and not just committee chairs and leadership.383 The expanded 
funds dedicated to Legislative Counsel (as initially made in furtherance of 
the House o-ce’s new !)'& charter) provided more drafting resources for 
individual members and committees alike.384 
GAO also has received similar attention, even beyond its role in the 
landmark separation-of-powers case of Bowsher v. Synar. Studies have 
chronicled the role that GAO has played in preserving the balance of power 
between political parties,385 between Congress and the executive branch,386 
and between itself and partisan congressional actors.387 
The political (partisan) sta,ers we interviewed for this study corroborated 
these points regarding the decentralization of internal power and elaborated 
on them. They emphasized that GAO was valued inside Congress for giving 
equal attention to the work of the majority and minority parties. Many 
opportunities and resources in Congress are allocated according to party 
 
382 Congressional Budget O"ce Oversight, Hearing before S. Comm. on the Budget, *#th Cong, !% 
(!*)(); supra note !)( and accompanying text. 
383 Sta'er Interview. 
384 Legislative Branch Appropriations for Fiscal Year $%&,: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Appropriations for the House of Representatives, *,rd Cong. !%%,-%) (!*)#) (testimony of 
Ward M. Hussey). 
385 See Levinson & Pildes, supra note ,"(, at $,)%-)! (observing that minority parties use GAO 
to protect their prerogatives in times of uni&ed government). 
386 See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, !+))-!*$%, at $%) (!*+$) (telling story of dual creation 
of OMB and GAO that focuses on these institutions arising from separation-of-powers tradeo's 
between the branches); Levinson & Pildes, supra note ,"(, at $,)%-)! (citing Anne Margaret Joseph, 
Political Appointees and Auditors of Politics: Essays on Oversight of the American Bureaucracy, at 
$%*-!% (May $%%$) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on &le with the Harvard 
University John F. Kennedy School of Government Library)) (reporting that Congress uses GAO 
to protect its institutional prerogatives against the executive branch in times of uni&ed government); 
see also FREDERICK C. MOSHER, A TALE OF TWO AGENCIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE AND THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET $-, 
(!*+#) (comparing GAO and the O-ce of Management and Budget to highlight that these agencies 
“are the most striking yet institutional expressions of the separation between the executive and 
legislative powers in the national government”). 
387 See O’Connell, supra note $)% (manuscript at "-() (noting that GAO is a'ected by the 
legislature’s party a-liation and faces “political constraints”). 
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control and/or seniority. But when it comes to GAO, one party does not 
receive more GAO attention simply because it is in power. It has been found 
that minority parties have leveraged this power to protect their prerogatives 
even in times of uni+ed government.388 
We were also told by partisan staff that the Parliamentarians and 
Legislative Counsel help to preserve minority party power by assisting with 
drafting motions (a resource provided equally to both parties, on all sides 
of an issue), and by making sure the minority understands its power and 
uses it properly. 
In a di,erent vein, another set of sta,ers emphasized that CRS was a 
particularly “democratic” bureaucracy: whereas CBO, or even Legislative 
Counsel, must prioritize the work of committee chairs and leadership 
(equally across the two parties) when Congress is particularly busy, CRS has 
the obligation to answer every call with equal attention. For a junior member 
of Congress, particularly in the House, CRS can serve as a critical research 
arm for that member’s o-ce that enhances her power and lawmaking ability. 
MedPAC and MACPAC can serve a similar function for junior members.389 
B. Di"erent Types and Structures of Congressional Bureaucratic Expertise 
There are many ways to be nonpartisan bureaucrats. In structuring its 
bureaucracy, Congress demanded specialization and nonpartisanship of all of 
its bureaucratic institutions. But Congress di,erentiated across the 
institutions in other aspects, making tradeo,s across structural elements. 
Should a nonpartisan agency’s work be authoritative or permissive? 
Con+dential or transparent? Policy neutral or o,ering a conclusion? At what 
point in the legislative process should the bureaucracy be engaged? At least 
some of these tradeo,s are relevant to considerations about the structures of 
executive branch agencies as well. And the tradeo,s contribute to theories of 
oversight. One way Congress can control its bureaucracy is if it does not have 
to use its inputs and assessments. Other o-ces in the congressional 
bureaucracy have mandatory inputs but are governed by transparency rules 
that allow Congress to police that work. Congress also votes on statutes after 
most (but not all) of the congressional bureaucratic input. That is of course 
another signi+cant control. The rest of this Part highlights the key tradeo,s 
and features of Congress’s bureaucracy. 
 
388 See id. (citing Anne Margaret Joseph, supra note ,+(, at $%*-!%). 
389 Sta'er Interview. 
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!. Nonpartisanship 
“You would never go down this road if you had a partisan bone in your body.” 
All nine of the bureaucracy o-ces emphasized nonpartisanship as the 
de+ning characteristic of their work. One interviewee described 
nonpartisanship as the “core of their legitimacy.”390 Two heads of o-ces told 
us that nonpartisanship is what makes their o-ces “valuable” to Congress.391 
And a deputy head of one of the o-ces remarked: 
The nonpartisan nature of the work infuses every conversation we have here 
every day, so both sides of the aisle know no matter who calls us !rst to ask 
the question we give the same answer. It is so ingrained in everything we do 
here every day. Nonpartisan is the core of what we are.392 
This nonpartisanship is anchored in a patchwork of legal requirements. 
Six of the institutions (out of nine, with single-chamber o-ces counted 
individually) have statutory requirements that their o-ce head be appointed 
without regard to political a-liation.393 Six have statutory requirements that 
their sta,s be so appointed.394 Statutory rules for eight provide a role for 
political actors in the appointment of o-ce heads, but CRS’s statute requires 
the head be appointed by a non-elected actor, the Librarian of Congress.395 
Similarly, while statutory rules detail a potential role for political actors in 
sta, hiring for +ve of the institutions, they explicitly omit such a role for 
three such institutions (and are silent for one).396 GAO also pointed toward 
 
390 Sta'er Interview. 
391 Sta'er Interview. 
392 Sta'er Interview. 
393 The six that do are: Senate Legislative Counsel; House Legislative Counsel; OLRC; CRS; 
CBO; House Parliamentarians. Those that do not are: JCT; Senate Parliamentarians; and GAO. 
For the relevant statutory provisions, see supra Part I. In practice, these statutory rules have not 
uniformly protected against appointments being perceived, on rare occasion, as politically 
motivated. See JOYCE, supra note !#), at ,+-#$ (describing the widespread perception that CBO 
Directors appointed in !**" and !*** were selected partly for partisan reasons, and the partisan 
disappointment when those Directors maintained the o-ce’s nonpartisan independence from 
partisan goals). 
394 They are: House Legislative Counsel; OLRC; CBO; House Parliamentarians; CRS; GAO 
(must hire based on merit and &tness). 
395 Those appointed by House Speaker: House Legislative Counsel; Senate Legislative 
Counsel; House Parliamentarians. Appointed by Speaker Pro Tempore: Senate Legislative Counsel. 
Appointed by House Speaker and Senate President pro tempore, with recommendations from 
Budget Committee: CBO. Appointed by President, with Senate con&rmation, after congressional 
submission of recommendations: GAO. Appointed by Joint Committee: JCT. 
396 Those with statutorily de&ned roles for political actor: Senate Legislative Counsel (subject 
to President pro tempore approval); House Legislative Counsel (subject to Speaker approval); Law 
Revision Counsel (with approval of Speaker); JCT (power to hire lodged in Joint Committee); 
House Parliamentarian (with Speaker approval). Those without a role: CBO (power vested in CBO 
Director); CRS (power vested in Librarian of Congress, upon Director’s recommendation); GAO 
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the absence of political appointees below the Comptroller General, for 
example, as a feature that contributed to GAO’s nonpartisan culture.397 
Culture and mission commitment also contribute. All of the bureaucratic 
institutions reported that, despite statutory requirements or lack thereof, they 
hire and promote on a nonpartisan basis. The Senate O-ce of the Legislative 
Counsel is typical. It lacks statutory protections for nonpartisanship in sta, 
hiring, yet it reports on its website that “[n]o change in personnel of the 
O-ce has resulted from any change in political control of the Senate.”398 
Prior research has found that JCT,399 GAO,400 and the Senate 
Parliamentarian’s O-ce401—each of which lacks statutory protections for 
nonpartisanship in the selection of o-ce heads—nonetheless all appoint 
leadership and hire without regard to partisanship, and some nonpartisan 
congressional o-ces also explicitly avoid hiring individuals who have 
previously done partisan work.402 Self-selection also happens on the 
employee side at the hiring stage, as the positions typically lack appeal for 
individuals with strong partisan inclinations. As one sta,er in a 
 
(power in Comptroller, or in Inspector General for Inspector General sta'). Statute is silent for 
Senate Parliamentarian’s O-ce. 
397 Cf. Sta'er Interview (describing the nonpartisan nature of GAO). Anne Joseph O’Connell 
has modeled the empirical incentives for and reality of nonpartisanship among GAO employees. See 
O’Connell, supra note $)%. 
398 Careers, OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, 
https://www.slc.senate.gov/Careers/careers.htm [https://perma.cc/G"CF-P)QH] (last visited Aug. 
+, $%!*). 
399 Notably, even though JCT sta' are nested within a committee, all sources agree that they 
are “assiduously nonpartisan.” Victor Fleischer, The State of America’s Tax Institutions, +! J. L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. ), $!-$$ ($%!+); see also Yin, Tax Legislation, supra note !*,, at $(" (reporting that 
“JCT sta' is increasingly viewed like sta' of a legislative support organization (such as CBO, CRS, 
and GAO) rather than committee sta' ”); Yin, supra note !+, at $$*+ (“Unlike most committee 
sta's . . . the JCT sta' is not a-liated with any party and is not separated into majority and 
minority party sta' members.”). 
400 While the President (a political actor) appoints the Comptroller General, early heads of 
GAO made it clear that their watchdog role was apolitical, and that norm persists today. See ROGER 
R. TRASK, DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST #*-(" (!st ed. !**() (emphasizing the 
independence of the &rst Comptroller General, John R. McCarl, despite the political nature of his 
appointment to the position). 
401 Gould, supra note !(, at $%%( (“[A]lthough removals of the parliamentarian have at times 
been partisan in nature, appointments have always been promotions from within the o-ce or 
restorations to o-ce of past parliamentarians, rather than installations of an outside party loyalist.”). 
402 See, e.g., Careers, supra note ,*+ (“Since the Office provides technical legal services on a 
nonpolitical and confidential basis, and must be impartial in appearance as well as in fact, active 
public participation in political matters is regarded as a disqualification for appointment or 
retention.”); Staffer Interview (“We are nonpartisan. In hiring, if someone says ‘I’d like to work 
for you because I worked on so-and-so’s campaign and really want to advance these ideas,’ we 
reject that application.”). 
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Parliamentarian’s O-ce remarked: “You would never go down this road if 
you had a partisan bone in your body.”403 
O-ce culture further cultivates the view that the primary allegiance is to 
the institution of Congress as a whole. We see similar descriptions in the 
general bureaucracy literature.404 The head of one o-ce said: 
There could be three senators in my o*ce arguing about something, but there 
is always a fourth entity [in that meeting] and [that is the Congress as] an 
institution. You are trying to be the guardian or steward of its unseen needs 
and traditions	.	.		. [t]rying to take a long view, when most [people] coming 
in are just trying to get something done for today.405 
In fact, we were told that this steadfast commitment to nonpartisanship 
is what saved the o-ces of the House Legislative Counsel and 
Parliamentarian in !))", when Speaker Newt Gingrich and the new 
Republican majority revamped many other congressional operations. One 
longtime former nonpartisan sta,er said: 
I attribute this to (+) the institutions being neutral and having worked with, 
and in support of, the minority in the House as well as the majority—[we] 
had personally worked extensively with Gingrich and other political 
generals—less so with their newly enlisted and drunk with power troops; and 
(,) the leadership observation that the revolution re)ected in the +--' 
election would be incapable of carrying out their mandate without the 
professional resources of the legislative quartermaster corps who had the 
logistics to actually produce legislation.406 
This commitment to neutrality was not su-cient to protect all 
nonpartisan o-ces—some o-ces had their budgets or functions reduced at 
 
403 Sta'er Interview. 
404 See, e.g., Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy 
Tasks, *$ J. PUB. ECON. #$(, #,# ($%%+) (noting that bureaucrats focus more on long term 
consequences of policies because they are often “appointed for longer than electoral cycles, precisely 
to avoid short-termist policies” and because “they care about their professional reputation in the 
eyes of their peers”). 
405 Sta'er Interview. 
406 Email from Former Staffer to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Jan. $(, $%$%) (on file with authors). 
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this time,407 and OTA was eliminated.408 For OTA, a combination of factors 
overwhelmed the institution-preserving function of neutrality—including 
Gingrich’s desire to centralize power,409 growing anti-science sentiments 
among some Republican factions,410 a desire for a highly-visible display of 
slashing the federal government,411 and lingering resentment over OTA 
assessments of the “Star Wars” program.412 For Legislative Counsel and the 
Parliamentarian, however, prior displays of neutrality proved vital to the 
cultivation of this support—and, consequently, to their survival both in that 
political transition, and into the current hyper-polarized and increasingly 
centralized environment. This supports George Yin’s suggestion that, in at 
least some instances, the neutral stance of the bureaucracy is key to preserving 
its power and in.uence.413 
*. Specialization and Long Tenure 
“A real cadre of people with institutional loyalty and knowledge . . . .” 
 
407 See R. ERIC PETERSEN AND IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL,,)$#, 
ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES RELATED TO A CHANGE IN MAJORITY IN THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES ($%%() (“[T]he incoming majority in the last weeks of !**# reportedly informed 
managers of several House administrative and support o-ces that they were dismissed.”); Yin, Tax 
Legislation, supra note !*,, at $(!-(" (discussing increased role of partisan sta' in tax policy 
development, at expense of JCT, beginning in early !**%s); Glastris & Edwards, supra note $)% 
(describing Gingrich successfully eliminating OTA and cutting sta' in other congressional service 
agencies, including GAO and CRS); supra note $)% & accompanying text (discussing shift in GAO 
work). 
408 On OTA’s strategy of neutrality, see BRUCE A. BIMBER, THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE IN 
CONGRESS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT #%-)! (!**(). 
Building on Bimber’s study, George Yin has noted that OTA’s neutrality was complicated: the o-ce’s 
founding structure arguably did not promote nonpartisanship, thereby requiring a later pivot to a 
“strategy of neutrality” that, while more successful in establishing the o-ce’s nonpartisanship, 
limited its in.uence. See Yin, supra note !+, at $$**-$,%% & $,!!-$,!". 
409 See Chris Mooney, Requiem for an O"ce, (! BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS #%, ## ($%%") 
(documenting that some attributed OTA’s closure to Gingrich not wanting a voice within Congress 
that might contradict his own); see also Bruce Bartlett, Gingrich and the Destruction of Congressional 
Expertise, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. $*, $%!!, (:%% AM), 
https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/$%!!/!!/$*/gingrich-and-the-destruction-of-congressional-
expertise/ (“Mr. Gingrich’s real purpose was to centralize power in the speaker’s o-ce, which was 
sta'ed with young right-wing zealots who followed his orders without question.”). 
410 See Mooney, supra note #%*, at #" (discussing the linkage between OTA closure and “the 
science politicizing bonanza of the Gingrich Congress”). 
411 See id. at ## (explaining how “the new Congress wanted to prove its willingness to make 
budget cuts in its own house,” and citing Representative Amo Houghton saying that “they were just 
looking for sort of symbolic targets”). 
412 See id. at #, (explaining the dispute over Star Wars assessments that led some to describe 
OTA’s closing as “Reagan’s revenge”). 
413 Yin, supra note !+, at $,!!-$,!$. 
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Specialization is another commonly touted bureaucratic feature in 
general.414 And the congressional bureaucracy’s institutions are likewise 
marked by a very high degree of it. The bureaucracy was created precisely 
because Congress was desperately in need of that expertise. Today, the 
institutions’ size gives the o-ces of the congressional bureaucracy capacity 
for heightened specialization: GAO has more than $,&&& employees,415 CRS 
around %*&,416 CBO *"&,417 Legislative Counsel more than )&,418 and JCT 
%".419 By contrast, the partisan committee with the largest sta, in the House 
is the Appropriations Committee with !!) employees;420 in the Senate it also 
is the Appropriations Committee, with !$$ employees.421 The average size of 
committee sta, in both chambers is about "(.422 
This capacity enables impressive output. GAO has produced thousands 
of sophisticated analyses on topics from energy (*,")$ reports) to health care 
(",!&") to space policy ()*&).423 GAO was directed to conduct over forty 
studies just by the Dodd-Frank Act, for example.424 CRS estimates that every 
year it +elds over %&,&&& informational queries from members on “whatever 
 
414 See LEONARD D. WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
( (!st ed., !*$() (noting that “[t]he problems which crowd upon legislative bodies today are often 
. . . technical questions which the layman can handle only by utilizing the services of the expert,” 
which drives government to incorporate subject-matter experts); see also JAMES W. FESLER & 
DONALD F. KETTL, THE POLITICS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS !( (!**!) (arguing that 
congressional sta' follow “internalized guides to conduct,” including an awareness of the sensitivity 
associated with their role in government, agency loyalty, and professional responsibility) (citing 
MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY !*(-$## (eds. H.H. 
Gerth and C. Wright Mills, !*#()). 
415 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-!+-!SP, SERVING THE CONGRESS AND THE 
NATION !$ ($%!+) (noting that “GAO is composed of roughly ,,%%% employees possessing academic 
degrees in various &elds”). 
416 Email from Sta'er to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Apr. $), $%$%) (on &le with authors). 
417 See Organization and Sta"ng, CONG. BUDGET OFF., 
https://www.cbo.gov/about/organization-and-sta-ng [https://perma.cc/#F"Z-VSWD] (last visited 
May !%, $%$%) (“CBO has about $"% sta' members . . . .”). 
418 See OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS OF THE HOUSE, CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY ($%!+) 
[hereinafter HOUSE DIRECTORY], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDIR-$%!+-!%-
$*/pdf/CDIR-$%!+-!%-$*-HOUSECOMMITTEES-,.pdf [https://perma.cc/+MN+-DEK"] 
(listing the names of o-cers and o-cials of the House; SENATE DIRECTORY, supra note !%! (listing 
the names of o-cers and o-cials of the Senate). 
419 Email from Sta'er to Authors (on &le with authors). 
420 See PETERSEN & WILHELM, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF LEVELS, supra note 
,,, at !,. 
421 See PETERSEN & WILHELM, SENATE STAFF LEVELS, supra note ,,, at *. 
422 Id. 
423 See Reports and Testimonies, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
https://www.gao.gov/docsearch/topic.php [https://perma.cc/RK""-"Z,R] (last visited July ,%, $%!*) 
(listing various GAO reports and testimonies by topic). 
424 See Dodaro, supra note $)$, at !,, (noting that “the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act alone required GAO to conduct more than #% studies”). 
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is hot” at the moment.425 In *&!(, CBO produced )#' formal cost estimates, 
responded to thousands of informational requests, and provided almost !"& 
scorekeeping estimates for appropriations bills.426 JCT emphasized that the 
committee sta, it supports has much smaller sta, than JCT itself. The Ways 
and Means Committee sta,, for example, has only +ve people providing 
services for all of the members on all of their issues. JCT in contrast has forty-
three legislative congressional sta,, including seventeen attorneys. They said: 
“For example, we have one person who does nothing but cross-border issues. 
The Ways and Means [sta,er on that issue] has many other issues [to handle] 
as well.”427 
Legislative Counsel divides drafters into teams that focus on speci+c 
subject areas.428 CBO is organized into nine divisions that are oriented 
around particular modes of analysis or subject matter.429 CRS partitions its 
analysts into six research divisions, as well as four research support o-ces.430 
JCT divides its sta, into interdisciplinary teams. GAO, in addition to having 
several internal management divisions, boasts fourteen “mission teams” that 
each have a special area of policy expertise.431 Even OLRC, one of the 
smallest nonpartisan o-ces, divides its workforce into a codi+cation team and 
a U.S. Code-updating team. 432 
Most of the congressional bureaucracy requires employees to hold 
advanced degrees in speci+c +elds. The Parliamentarians, Legislative 
Counsel, and OLRC all are sta,ed by attorneys.433 GAO’s employees have 
(often advanced) academic degrees in +elds including accounting, law, 
 
425 Sta'er Interview. 
426 CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE’S WORK IN $%!+: A 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ($%!*), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/$%!*-%,/""%##-
CBOsWork$%!+.pdf [https://perma.cc/)*#L-YF#N] (providing an overview of the CBO’s work 
in $%!+). 
427 Sta'er Interview. 
428 Bressman & Gluck, supra note !, at )#(-#); 
429 See Organization and Sta-ng, supra note #!) (listing the various divisions: budget; 
&nancial; health, retirement, and long-term analysis; macroeconomic; management, business, and 
information services; microeconomic; national security; and tax). 
430 MAZANEC, supra note )!, at app. *!-*,. 
431 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note #!", at !, (describing teams’ 
competencies as including defense capabilities and management, healthcare, and natural resources 
and environment). 
432 Sta'er Interview. 
433 See HOUSE DIRECTORY, supra note #!+ (listing counsels in Legislative Counsel o-ces and 
OLRC); Statement Before the House Subcommittee on Legislative Branch Appropriations Regarding Fiscal 
Year '('( Appropriations, !!(th Cong. ) ($%!*) (statement of E. Wade Ballou, Jr., Legislative Counsel) 
(reporting that House o-ce was sta'ed in $%!* by #* attorneys, and a support sta' of !! individuals); 
MATTHEW E. GLASSMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS$%+"(, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE 
COUNSEL: SENATE ! ($%%+) (reporting that Senate o-ce was sta'ed in $%%+ by ,% attorneys along 
with a support sta', Legislative Counsel, and Deputy Legislative Counsel); Gould, supra note !(, at 
!*+* (noting that “[t]he parliamentarians are trained as attorneys”); Sta'er Interview. 
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engineering, economics, and social and physical sciences.434 JCT sta, includes 
attorneys, economists, and experts in accounting and tax analysis.435 At CRS, 
ninety percent of sta,ers have graduate degrees in law, policy, or other +elds 
of expertise.436 
Long tenure is another feature that the congressional bureaucracy shares 
with other common bureaucratic career sta,.437 In CRS, for example, current 
employees have spent an average of thirteen years there, with several working 
for CRS for over +fty years.438 Legislative Counsel and GAO employees are 
of similar longevity.439 OLRC employees noted that: “[G]enerally, we’ve been 
here a long time . . . . [So] there is a real cadre of people with institutional 
loyalty and knowledge . . . . who interact with each other informally to get 
stu, done . . . .”440 JCT sta, commented that their “expertise is longer, we’ve 
seen stu, before. Our tenure is longer.”441 
As in Weber’s paradigm, each institution respects its own jurisdictional 
boundaries and the expertise and terrain of others. JCT sta,, for example, 
emphasized that they pride themselves on “good tax policy” and that they 
relatedly have a commitment to working with their +eld-speci+c counterparts 
in the executive branch—the nonpartisan Treasury sta,.442 These JCT sta, 
comments were typical of those we heard from others: “Our comparative 
expertise is we have greater specialization . . . . We have !" lawyers plus 
accountants and we can specialize. Legislative Counsel brings drafting 
expertise. . . . Political sta, brings a closer understanding of policy and 
 
434 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note #!", at !$ (noting that many of GAO 
employees hold degrees in listed &elds). 
435 See About Us—Overview, supra note $%! (“The Joint Committee operates with an 
experienced professional sta' of Ph.D economists, attorneys, and accountants . . . .”). 
436 Evans, supra note (, at #$$ (“Ninety percent of CRS sta' hold master’s, law, or doctoral 
degrees.”). 
437 The median tenure of federal employees is over eight years. Employee Tenure Summary, 
BUREAU LABOR STATS. (Sept. $%, $%!+), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nr%.htm 
[https://perma.cc/,V#M-GK+T]. This has positive consequences for policymaking. See supra Part I 
(discussing bureaucratic sta' ’s nonpartisan character). 
438 See Email from Sta'er to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Apr. $), $%$%) (on &le with authors) 
(discussing the average length of tenure for CRS sta' members). 
439 See Shobe, supra note ,,, at +$,-$" (reporting “almost all attorneys staying with the 
[Legislative Counsel] o-ces for more than twenty-&ve years”); GAO AT A GLANCE, supra note $)$ 
(noting that the Comptroller serves a “!"-year term—one of the longest in government” and that 
GAO’s “workforce consists of career employees”). 
440 Sta'er Interview. 
441 Id. 
442 Id. We cannot resist here introducing the idea of what we might call “picket fence 
administrative law”—the cooperative relationships between nonpartisan bureaucrats across branches 
that seems to parallel the concept of “picket fence federalism” in the political science literature. Cf. 
TERRY SANFORD, STORM OVER THE STATES +% (!*() (describing government as like “like a 
picket fence” in that it keeps “lines of authority, the concerns and interests, the .ow of the money, 
and the direction of programs” in line, but does not bring them together). 
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members’ preferences.”443 The sta, in a Parliamentarian’s O-ce told us: “We 
are the procedural navigators. Our knowledge isn’t replicated anywhere 
else.”444 A GAO interviewee added: “We have a multidisciplin[ary] 
workforce. Most of [our] workforce have advanced degrees [and] have 
specialties that aren’t represented with sta,. [B]ecause we don’t have to 
respond to the political process, we can make plans and look at programs in a 
very orderly fashion.”445 
This high degree of specialization stands in contrast to the political policy 
sta, and members themselves. Interviewees emphasized that Congress is now 
experiencing a greater “churning” of partisan congressional sta, and that 
“new folks” are coming in who “need to get up to speed.”446 The relative youth 
of that sta, was also emphasized, as was their transient nature.447 
Interviewees also told us that political sta, “doesn’t have time” to cultivate 
expertise or specialized knowledge, and that “members are coming from more 
nontraditional [i.e., non-legal or policy] backgrounds . . . with di,erent types 
of expertise” and that may change “how we need to get them up to speed.”448 
Sta, who work directly for members are generally less expert than committee 
sta,, and House member sta,s tend to be less experienced than Senate 
member sta,s.449 
Through the combination of nonpartisanship and specialization, these 
o-ces foster a perception in Congress that they are valuable and trustworthy. 
In a recent survey of partisan congressional sta,, Kevin Kosar gathered sta,er 
impressions regarding the frequency of use and reliability of di,erent 
congressional support actors in budget and healthcare policy.450 Kosar found 
that sta,ers ranked each nonpartisan o-ce included in the survey (GAO, 
CRS, and CBO) as more trustworthy across all topics (signi+cantly so with a 
minor exception451) than each of: professional committee sta,, bureaucratic 
 
443 Sta'er Interview. There are now !) lawyers. 
444 Sta'er Interview. 
445 Id. 
446 Id. 
447 Many members’ political sta' are “young, right out of college . . . .” Bressman & Gluck, 
supra note !, at )"(. The average age of congressional sta' is around ,%. See Jennifer M. Jensen, 
Explaining Congressional Sta! Members’ Decisions to Leave the Hill, ,+ CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY ,*, 
## tbl.! ($%!!); see also Cross, Legislative History, supra note ! (parsing these sta'er di'erences). 
448 Sta'er Interview. 
449 Sta'er Interviews; see also Cross, Legislative History, supra note ! (parsing these sta'er 
di'erences). 
450 Kosar, supra note $", at !$. 
451 Professional committee sta' ranked very close to CBO—professional sta' received a mean 
score for trustworthiness (on a scale from zero to three) that was .%! higher than the score for CBO 
for budget whereas CBO’s mean score was .%$ higher for healthcare—but CBO still scored much 
more highly than all of the other actors, and CRS and GBO both beat professional committee sta' 
on both budget and healthcare by large margin Id. 
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agencies, party leadership, members similar to one’s own boss, caucuses, the 
administration, and state delegation members452; CBO and CRS were also 
reported to be the most frequently used support actors along with 
professional committee sta,.453 
$. Nonpartisan Is Not Necessarily Position-Neutral or Non Substantive 
There are di,erent ways to be nonpartisan and to use specialized 
expertise. For starters, there is a di,erence between being nonpartisan and 
being position-neutral, although almost nothing the congressional 
bureaucracy does is devoid of substance. 
With respect to those institutions that do not reach policy conclusions: 
OLRC, and to some extent Legislative Counsel and the Parliamentarians, do 
not take substantive positions on one side of a question or another, but the 
Parliamentarians will give members advice about procedural matters and how 
to structure bills to bring them within (or keep them out of) a particular 
committee’s jurisdiction. Their decisions have an important impact on the 
ultimate shape of legislation. Legislative Counsel will not judge the merits of 
any statute but will express views about the best way to phrase language or 
provisions that should be added. 
Unlike the executive branch bureaucracy, the congressional bureaucracy 
performs its tasks for both the majority party and the party not in control. 
Legislative Counsel, for instance, may have views about how to write clear 
language, use cross references, and so on, but those views will be consistently 
applied between the majority and minority draft legislation. They will work 
on whatever policy, we were told, “no matter how despicable,” that members 
ask them to draft. It is common for a single Legislative Counsel drafter to 
help members of both parties draft opposing legislation on the same policy 
question, often simultaneously. JCT sta, told us “all the time, we advise 
members of opposite parties about the same issue.”454 
Similarly, OLRC’s mission is the same regardless of whose law OLRC is 
working on. As one interviewee described the o-ce’s role: “[It] doesn’t matter 
to us whether a policy is liberal or conservative, wise or stupid. We are looking 
for clarity of expression and that’s it.”455 
In contrast, those congressional bureaucrats that are nonpartisan, but 
more policy focused, do issue conclusions about legislative proposals that may 
be preferred by one side or another. In many cases, these are conclusions 
about whether the proposals comport with rules or goals that, again, Congress 
 
452 Id. 
453 Id. at !,. 
454 Sta'er Interview. 
455 Id. 
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has articulated for itself ex ante. CBO and JCT issue conclusions about the 
+scal impact of proposed legislation—conclusions that are used, among other 
things, to determine if legislation comports with Congress’s stated +scal 
goals. CBO, as noted, established its independence early by issuing estimates 
at odds with the policy goals of Congress and an Administration from the 
CBO director’s own party. CRS likewise told us: 
We are not the decision maker. We can draw pros and cons and arrive at 
conclusions, but we don’t advocate.	.	. . We are an objective organization. We 
don’t tell members what the best option is and what they should vote for. 
That’s not our job. But it is not uncommon for us to come to a rather !rm 
conclusion .	.	.	. We have to present the minority position in order to fully 
inform members about any given issue.456 
George Yin also has recounted a now-famous battle inside CRS over the 
drawing of policy conclusions.457 There, a CRS analyst had published an 
academic article critical of government decisionmaking that led to the Iraq 
war, leading the CRS Director to caution against taking “public positions” 
related to an analyst’s research in outside publications.458 In a response, the 
analyst suggested the Director’s stance could have a chilling e,ect, preventing 
analysts from drawing conclusions even in CRS publications (which typically 
draw conclusions when appropriate).459 The Congressional Research 
Employees Association also weighed in, releasing a statement in support of 
the analyst.460 (CRS sta, we interviewed, however, disputed that CRS 
management had ever discouraged drawing conclusions and pointed to recent 
instances of CRS taking controversial stances.)461 
This dispute reveals the competing conceptions of nonpartisanship that 
the congressional bureaucracy navigates. On the one hand, the analyst had 
expressed the opinion that, if not permitted to draw policy conclusions, the 
utility of his expertise would be greatly diminished. As Yin notes, the dispute 
 
456 Id. 
457 See Yin, supra note !+, at $,!(-!*. 
458 See Louis Fisher, Deciding on War Against Iraq: Institutional Failures, !!+ POL. SCI. Q. ,+* 
($%%,) (analyst article); DANIEL P. MULHOLLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DIRECTOR’S 
STATEMENT, OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES: PRESERVING OBJECTIVITY AND NON-PARTISANSHIP $ 
($%%#) (Director statement). 
459 Memorandum from Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist, Cong. Research Serv., to Daniel P. 
Mulhollan, Dir., Cong. Research Serv. $ (Jan. ,!, $%%#), http://www.fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/&sher%!,!%#.pdf. 
460 POSITION STATEMENT, CONGR. RESEARCH EMPS. ASS’N, OUTSIDE WRITING, 
LECTURING ACTIVITIES BY CRS STAFF: OBJECTIVITY ,–# ($%%#), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/crea%"!$%#.pdf. 
461 Sta'er Interview. For an example of CRS taking and defending a controversial stance, see 
supra note #+# and accompanying text (discussing CRS report receiving public criticism from Sen. 
Grassley and others). 
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thereby highlighted the risk that neutrality, when understood as a reluctance 
to draw conclusions, can pose to the bene+ts o,ered by expertise. On the 
other hand, CREA forcefully defended analysts issuing policy conclusions 
when derived from “generally accepted methodologies of analysis and 
scholarship.”462 In so doing, it o,ered a competing vision where policy 
conclusions are nonpartisan when anchored in neutral, expert methodologies. 
These institutions—and Congress in utilizing them—do consistently rely 
on their established methodologies to claim an objective legitimacy even in 
the face of side-taking. Parliamentarians operate based on the principle of 
precedent, and publish their precedents, but render decisions applying 
precedents that will favor one side or the other. JCT, GAO, CBO, and CRS 
issue analyses that may cut in favor of one position, but all of them forcefully 
emphasize the same principle of relying upon a consistent, published, and 
justi+ed methodology as critical to their objectivity and nonpartisan 
credibility—a Weberian focus on rationalization that they argue lends 
neutrality or objectivity even to conclusions that some members might not 
wish to receive. As one interviewee remarked: 
I’ve always seen a tendency to ascribe advice that is not what they wanted to 
some political motive. I think the only way we can combat that is [to] be 
available to go over that with them and use precedents and so on to show 
them that we have history of doing things this way.463 
Congress has had hearings on JCT and CBO’s methodologies by way of 
oversight.464 As JCT sta, told us: 
What does nonpartisan mean? This is why there’s lots of pressure on 
modeling and transparency. Some members are disturbed that the way they 
think the world’s going to work doesn’t square with our estimates, so [we say 
 
462 Id. 
463 See Sta'er Interview. See generally Gould, supra note !(. 
464 Republicans have criticized these o-ces’ reluctance to calculate important cost estimates 
through “dynamic scoring,” a process whereby cost estimates incorporate the macroeconomic e'ects 
of a bill. See Wendy Edelberg, Dynamic Scoring at CBO, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Oct. $!, $%!"), 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/"%*!*. Republicans long argued that this policy led to unduly 
harsh assessments of tax cuts. See JOYCE, supra note !#), at (*; Jonathan Weisman, House Republicans 
Change Rules on Calculating Economic Impact of Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. (, $%!"), 
https://www.nytimes.com/$%!"/%!/%)/business/house-republicans-change-rules-on-calculating-
economic-impact-of-bills.html. In $%!", these criticisms culminated in the !!#th Congress mandating 
that dynamic scoring be used in certain instances. S. Con. Res. !!, !!#th Cong., § ,!!$ ($%!"). Until 
that time, CBO and JCT had resisted political pressure on this matter, even after a change of 
leadership at CBO in !**" and !*** that many Republicans assumed would bring more receptive 
administrations. JOYCE, supra note !#), at (*; id. at )+. 
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to them,] here are our methods and our evidence for why we are lining up a 
certain way.465 
#. Policy Versus Procedure 
Within Congress, the political sta,s (those who work for members, 
committees, and leadership) undoubtedly are the primary specialists in policy 
development. As noted, however, some o-ces in the congressional 
bureaucracy explicitly provide critical policy development work for Congress. 
Congress tends to control those institutions’ policy work by making the 
members’ use of it optional. Others primarily play a procedural role—
assisting a policy idea on its journey toward legislative enactment—but even 
procedural work can have policy implications. 
CRS and GAO (and MedPAC and MACPAC) provide the most direct 
substantive policy support. Those o-ces independently (i.e., without speci+c 
congressional solicitation) may produce policy reports that Congress can use 
as it wishes.466 GAO has documented that many of its reports have played a 
mobilizing role in the ideation of legislation.467 JCT sta,, while more reactive 
than proactive, also supply the bulk of tax policy expertise to sta,ers across 
various committees—especially Senate Finance and House Ways and 
Means—working on tax issues.468 
Some straddle the policy–procedure divide. Legislative Counsel, for 
instance, is tasked only with taking members’ policy ideas and “translat[ing] 
those ideas into statutory language and legalese.”469 In practice, however, the 
o-ces’ deep knowledge of statutory regimes—and their institutional memory 
of past congressional successes and failures—often leads political actors to 
seek out input on how best to address policy concerns. 
OLRC occupies a similar position. Its assigned task is to capture the 
already-enacted intent of Congress, not to develop new policy ideas. 
Nonetheless, it still engages in something that bleeds into policy when it 
reconceptualizes (indeed its authorizing legislation uses the word 
“restatement”) separately enacted pubic laws as belonging together under a 
new single title of the U.S. Code.470 So, too, OLRC makes signi+cant policy-
 
465 Sta'er Interview. 
466 See Reports & Testimonies: Recommendations Database, supra note $)+ (listing GAO’s pending 
recommendations); see also Sta'er Interview (noting Comptroller authority to initiate 
investigations); id. (noting CRS authority to initiate research into “general congressional interests,” 
whether current or anticipated). 
467 See GAO AT A GLANCE supra note $)$ (stating that GAO work has helped “shape[] 
legislation”). 
468 See supra notes $%!–$!! (reviewing JCT’s key role in federal tax policy). 
469 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note !; see also Sta'er Interview. 
470 $ U.S.C. § $+"(b)(!) ($%!+). 
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implicating determinations when it decides which parts of a statute will be 
inserted into the main text of the U.S. Code versus those parts that will be 
relegated to largely-invisible side notes (a function of OLRC, surprising and 
unknown to many, that we detail below471). These editorial and conceptual 
functions are critical to shaping how legislation reads and is understood by 
the public after enactment, but they do not re.ect the underlying policy 
decisions leading up to enactment. 
The Parliamentarians’ O-ces engage mostly in procedure. While the 
work of these o-ces has high-stakes policy implications, they are almost 
never enlisted to assist in policy development, except insofar as they advise 
sta, who to draft around procedural hurdles. 
". Con+dential Versus Transparent: “The Atmosphere Has Changed” 
Not all expertise-giving is apparent to the public. As we discuss in Part 
III, massive changes in how Congress operates—most importantly, 
departures from the regular-order, textbook process of lawmaking—have 
pushed much of the expertise-giving by the congressional bureaucracy earlier 
in the process and made it generally less visible. But here we wish to highlight 
another distinction that is a familiar tradeo, in administrative law: some 
expertise that these institutions develop is intended to be con+dential, while 
some is not. 
Each approach comes with its own risks. Con+dential expertise can be 
manipulated (another way Congress can control its bureaucracy) and used to 
shift blame. Transparent expertise can get politicized. 
Congress has written speci+c con+dentiality obligations into the organic 
statutes of CRS, House Legislative Counsel, and the CBO,472 but private 
consultations with all of the nonpartisan o-ces that we studied are totally 
con+dential—a practice that, for many o-ces, extends even to when members 
commission reports.473 Members can use information they commission if 
helpful, but never release it if harmful to their position.474 Sta,ers from all 
these agencies told us that members “+nd us useful. They can hide behind us 
 
471 See infra Section IV.B. 
472 $ U.S.C. § !(((i) ($%!+); $ U.S.C. § $+!a ($%!+); $ U.S.C. § (%,(d) ($%!+). 
473 See Sta'er Interview (noting that if members and sta' “request that something is 
con&dential, it’s automatically con&dential”); id. (emphasizing that private consultations remain 
private). 
474 See Sta'er Interviews; see also Lisa Rein, Trying to Crack Open Congress’s Con#dential Think 
Tank After a Century of Secrecy, WASH. POST (Oct. $*, $%!", (:"( PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/$%!"/!%/$*/a-con&dential-arm-of-congress-
gets-more-secretive/ (“For !%! years, the Congressional Research Service has conducted studies for 
members of the Senate and House, and the &ndings have remained con&dential unless the 
lawmakers release the research themselves.”). 
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sometimes or use us to delay. They can tell constituents they submitted a 
question and haven’t heard back.”475 And: “Yes, they can request [information] 
and choose to release or not if it comports with their political purposes. If 
they hear something from us they don’t like, we won’t tell anyone we spoke 
to them.”476   
Even when o-cial public input is ultimately the goal, members and sta, 
frequently +rst consult informally—and con+dentially—with all parts of the 
congressional bureaucracy. They routinely ask CBO about projections, or the 
Parliamentarians about jurisdictional and procedural questions, before 
seeking formal, public opinions from those entities.477 We were repeatedly 
told that this dialogic process of informal and typically con+dential expertise-
giving and subsequent legislation-changing—whether to get the bill to a 
particular budget number or to tweak the subject matter for a particular 
committee referral—greatly impacts what is ultimately written into the 
statute’s text. So does the substantive feedback that the o-ces may provide 
in con+dential consultations, such as when MedPAC or MACPAC provide 
commentary on early legislative proposals or drafts.478 
GAO operates under a stronger default norm of transparency agreed to 
ex ante with Congress. Most of GAO’s work happens in public, although 
GAO does informally consult with members in private. GAO emphasized the 
transparency of its actions as a core feature of its credibility.479 Notably, 
legislative reforms in recent years have called for more transparency in the 
various nonpartisan congressional institutions, with respect to both their 
processes and their work products.480 But our interviews suggest some 
caution may be warranted. In recent years, the CBO has found that 
publication of its cost estimates has dragged the o-ce into the partisan fray.481 
 
475 Sta'er Interview. 
476 Id. 
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478 Sta'er Interviews. 
479 See id.; see also supra notes ,!!-,!, (noting the similar transparency emphasis for MedPAC 
and MACPAC). 
480 See, e.g., Aprill & Hemel, supra note !+( at !,,–," (calling for greater transparency in Senate 
Parliamentarian rulings on the Byrd rule); Rebecca M. Kysar, Tax Law and the Eroding Budget Process, 
+! LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (!, *$–*, ($%!+) (discussing a proposed “CBO Show Your Work Act” 
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imposition of a requirement for CRS to publish its reports, as well as criticisms that CRS is not 
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481 See Alan Rappeport, C.B.O. Head, Who Prizes Nonpartisanship, Finds Work Under Attack, N.Y. 
TIMES (June !*, $%!)), https://www.nytimes.com/$%!)/%(/!*/us/politics/cbo-congressional-budget-
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For example, CBO drew major heat after its in.uential A,ordable Care Act 
forecasts.482 CRS also has come under political pressure for conclusions it 
draws in published materials, such as a *&!) CRS report about the economic 
e,ects from the *&!' tax reform legislation483—a report met with partisan 
criticism from political commentators, the Treasury Department, and the 
Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Chuck Grassley.484 
Parliamentarians also have come under media and political scrutiny 
precisely at moments when high-stakes, procedural rulings became public.485 
On rare occasions, the Senate has even +red the Parliamentarian, including 
in the wake of controversial rulings.486 More recently, some members have 
 
o-ce.html [https://perma.cc/GZ##-WRAN] (noting that the CBO and its “facts and data have 
increasingly come under assault by politics”). 
482 See, e.g., Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Real Arithmetic of Health Care Reform, N.Y. TIMES 
(March $%, $%!%), https://www.nytimes.com/$%!%/%,/$!/opinion/$!holtz-eakin.html 
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Senate Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. $!, $%!)), https://www.nytimes.com/$%!)/%)/$!/upshot/byrd-
bath-seven-provisions-that-could-disappear-from-the-senate-health-bill.html (covering Byrd bath 
over A'ordable Care Act repeal); Dylan Scott, Senate’s Budget Rules Invalidate Key Provisions in 
Republican Health Care Bill, VOX (Jul. $!, $%!)), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
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(noting political scrutiny of Parliamentarians for A'ordable Care Act rulings). 
486 When a new party took over the Senate in the !*+%s and !**%s, it regularly installed a new 
Parliamentarian. See HATCHER, supra note $,(, at ,$; Gould, supra note !(, at $%%" (“Senate 
parliamentarians have been removed several times . . . .”); see also Wallner, supra note $$#, at ,*$ 
(noting that “in !*+!, the new Republican Majority Leader Howard Baker removed Murray Zweben 
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argued that the Vice President should play the role of Parliamentarian487—a 
threat made possible by virtue of the fact the Senate Parliamentarian exists 
only for the grace of Congress.488 As the only nonpartisan congressional 
institution without an organic statute, its very existence is especially 
precarious. As we were told, the Senate Parliamentarian “is out there without 
a net.”489 
Sta,ers from all nine o-ces told us that congressional bureaucrats “would 
never take those jobs so they can carry out some [political] purpose,” even as 
some noted “the atmosphere has changed” and “nonpartisan sta, are being 
impugned.”490 They worried about the “huge e,ort to minimize CBO and 
GAO and other organizations we use to function every day,” which often 
comes in the form of public criticism of those o-ces’ outward-facing work.491 
The more transparent the bureaucracy work has been, the greater the public 
oversight and the more it has come under this kind of pressure.492 
%. Authoritative Versus Permissive 
Some of Congress’s nonpartisan institutions have limited mandatory 
responsibilities. Others are a statutorily required step in the legislative 
process. But one di,erence across the board from the executive bureaucracy 
 
487 See, e.g., Alexander Bolton, Cruz: Let’s Override Senate O"ce to Expand ObamaCare Bill, THE 
HILL (March *, $%!), #:"+ PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/,$,$)$-cruz-lets-overrule-
senate-o-cer-to-expand-obamacare-bill [https://perma.cc/PC*K-$LBA] (describing Ted Cruz’s 
statements that Mike Pence should wield more power over the Senate in order to permit inclusion 
of additional provisions in health care reconciliation bill). 
488 The Senate Parliamentarian has no independent originating statute but exists per the 
statutory authority of the Secretary of the Senate to establish positions under her purview. $ U.S.C. 
§ (",* ($%!+). There is also a statutory provision setting forth the maximum compensation for the 
Senate Parliamentarian. Id. at § (",". 
489 Sta'er Interview. 
490 Sta'er Interview. 
491 Id. 
492 See, e.g., Je' Stein, Ellen Nakashime, & Erica Werner, White House Hold on Ukraine Aid 
Violated Federal Law, Congressional Watchdog Says, WASH. POST (Jan. !(, $%$%) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/white-house-hold-on-ukraine-aid-violated-
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d()#))$db*(b_story.html [https://perma.cc/M"VC-VYJW] (reporting that Russell Vought, the 
acting director of the O-ce of Management and Budget, derided GAO assessment that the Trump 
administration broke the law by withholding Ukraine aid, tweeting that GAO’s “opinion comes from 
the same people who said we couldn’t keep National Parks open during the shutdown”). For a 
connection to the executive bureaucracy literature, see ROGER TAYLOR & TIM KELSEY, Critiques of 
Transparency, in TRANSPARENCY AND THE OPEN SOCIETY ,#-#" ($%!() (discussing the negative 
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is that most of the work of the congressional bureaucracy does not have formal 
legal e,ect without some additional action from Congress. 
Use of CRS and the Legislative Counsel is voluntary.493 CBO’s cost 
estimates, on the other hand, are a necessary hurdle most bills must clear. 
Federal law mandates that each bill or resolution approved by any 
congressional committee (other than an appropriations committee) receive a 
CBO estimate.494 House rules additionally require these estimates to be 
published in committee reports495 and that legislation may be considered in 
the House only if, over various timeframes, that legislation does not increase 
the de+cit or reduce the surplus—a determination that, partly by statutory 
mandate and partly by custom, is made by reference to CBO’s cost 
estimates496 (but a House majority vote can waive the rule, and legislation has 
been passed without a score, or with a score after passage).497 JCT plays an 
analogous, mandatory role with respect to revenue-raising legislation. 
 
493 This is in contrast to many other countries where legislators are required to use professional 
drafters. In Canada, England, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, and France, use of professional 
drafting services is required, not optional. See John Bell, What Is the Function of the Conseil D’etat in 
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Parliamentary Counsel, AUSTL. GEN., https://www.opc.gov.au (last visited May !$, $%$%) (the O-ce 
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of Australia); Role of the Parliamentary Counsel O"ce, PARLIAMENTARY COUNS. OFF., 
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494 See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of !*)#, Pub. L. No. *,-,##, 
§ #%$, ++ Stat. $*).. 
495 See RULE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, !!(th Cong., Rule XIII.,(c)(,) (“The 
report of a committee on a measure that has been approved by the committee shall include . . . [a]n 
estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget O-ce . . . .”). For 
tax legislation, CBO simply publishes the estimate made by the JCT. See Pub. L. No. **-!)) § $), 
(codi&ed at $ U.S.C. § (%!(f) ($%!+)) (requiring CBO use of JCT estimates for revenue e'ects). 
496 Technically, the Committee on the Budget determines, relative to a baseline calculated by 
the Congressional Budget O-ce, whether the legislation complies. In practice, CBO determines 
both the baseline and the impact of the legislation. 
497 See, e.g., Kelsey Snell, Here’s How Much Congress Has Approved for Coronavirus Relief So Far 
and What It’s For, NPR (May !", $%$%), https://www.npr.org/$%$%/%"/!"/+"#))#(+!/congress-has-
approved-,-trillion-for-coronavirus-relief-so-far-heres-a-breakdown (noting that “In several cases 
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GAO publishes a “Red Book” of appropriations opinions that are viewed 
as precedential inside Congress. These opinions are not binding on the 
judiciary, and GAO has no enforcement powers, but courts do give them 
“special weight.”498 When the Comptroller General exercises its statutory 
power to “settle all accounts of the United States Government and supervise 
the recovery of all debts,” the balance the Comptroller certi+es is “conclusive 
on the executive branch.”499 
Parliamentarian decisions are often treated as conclusive within Congress, 
even though statutes and chamber rules do not mandate their use in the 
legislative process. On a few procedural matters over the last few decades, 
Senators have ignored (or overturned by a majority vote) Parliamentarians’ 
decisions500—including in the much-discussed instances in which the Senate 
has invoked the “nuclear option” in order to override supermajority rules for 
federal judicial appointments.501 
Notably, many o-ces in the congressional bureaucracy with authoritative 
powers are required to exercise those powers transparently, through public 
reports or opinions. We think it is no coincidence that those o-ces are the 
ones most at risk of politicization.502 The combination of their visibility and 
the importance of their rulings puts them in the oversight spotlight. 
'. Trust with Low Salience Tasks: Why OLRC? “No Members Know 
We’re Here” 
It is worth noting that OLRC inhabits an odd place on this spectrum. 
OLRC is required to prepare the U.S. Code for publication; that aspect of its 
work is mandatory. But it is up to OLRC to decide when a new title should 
be created and what it should contain, and Congress is not required to take 
any action on codi+cation bills prepared by the o-ce. OLRC can organize 
and reclassify enacted statutes into coherent legal titles, but it is up to 
Congress whether to formally enact those titles as so-called “positive law.” As 
 
[on the emergency Coronavirus relief bills], Congress voted on the relief spending . . . without an 
o-cial cost estimate from the Congressional Budget O-ce.”). 
498 Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, #%% F.,d *, !( (D.C. Cir. $%%") (quoting United Auto., 
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. Donovan, )#( F.$d +"", +(! (D.C. Cir. !*+#)); supra note 
$+) (citations to Red Book by the Supreme Court). 
499 ,! U.S.C. §§ ,"$((a), (d) ($%!+). 
500 See Gould, supra note !(, at !*)(-)). By one count, such an appeal has been successfully 
carried out seventeen times between !*+% and $%!,. See Wallner, supra note $$#, at ,*! (“In the ,% 
years since the Republicans took over the majority in !*+% . . . [t]he full Senate overturned the 
decision of the Chair only !) times . . . .”). 
501 On the “nuclear option” and its recent uses, see supra note $"%. 
502 In the case of the A'ordable Care Act and its repeal, for example, see supra note #+" 
(discussing politicization of Parliamentarians); supra note ,(+ & infra note ,)% (discussing 
politicization of CBO). 
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noted, half of the titles of the U.S. Code (including important titles like Title 
#*, which contains the civil rights laws) have been organized by OLRC (or 
prior codi+ers) but never formally enacted by Congress as positive law titles. 
OLRC sta, told us several times there is a “total lack of political will” to 
enact codi+cation bills: 
Members don’t care about positive law codi!cation bills. Members care about, 
at best, policy and constituents, but making law easier to read and understand 
and navigate or correcting technical errors? They don’t care about that .	.	.	. 
What member ever went back to a town hall meeting and said, you know, “I 
got a U.S. Code title codi!ed!”?503 
We were surprised to learn from our interviews of partisan sta, that most 
sta,ers do not even know what OLRC does, or where it is! Due to this lack 
of political salience, OLRC is not sought out by members. As they put it: 
“No members know we are here.”504 
Why have an o-ce no one cares about enough to use? The need to 
organize the U.S. Code in ways that make statutes and their amendments 
accessible to the public is uncontroverted. But why give that responsibility to 
a nonpartisan agency? Why not the Speaker’s O-ce? 
One reason, we believe, is precisely because no one is watching. As one 
interviewee put it: “Someone needs to do this. You need someone to run this 
stu, down. You have to have someone who isn’t going to slip something by. 
Congress isn’t going to be tracking it down.”505 In other words, the 
nonpartisan and politically dull stance of OLRC, ex ante, gives it the 
credibility to do work that is needed, but that Congress does not care about 
enough to supervise. 
As with other studies of bureaucracies, OLRC’s institutional design 
enables it to take on projects with long-term, di,use bene+ts (but 
correspondingly low political salience). Its sta, are incentivized not by the 
electoral connection, but by their own commitment to professionalism far 
beyond the next election cycle.506 
 
503 Sta'er Interview. 
504 Id. But see Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 
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a provision in a non-positive title). Stephen Lubben, who &rst brought attention to this provision, 
found no other examples of Congress directing placement for non-positive provisions. See Stephen 
J. Lubben, PROMESA and the Bankruptcy Clause: A Reminder About Uniformity, !$ BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. ",, (% n."# ($%!)). 
505 Id. 
506 See Alesina & Tabellini, supra note #%#, at #,# (noting that “bureaucrats care about their 
professional reputation in the eyes of their peers”). 
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(. Timing 
Finally, expertise comes in all stages of the legislative process—including 
both pre- and post-enactment. The timing of congressional bureaucratic 
intervention is particularly interesting because, in addition to shedding light 
on the modern Congress’s operations, it also creates a far more nuanced view 
of where “lawmaking” stops and starts. We return to this point in Part IV. 
Some o-ces play a mobilizing role in the generation of legislation. GAO 
produces policy reports containing speci+c recommendations that can inspire 
legislators and sta, to take action.507 CRS submits to Congress a list of 
expiring provisions in current law, thereby identifying possible topics for 
legislation.508 And OLRC even noti+es members and Legislative Counsel of 
errors and inconsistencies in the law as enacted so that corrective measures 
can be passed.509 
The Parliamentarian interjects expertise very early when called upon to 
make the critical decision about referrals to committee. (Consistent with the 
+ndings in the Gluck/Bressman study, it was repeatedly emphasized that 
“referral to committee remains hugely important.”510) Legislative Counsel 
translates policy sta, goals into statutory language, and CBO and JCT 
calculate the cost of the legislation. JCT sta,, as noted, is directly involved in 
nearly all stages of the legislative process.511 CRS drafts the bill summaries 
that appear on Congress.gov after their introduction.512 Germaneness rules 
and the Byrd rule create an important role for the Parliamentarians’ O-ces. 
During this iterative process, the congressional bureaucracy’s various 
o-ces have di,erent roles, but they do not operate as silos. CBO relies on 
JCT estimates in the tax and revenue context. Partisan sta, bring the 
Parliamentarians into dialogue with Legislative Counsel to develop statutory 
text that receives a desired committee referral. CRS may draft a report on 
proposed legislation that partisan sta, will pass to Legislative Counsel to 
draft. JCT describes their role as one of transforming a concept into a 
concrete plan, but told us they then work hand-in-hand with Legislative 
Counsel to translate that plan to text. Language and substance are tweaked 
 
507 See supra notes $)+–$+% (discussing GAO policy reports). 
508 $ U.S.C. § !(((d)($) ($%!+). 
509 Sta'er Interview. One of the authors also has &rst-hand experience with this because, as a 
drafter in Legislative Counsel, he received such edits. 
510 See Sta'er Interview (discussing committee referral). With regard to committee referral, 
LRC sta' were particularly attuned to how legislation is often carefully drafted to obtain (or avoid) 
a certain referral: “From the inside, where the real acid wars take place is committee jurisdiction. 
How things are written in the law has to do with, ‘My God, we have to keep it away from so and so 
in the subcommittee.’” Sta'er Interview. 
511 See supra Part I.E. 
512 See Sta'er Interview (noting that CRS writes bill summaries that are published on 
Congress.gov). 
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and tweaked again to get legislation within the budget and revenue goals 
members have set. A GAO sta,er remarked: 
We talk to each other all the time. We are very supportive of each other; we 
want to be sure we stay in our lanes. At the end of the day, we are all here to 
serve Congress and support congressional prerogatives. We do it in our own 
way. Some of CBO’s work overlaps with GAO; everyone is respectful of that. 
Same with CRS. Congressional sta" knows how to use us.513 
A CRS sta,er similarly noted: “There is a complementary relationship 
across GAO, CRS, and CBO in terms of our various mission spaces . . . [as] 
de+ned by Congress.”514 
Later in the process, JCT also drafts the legislative history for tax aspects 
of most bills before they are passed (usually for the Senate Finance and House 
Ways and Means Committees). CRS may be called in at any stage, whether 
to assess new ideas, analyze proposed legislation, or evaluate already passed 
legislation. CRS also provides data and analysis for committee reports.515 
Legislative Counsel drafts some special legislative history, conference reports, 
and even amendments on the .oor until the moment of the vote. 
Most interestingly—in part because it is least well known—OLRC begins 
its in.uential work reorganizing and editing the positive and non-positive law 
titles of the U.S Code only after enactment. This includes textual changes 
(those changes, for positive law titles, are voted on in codi+cation bills but 
not for the nonpositive titles). Other o-ces have post-enactment roles as 
well. JCT comes back into the picture to draft the “Blue Book,” its in.uential 
post-enactment synthesis. And GAO, in its role as the watchdog that oversees 
agency implementation, often begins the cycle anew by producing policy 
reports that contain speci+c recommendations for new legislative action—
whether to address gaps in in oversight or to reign in agencies who are 
implementing laws improperly.516 
III. LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION THEORY 
At one of his last oral arguments before his death, Justice Antonin Scalia 
debated with Justice Stephen Breyer over how to resolve ambiguity in a 
 
513 Sta'er Interview. 
514 Sta'er Interview. 
515 See id. (discussing that CRS conducts “complex economic or political analysis” at the 
request of committee sta'). Interviewees noted that committee requests tend to be more complex 
and robust than most other queries. Id. 
516 See supra notes $)+-$+%. 
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statute where the text alone, including rules of grammar, was of no help.517 
Justice Breyer suggested looking to legislative history. Justice Scalia instead 
suggested relying on a judge-created source outside the legislative process—
a policy-based presumption of statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia’s 
rationale: “You don’t think Congress can leave it to its sta, to decide what a statute 




We now turn to the implications of our study for the theories of legislation 
and statutory interpretation. There are several de+cits we seek to remedy and 
several debates in which we intervene. 
First, no matter where one comes down in the statutory interpretation 
wars, those debates are almost entirely based on empirical assumptions about 
Congress. Even those who think that lawyers should ignore the realities of 
the legislative process ground that argument in empirical claims that 
Congress has no collective intent, that Congress operates irrationally, or that 
Congress shares special drafting conventions with courts that are better 
substitutes for an approach focused on how Congress actually works.518 One 
cannot legitimate (or refute) such claims without doing the work of learning 
about Congress to determine if they are true. 
We should be clear, too, that no one’s approach is merely: “read the text 
and stop.” Every approach in the mainstream debates depends on sources 
external to enacted text when statutes are unclear, whether those sources are 
dictionaries, congressional operations, legislative history, or judge-crafted 
interpretive presumptions. Just because some sources, such as the courts’ 
common presumptions of linguistic consistency or dictionaries, have legally 
attractive features (because some interpreters think those sources are 
“objective”), that does not make those sources less external to the text 
Congress enacts than sources linked to Congress’s work. 
 
517 Transcript of Oral Argument at ,*-#$, Lockhart v. United States, !,( S. Ct. *"+ ($%!") (No. 
!#-+,"+). Grammar rules were not helpful because there were applicable grammar rules supporting 
both sides. 
518 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note +, at $,-$" (discussing textualist justi&cations for 
statutory interpretation); Doer.er, supra note !!, at *+!-+, (noting that “as an empirical matter, 
members of Congress do not share intentions” (emphasis in original)); John F. Manning, Textualism 
and Legislative Intent, %$ VA. L. REV. ,$%, #$# ($%%") (describing the textualist argument that 
Congress does not share a “collective will apart from the outcomes of the complex legislative process 
that conditions its ability to translate raw policy impulses or intentions into &nished legislation”); 
see also Gluck & Bressman, supra note !, at *!" ($%!,) (cataloging the many &ctions judges apply, 
including the lack of collective intent, “the notion of a single ‘congressional intent’”, and the idea 
that canons are background assumptions that Congress knows and against whose background 
Congress legislates). 
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John Manning’s argument for shared interpretive conventions—that is, 
using judicially-developed canons of statutory interpretation instead of 
material more tied to Congress—is expressly legitimated on the assumption 
that Congress in fact shares those conventions. Justice Scalia’s argument for 
the use of canons was similarly dependent on the assumption that Congress 
uses those conventions or knowingly drafts in their shadow. However, the 
Gluck–Bressman empirical study of congressional drafting practices seriously 
undermines those assumptions. 
A more recent critic, Ryan Doer.er, argues that information about 
Congress is irrelevant because “context consists of information salient to both 
author and audience” and that the ordinary public, and perhaps also agencies 
or other legislators, do not know about Congress’s operations.519 There is zero 
evidence, however, that the courts’ interpretive presumptions are salient to 
anyone other than judges. The congressional bureaucracy’s materials—
including the CBO score, the Parliamentarians’ rulings, legislative history, 
JCT explanatory outputs, and the organization of statutes in the U.S. Code—
are more salient to all of the actors Doer.er identi+es. 
Doer.er also aligns himself with others520 in claiming that any arguments 
about collective intent—for instance that Congress, like corporations, can act 
collectively—are false because one cannot impute the intention of any one 
member of Congress to the whole. But that is not the point. Arguments about 
individual or subjective intentions are distractions here. Even Doer.er 
recognizes that Congress speaks collectively when it passes procedural rules 
or when it votes on +nal text of legislation, and that “it is plausible to attribute 
to an institutional group an intention to [do x] despite some members of that 
group failing to intend that ‘we’ [do x].”521 
The congressional bureaucracy’s formal work is precisely this kind of 
collective activity. As we stated earlier, Congress is sometimes an “it” as 
well as a “they.” The offices of the congressional bureaucracy are the 
creatures of Congress’s own enacted laws, and those laws direct the 
 
519 Doer.er, supra note !!, at *+,. 
520 See Nourse, supra note !% (collecting the criticisms); Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary 
Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, "" B.C. L. REV. !(!, ($%!#) (same); 
see also Eskridge, supra note +, at ("!–"$ (arguing that Justice Scalia adopted Max Radin’s critique 
against collective intention); Manning, supra note "!+, at #,% (noting that “textualists deny that a 
legislature has any shared intention that lies behind but di'ers from the reasonable import of the 
words adopted.”); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, #, HARV. L. REV. +(,, +)% (!*,%) (“The 
chances that of several hundred men each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind 
as possible reductions of a given determinable, are in&nitesimally small.”); Antonin Scalia & John 
F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, +% GEO. WASH L. REV. !(!%, 
!(!!–!$ ($%!$) (describing textualism); Shepsle, supra note !,, at $"# (arguing that “[i]ndividuals have 
intentions and purpose and motives; collections of individuals do not”). 
521 Doer.er, supra note !!, at !%%). 
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bureaucracy to produce statutory inputs. If the JCT says a law will raise 
/!&& million, it does not matter if a particular member of Congress opposed 
the law for other reasons and it does not matter if the law actually would 
raise /!&& million; regardless, we can assume that Congress had before it 
the conclusion the law it was enacting would raise /!&& million. If the 
Parliamentarian says a piece of legislation should be referred to committee 
Y instead of committee Z because committee Z has no jurisdiction over 
oceans, then it is fair to assume that the bill covers oceans. So, too, 
legislators voting for a bill produced through Congress’s professionalized 
drafting process, can be assumed to enact what the professional drafters 
themselves aimed the legal text to convey, not what any single member 
might have sneakily thought to herself. Just because legislators sometimes 
act individually, does not mean Congress does not act collectively.522 
Second, we are part of a new movement in the field that has a civic-
education bent. Legislation is now a subject taught in the first-year 
curriculum at many law schools. It would be preposterous to teach 
administrative law without teaching students about the components, 
structures, rules, and operations of the administrative state. And yet when 
it comes to statutes—the lion’s share of modern American law—that is 
exactly how the topic has traditionally been approached, both as a matter of 
pedagogy and as a matter of legal doctrine. Statutory interpretation theory 
has engaged more deeply with dead philosophers than it has with Congress. 
Congress also has changed over time, and yet barely a dent has been made 
from those changes in even those interpretive theories and doctrine that are 
purportedly based on Congress’s own operations. Work by us and our 
coauthors—as well as other scholars including Judge Robert Katzmann, 
Elizabeth Garrett, Victoria Nourse, Rebecca Kysar, and Jonathan Gould—
has pushed to change this.523 
 
522 It might be said that locating legislative meaning with Congress’s internal bureaucracy only 
reproduces aggregability problems at the sub-congressional level, given that drafting bodies are 
themselves comprised of many people. While a response goes beyond the contours of this article, 
the bureaucratic form of such bodies is particularly amenable to ascriptions of collective intent. For 
one, drafters are much less likely to diverge in their understandings of a legislative text in favor of 
individual preferences than are legislators themselves, given drafters’ politically neutral character 
and close cooperation. Second, internal drafting bodies themselves re.ect hierarchical arrangements 
that consolidate agency in a head or lead drafter. 
523 See generally ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (discussing utility of legislative 
history to everyday work of Congress and judges); Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework 
Legislation, !# J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES )!) ($%%") (arguing that di'erent interpretive methods might 
apply to omnibus legislation because of the unique circumstances of their enactment); Gould, supra 
note !( (descriptive account of the Parliamentarians’ o-ces); Rebecca M. Kysar, Dynamic Legislation, 
!() U. PA. L. REV. +!! ($%!+); (discussing special kinds of laws, ideal for bypassing gridlock, that 
automatically evolve with changed circumstances); Kysar, supra note #+% (detailing modern realities 
and instabilities of the budget process); Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory 
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Third, regardless of the first two points, the fact of the matter is that 
judges do consistently interpret statutes in ways that judges claim are 
usually tethered to Congress. That means lawyers have to engage those 
arguments, too. Judges tell us they interpret statutes as not using redundant 
language because they assume that is how Congress uses language (but at 
least one prominent textualist judge (now Justice) has questioned that rule 
in the face of empirical evidence to the contrary.524) Judges tell us they rely 
on statutory organization instead of legislative history precisely because 
they assume the organization of statutory text is voted upon by members as 
part of the text, whereas legislative history is written by staff. This is not 
true. Students of the congressional bureaucracy now know that statutes are 
organized into the U.S. Code after passage by OLRC. Judges also presume 
that Congress uses the same words in the same way throughout the U.S. 
Code, when in fact, the structure of Congress and its bureaucracy points 
toward consistency and coherence only within subject matter areas and not 
within the Code as a whole. 
With the exception of former Judge Richard Posner, we have not 
encountered a judge in the modern legislative state who has claimed that his or 
her interpretive approach is the result of judicial invention, federal common-
law lawmaking, or the imposition of external norms—norms like notice, 
coherence, and consistency that could indeed justify some linguistic 
presumptions—atop the congressional process even in the face of evidence that 
Congress does not operate in the shadow of those norms. We emphatically believe 
that one could justify modern approaches in that way, but modern judges have 
never been willing to assert the mantle of being anything other than “faithful 
agents” of Congress with their work tethered to the principle of legislative 
supremacy. If that is to remain the justification, then for the doctrines to be 
legitimate our understanding of Congress has to be more accurate. 
In the exchange set out at the top of this Part, Justice Scalia debated 
Justice Breyer over how to resolve a statutory ambiguity. Breyer would have 
used legislative history, but Scalia refused to because legislative history was 
the product of “sta,.” But turning to a policy presumption instead, as he 
suggested, simply means the Court decides the question itself. How is that more 
faithful to Congress or more democratically legitimate if a theorist is 
focused—as textualists say they are—on legislative supremacy? 
 
Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, !$$ YALE L.J. )%, +%-+( ($%!$) (advancing theory of 
interpretation based on Congress’s own procedural rules); Elizabeth Garrett, Conditions for 
Framework Legislation (USC Law & Econ., Working Paper No. %#-$,, $%%#). 
524 Loving v. I.R.S., )#$ F.,d !%!,, !%!) (D.C. Cir. $%!#); see also Barton v. Barr, !#% S. Ct. !##$, 
!#", ($%$%) (building on Loving). 
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Further engagement in these debates requires separate treatment. Our 
aim in this Article is (mostly) not to argue that the realities of the 
congressional bureaucracy necessarily must be utilized by statutory 
interpreters. Rather, our aim is to illustrate how our analysis of heretofore-
overlooked congressional functions sheds light on those debates and o,ers a 
challenge to interpreters with theories and doctrines tied in one way or 
another to Congress.  This Part examines how the congressional bureaucracy 
contributes to ongoing debates about the nature of the legislature, including 
modern changes and deviations from the textbook process that theory and 
doctrine rarely take into account. In Part IV, we conclude by suggesting  how 
the bureaucracy changes our understanding of the very  concept of a “statute”, 
and the implications this may hold for the rules of interpretation. 
A. What the Congressional Bureaucracy Tells Us About Congress’s Rationality and 
Changes in Modern Lawmaking 
Recall the famous assumption about Congress advanced by Legal Process 
titans Hart and Sacks: “the legislature was made up of reasonable persons 
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”525 Modern textualism pushed that 
assumption aside, grounding interpretation instead in realist- and economic-
based theories of Congress as an impenetrable, deal-making, compromise-
driven, incoherent institution that courts can never hope to understand.526 
The Court today has no loyalty to the Legal Process approach (although 
one of us has argued that Chief Justice John Roberts is actually of that 
school527), and the Court as a whole is quite textualist.528 But ironically, 
textualism’s main interpretive doctrines—which are the ones the Court 
applies in virtually every statutory interpretation case—do implicitly 
attribute rationality, sometimes even perfection, to Congress. In other words, 
the assumption of a reasonable Congress underpins the central textualist 
canons of interpretations, even as textualism itself is grounded in the opposite 
assumption. Among the presumptions that federal courts (including judges 
of all stripes) routinely apply are assumptions that Congress legislates 
 
525 HART & SACKS, supra note ), at !,)+. 
526 See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION () (,d ed. $%!)) (“Rather than seeing the legislative process as coherent and 
reasonable, the new textualists emphasize the rough-and-tumble of political compromise.”). 
527 Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, supra note !%. 
528 Justice Kagan has made this point several times, see, e.g., Ryan Lovelace, Elena Kagan: The 
Supreme Court Is a ‘Textualist Court’ That Reasons More Like Scalia Than Breyer, WASH. EXAMINER 
(Oct. !(, $%!)), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/elena-kagan-the-supreme-court-is-a-
textualist-court-that-reasons-more-like-scalia-than-breyer [https://perma.cc/U*TX-M"B+] (“[W]e 
are a generally, fairly textualist court . . . .”). 
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constitutionally;529 does not bury elephant-sized changes in statutory 
mouseholes;530 does not unnecessarily repeat itself;531 uses similar words in 
the same way throughout statutes;532 and so on. The Gluck–Bressman study 
has shown that some of these assumptions are mistaken, but that does not 
change the larger point that even textualists, despite their purported values, 
maintain an idealized vision of a rational Congress for purposes of doctrine. 
Modern lawmaking further complicates this view. The Gluck/O’Connell 
study of “unorthodox lawmaking” documents for legal readers the pervasive 
deviations from the textbook, “schoolhouse rock” legislative process that has 
been the paradigm for the past half century.533 If textualists thought the 
Congress of the !)'&s was incoherent, they should +nd the gridlocked, 
unorthodox Congress of the *&&&s much worse. 
Enter the congressional bureaucracy. The congressional bureaucracy’s 
interaction with the modern unorthodox Congress makes three interventions 
in this debate. First, it challenges these pessimistic views of Congress as an 
institution. Second, it helps us see how even common interpretive methods, 
including textualist interpretive presumptions, might be better tailored to the 
 
529 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, !,# S. Ct. $%)), $%+*-*% ($%!#) (construing statute 
implementing an international convention on chemical weapons does not apply to local crimes 
involving chemicals to avoid constitutional question); Skilling v. United States, "(! U.S. ,"+, #%$-
%, ($%!%) (narrowing potentially unconstitutionally vague statute, regarding the intangible right of 
honest services for vagueness, to avoid the constitutional issue”). For a full explanation and 
additional examples, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW 
TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION ,!) ($%!() (describing the development of the 
“Modern Avoidance Canon”). 
530 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, "#( U.S. $#,, $)" ($%%() (striking an interpretive 
regulation that would have dramatically altered the landscape of drug regulations and physician-
assisted suicide); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., "$* U.S. !$%, !$"-$) ($%%%) 
(finding that Congress would not have delegated major question of tobacco regulation to FDA 
without expressly saying so); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note "$*, at ,,) (explaining the “No 
Elephants in Mouseholes Canon”). 
531 See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., "!" U.S. (+), (*)-*+ 
(!**") (discussing the “reluctance to treat statutory terms as surplusage”); Kungys v. United States, 
#+" U.S. )"*, ))+ (!*++) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (describing how the concurrence “violates the 
cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to be entirely 
redundant”); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note "$*, at !!$ (discussing the “Anti-Surplusage (-
Redundancy) Canon”). 
532 See, e.g., Babbitt, "!" U.S. at )%$ (describing the way the word “harm” came to have a 
particular meaning throughout the entirety of the Endangered Species Act); see also West Va. Hosp. 
v. Casey, "#( U.S. $#,, $("-(+ ($%%() (assuming Congress drafted fee-shifting statutes the same way 
in #! instances across the U.S. Code); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note "$*, at !%+ (discussing the 
“Consistent Use Canon”). 
533 The late political scientist Barbara Sinclair &rst introduced the concept. See Gluck, 
O’Connell & Po supra note !, at !)*# (“[I]t seems that the Schoolhouse Rock! Cartoon version of the 
conventional legislative process is dead. It may never have accurately described the lawmaking 
process in the &rst place.”). 
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facts of modern lawmaking. And third, it illustrates gaps in prevailing 
doctrine that must be addressed. 
B. Unorthodox Lawmaking Is the New Orthodox Lawmaking: Implications for 
Understanding Statutes 
The concept of “unorthodox lawmaking” (a term coined by political 
scientist Barbara Sinclair) was almost entirely absent from legislation and 
statutory interpretation theory and doctrine even a few years ago.534 The 
nonpartisan offices studied in this Article both fill out and complicate the 
unorthodox lawmaking account that has recently gained more traction in 
legal scholarship. 
!. Congress Is Still Informed in Key Ways 
On the one hand, the experience of the congressional bureaucracy 
substantiates the notion that the textbook process is increasingly rare and that 
new procedures—which to many internally already are understood to be the 
new orthodox lawmaking—have replaced it. Each of the o-ces we studied 
volunteered these congressional-process changes as extremely signi+cant and 
pervasive. On the other hand, however, our account adds nuance that may be 
cause for at least some optimism. “Unorthodox,” we learn from the 
nonpartisan institutions, does not necessarily mean “uninformed.” Regular 
order—the now-traditional process that emerged in the !)'&s to publicly vet 
a bill through committee, hearings, .oor debates, bicameral conference, and 
more—was designed to ensure that legislation was studied, deliberated, 
transparent, precise, and error-free. Today, those processes have changed, but 
the congressional bureaucracy, and its expertise, continue to be utilized, even 
if they are less visible. 
When it comes to a broad swath of legislative activities (including 
drafting, estimating, auditing, analyzing, and following the procedures for 
amending legislation), Congress continues to seek out rational deliberation 
and expertise—even within unorthodox lawmaking. Of course, the 
 
534 References to Sinclair’s canonical work in political science on unorthodox lawmaking were 
almost entirely absent from legal scholarship before the Gluck–Bressman study. A search of law 
reviews on Westlaw found just &fty-one results for “Barbara Sinclair,” and just !, for “unorthodox 
lawmaking,” prior to $%!,. By contrast, a similar search of law reviews published after $%!, found 
$%* results for “Barbara Sinclair” and $$+ for “unorthodox lawmaking.” One critical exception is 
Elizabeth Garrett, whose excellent work documented deviations from the textbook process much 
earlier. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Conditions for Framework Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED 
BRANCH $*#, $*)-,!+ (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., $%%() (cataloguing various types 
of modern statutes with special rules that deviate from textbook account, including omnibus laws, 
the budget process, and statutes that use commissions as automatic decisionmaking regimes); 
Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, supra note "$,, at )!+ (same). 
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bureaucracy’s institutions are not Congress’s main source of substantive 
subject-matter expertise—except for JCT (and legislative commissions like 
MedPAC and MACPAC). Future scholars therefore still bear the burden of 
showing that the partisan expert policy sta,—the committee sta, who 
provide the bulk of Congress’s substantive policy expertise—continue to act 
in ways that contribute to a rational account of Congress (our anecdotal 
impression is that they do). But to say that modern federal statutes are not 
vetted or deliberated is simply wrong. Reasonable legislators still try to 
pursue reasonable purposes reasonably—just not in the ways the old orthodox 
model recognizes. 
It is undoubtedly true that things are much more rushed. As Gluck, 
O’Connell, and Po detailed,535 unorthodox lawmaking changes the timing and 
transparency of legislative interventions and, with it, the structure, 
complexity, and legislative materials that accompany legislation. This proves 
to be as true for the congressional bureaucracy’s role. As one sta,er put it: 
The expectation today is totally di"erent. Before, it used to be the joke was 
the complexity of the tax code, but now that is spreading to other areas of the 
law. This creates more challenges for practitioners. The amount of time spent 
on legislating, having to do everything in one large bill, ram it all in, in fewer 
steps, leads to more mistakes, more inconsistencies.536 
Parliamentarians are increasingly doing their work o, the .oor. The 
Legislative Counsel still drafts bills but now rarely has the chance to draft 
amendments from the .oor or clean up in conference (because there is rarely 
a conference anymore). JCT still provides the policy backbone of tax 
legislation and the accompanying legislative materials, but legislative history 
is evaporating thanks to unorthodox processes. The JCT now puts those 
materials in other formats—including the post-enactment Blue Book—in the 
absence of legislative history. CBO has an iterative back-and-forth with 
drafters before an o-cial score is released as drafters “slice and dice” to get a 
statute within target score. The public cannot see any of that. The public just 
sees legislation rushed from formal introduction to passage. 
Sometimes, bills simultaneously undergo the more public journey 
through the steps of the old orthodox lawmaking process. Some legislative 
reformers, nostalgic for the olden days, have called for changes to bolster 
those old steps.537 But, at least some of the time today, the tools of old 
 
535 See Gluck, O’Connell & Po supra note !, at !+!*-$% (discussing the impact of unorthodox 
lawmaking on timing and transparency of the legislative process). 
536 Sta'er Interview. 
537 See, e.g., THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW 
CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK ($%%+) (arguing 
Congress has become dysfunctional); Neil S. Siegel, After the Trump Era: A Constitutional Role 
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orthodox lawmaking—hearings and .oor debates—are for C-SPAN cameras, 
not for internal fact-gathering and deliberation.538 Other times, it is true, 
public airing of issues—much like an oral argument in court—is a way to mull 
the issues, or hear where other colleagues stand. Substantive markups are still 
typically core legislative work. At the same time, however, Congress has 
remade these old orthodox steps into opportunities for external 
communication with constituents—and a great deal of deliberation and 
re+nement now occur largely o, the radar behind closed doors. But they do 
occur, and to a great extent they still rely on the bureaucracy. 
The Gluck–O’Connell study details many distinctive features of the new 
unorthodox lawmaking and their implications for statutory interpretation and 
administrative law doctrine, and it raises questions about the risks and 
bene+ts of these modern departures from so-called “regular order.”539 Below, 
we highlight those areas that are of particular relevance to the congressional 
bureaucracy and that emerged as especially salient from our interviews. The 
main takeaways are: 
• Preconference replaces conference: textual changes to bills are less 
visible, come earlier, and party leaders aggregate more power; no 
more conference reports 
• Statutes are longer, and have more errors and gaps 
• Text relating to procedural hurdles and budget scoring is 
painstakingly negotiated 
• There is less legislative history 
• The bureaucracy becomes more politicized as procedural tactics gain 
importance 
 
Morality for Presidents and Members of Congress, !%) GEO. L.J. !%*, !(( ($%!+) (arguing for imposing 
“role morality” on Members of Congress to preserve “important rules and practices,” including 
regular order); ; Hanah Metchis Volokh, A Read-the-Bill Rule for Congress, )( MO. L. REV. !,", !,* 
($%!!) (noting the problem of rushed legislation and arguing for “a Read the Bill norm, coupled with 
a norm of writing bills in readable and understandable language . . . .”); Improving Congress, C-SPAN 
(July $$, $%!"), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c#)$$!"%/returning-regular-order-congress 
[https://perma.cc/B,GF-N"M,) (discussing comments of John Fortier, Director of the Bipartisan 
Policy Center’s Democracy Project); Derek Willis & Paul Kane, How Congress Stopped Working, 
PROPUBLICA (Nov. ", $%!+), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-congress-stopped-working 
[https://perma.cc/(B"A-NUZ#] (recounting the problems Members of Congress attribute to 
Congress’s deviation from regular order and several ideas to remedy the issue, including remaining 
in session for longer). 
538 Cross, Legislative History, supra note !, at !#%-"% (providing survey results on the uses of, 
and intended audience for, di'erent congressional statements and fora than hearings, to learn the 
contents of proposed legislation). 
539 See generally Gluck & Bressman, supra note !; Gluck, O’Connell & Po, supra note !. 
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*. New Timing and “Preconference”—and Their Challenges for Textualists 
The new timing is di,erent, not only with respect to compressed 
timeframes for legislating, but with respect to the point in the process at 
which expertise is sought and utilized. A new procedure—”preconference”—
has largely replaced the last stage of the legislative process (conference) where 
changes between House and Senate bills were traditionally worked out. Many 
of our interviewees, without prompting, referenced to this term—
”preconference”—as the new norm. 
Conference has largely disappeared because any changes made at that 
stage require a new vote from both chambers; in today’s era of extreme 
gridlock,540 party leaders are reluctant to take that step and seek to get bills 
done with just one vote. 
Preconference was described this way: “Senate sta,, they might negotiate 
more informally to get a bill the House can pass after Senate [passage].” There 
are “amendments back and forth.”541 But because of the traditional importance 
of conference, courts typically give great weight to the textual changes made 
at that stage,542 and many judges give special weight to the conference 
committee report.543 The new unorthodox timing changes this because there 
are almost no conference reports. The new timing also makes less visible the 
various changes made to bills between introduction and the vote. This is also 
an important change for interpreters, given that judges and advocates, 
including and especially textualists, often look to that statutory evolution for 
textual evidence of statutory meaning. 
The Parliamentarians told us that now they “try to negotiate . . . out 
[policy compromises ahead of time] rather than +ght them out on the 
.oor.”544 GAO told us that, even while most of its work is transparent, it now 
gives more nonpublic, early informal technical assistance than in the past.545 
We were also told that procedural decisions are “becoming a lot more front-
 
540 For a discussion of whether nonpartisan sta' themselves reduce gridlock, see MICKEY 
EDWARDS, THE PARTIES VERSUS THE PEOPLE *!–!$+ ($%!$) (arguing that nonpartisan committee 
sta' could reduce gridlock); Yin, supra note !+ (questioning this idea). 
541 Id. 
542 See, e.g., WILLIAM ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND 
INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION & ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES )$-), 
($%!#) (noting that conference reports typically sit atop the hierarchy of legislative history as 
reviewed by judges); Nourse, supra note *, at *,-*) (noting the Supreme Court’s reliance on 
Conference history). 
543 Even scholars who urge attention to the legislative process place great weight on this now 
largely absent stage. See Nourse, supra note *. 
544 Sta'er Interview. 
545 Id. 
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loaded” and decisions about germaneness are “happening earlier and earlier 
in the process.”546 
We were told there are rarely presidential vetoes anymore, “because the 
administration sends out statements of policy . . . . and the Senate and House 
are coordinating. Things are scheduled and done ahead of time. [They] are 
dealing with this stu, earlier.” Sta,ers characterized this new normal as 
“more pointing out landmines in advance . . . rather than on the .oor.”547 
Sta,ers stated: “Fast track processes can feel like cheating. You are never 
going to spend three weeks on an energy bill, again.”548 One sta,er told us 
that the national defense authorization process used to be a “robust 
amendment process” in committee and on the .oor. But now, the sta,er 
added, “today we do it one day on the .oor as opposed to two weeks . . . .”549 
JCT sta, noted that under regular order, JCT had a role with conference 
[i.e., with reconciling House and Senate versions]. They told us: “behind the 
scenes, bills still look di,erent now on the House and Senate side, but now 
they do preconference more to reconcile bills before they come out.”550  
Even apart from losing the conference report, these timing changes make 
the basic amending process less transparent. Under old orthodox lawmaking, 
much of Congress’s expertise-seeking occurred in display of the public. 
Congress undertook these activities, for the most part, on chamber .oors or 
in committees. Today, with most vetting, changing, and analyzing of 
legislation now happening before a bill hits the .oor, there is less opportunity 
for outsiders to see Congress actually grappling with di-cult issues and 
tradeo,s. There is less formal procedural precedent being created and less 
explanatory material to inform other members and later readers of statutes. 
This leads to the often-false perception that Congress is not doing its job in 
a thoughtful way. 
It also means that one kind of textualists’ favorite materials—what they 
call “statutory history” (as opposed to legislative history), the textual 
evolution of a bill, including rejected and accepted amendments—is 
disappearing. We were told, for instance, that “appropriations has 
traditionally had a more open process. Legislative Counsel used to come to 
the .oor to be ready to write amendments, but that is [a] relic of the past.”551 
This does not mean that appropriations bills are not being amended or that 
Legislative Counsel is not writing the amendments. It would be a mistake for 
 
546 See id.; see also Gould, supra note !(, at !*)# (reporting similar references in his own 
interviews to “frontloading”). 
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judges to assume these things do not happen just because they are now less 
visible, with fewer published materials. It just means that the negotiations 
and drafting happen before the bills come to the .oor. Instead, policy sta, 
exchange notes and negotiate changes behind the scenes, often together with 
their bureaucracy supports, and typically before the bill goes to the .oor, to 
avoid a conference.552 Policy sta, may continually adapt the proposed 
legislation outside of the public view to account for the feedback, debates, 
and discussions that these entities now facilitate more informally—whether 
through early projections of a budget score, procedural advice on 
germaneness, or the drafting of language. 
This movement away from the action on the .oor to these earlier behind-
the-scenes procedures may also have implications for our internal separation 
of powers point, detailed in Part II. The Gluck–Bressman study established 
that unorthodox lawmaking has shifted power away from committees and 
toward the party leaders.553 Our bureaucracy interviewees corroborated those 
conclusions and added to them. They told us that the timing changes make 
regular members less visible, and that there is instead more interaction with 
the bureaucracy directed by party leaders. CRS sta, ’s comment was typical: 
“The nature of work is largely unchanged . . . [but] the avenues by which they 
come to us are . . . di,erent . . . . Decades ago we worked primarily [with 
Members] through committee constructs . . . [but now it’s coming] primarily 
through Leadership.”554 This account suggests that increasingly centralization 
might be happening with respect to bureaucratic information and expertise—
centralization that would undermine some of the internal separation of 
powers bene+ts the congressional bureaucracy brings. 
$. More Mistakes and Gaps 
There is now a higher expectation of errors and gaps. We were told by 
several o-ces that, for Legislative Counsel, usually charged with cleaning up 
statutes, unorthodox processes and timing now make it “harder to +x 
problems in bills on the .oor,” and that as a result, statutes may be more 
“Delphic.”555 We were also told by OLRC that “as Congress has become 
contentious . . . it’s hard to get [the law] passed” that would make technical 
corrections after enactment. They added that departures from regular order 
can get a bill passed but that they “come out messier and later in the 
 
552 Sta'er Interviews. Hearings and markups occurred before congressional committees, for 
example, while debate over solutions occurred both in committee rooms and on the .oor of 
Congress. 
553 See Bressman & Gluck, supra note !, at *)(-)). 
554 Sta'er Interview. 
555 Id. 
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session.”556 In the !!#th Congress, we were told, '"% of the passed legislation 
was passed at the end of the session. In addition, OLRC observed: “They can 
throw things in omnibus bills; those bills tend to be more complicated, have 
more errors. This has complicated things for us.”557 
As one of us has previously detailed, the federal courts do not have a 
clearly articulated doctrine of legislative mistakes.558 Instead, the courts have 
an exceedingly harsh rule: e,ectively, that if the statutory language reads in 
plain English, apply it as such. The courts mitigate this rule with case-by-case 
exceptions meted out with little rhyme or reason apart from the fact that it is 
most often high-stakes cases (e.g., the recent A,ordable Care Act challenge 
in King v. Burwell) that get the leniency.559 The lack of usable doctrine in this 
area is a major gap, and the quality-enhancing e,ects of the bureaucracy 
institutions notwithstanding, courts must develop a more rigorous and well-
considered approach to legislative mistakes. 
#. Highly Specific, Negotiated, Language Used to Clear Procedural Hurdles 
On the other hand, and in some tension with our point about mistakes, 
there may be a reason to give heightened weight to the particular words used 
to clear procedural or budgetary hurdles and to consider text especially 
carefully in the context of those procedural and budget rules. Our 
interviewees strongly emphasized the very careful language-slicing that 
occurs to bring bills with the desired procedural or budgetary goals. 
One sta,er compared this parsing of language to “slicing garlic with a 
razor blade.”560 When it comes to procedures for reconciliation—the 
procedural mechanism that avoids a +libuster—our interviewees emphasized 
that, to get a bill within the rules: “[we] are ripping things out of [it] . . . [l]ike 
weeds in a garden.”561 
Anyone looking at such a law, they emphasized, has to “presume it’s not 
just because you are pleasing a particular constituency; it’s about 




558 Gluck, supra note !%, at **-!%$; cf. Cross, Sta!er’s Error, supra note !, at !$!-!$$ (describing 
how in King “[t]he Court essentially reviewed statutory text for a speci&c, particularly egregious 
type of sta'er error” of the type that would “undermine core statutory purpose—which is to say . . . 
the basic goals that members of Congress would have entrusted to [the sta'ers]”). 
559 Compare, e.g., King v. Burwell, !," S.Ct. $#+%, $#*" ($%!") (reading likely erroneous 
statutory language expansively in order to uphold statutory plan), with Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, "#% 
U.S. "$(, ",# ($%%#) (holding Congress to its word despite a clear error in the bankruptcy code 
because the statute could still be read intelligibly). 
560 Sta'er Interview. 
561 Id. 
562 Id. 
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constraints of the reconciliation process, we were told, is considered a 
misinterpretation of the law Congress tried to pass—plain and simple.563 
OLRC’s work has changed in a different way. Unorthodox lawmaking has 
made that Office’s job much more complex. Omnibus bills are the current 
favorite vehicle for passing mega-legislative deals together, and, as such, they 
bring together many different subjects. OLRC’s job is basically the opposite—
that is, to cohere the U.S. Code by subject matter. What OLRC must now do, 
then, is effectively reverse-engineer Congress’s omnibus process. They told us: 
“We are breaking up what they are bringing together.”564 
". Less Legislative History 
JCT and Legislative Counsel emphasized the important legislative 
materials that are often lost in the modern processes. Many omnibus bills 
do not have legislative history at all, or they bring together previously-
written, separate bills with legislative history that may be old and outdated. 
JCT noted that, in particular, without the conference report “you lose an 
important part of the legislative history, which can be a significant loss.”565 
JCT also told us that unorthodox lawmaking consequently increases the 
importance of the Blue Book—the influential summary of tax legislation 
produced by JCT after statutes are enacted. The Blue Book takes on greater 
significance in conveying congressional intent to agencies and the tax bar, 
we were told, “when there is no regular order, because often there is no 
conference report [or] committee report.”566 This is the case even though 
the Blue Book has often “been more aggressively expansive [than] 
legislative history”—it makes bigger statements.567 
The House Parliamentarian’s O-ce similarly emphasized that legislative 
history looks di,erent now: 
When looking to legislative history, there needs to be a modern look that 
takes into account [the fact] that the process [on the House )oor] is much 
more structured [now]. The amendments and remarks need to be construed 
using a modern lens .	.	.	. [T]he amount of remarks on the )oor that are 
generated for purpose of legislative history has shrunk tremendously and 
[these remarks are now] reserved to bills where there are likely to be 
practitioners: judiciary committee, election law .	.	.	. I don’t think the process 
 
563 On highly speci&c language being used to clear procedural hurdles, see also Gould, supra 
note !(, at !*)!-), (discussing the Byrd bath process). 
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is as static as some academics or judicial branch folks may have learned in 
civics.568 
%. More Visibility and Politicization 
Unorthodox lawmaking is not solely about doing things behind closed 
doors. It has actually elevated the visibility of some of the nonpartisan 
institutions—as we have noted, not always in ways that are bene+cial. 
For the Senate Parliamentarian, resort to special procedures that get 
around the +libuster and other hurdles has made a di,erence in the public 
perception of the role. We were told: “The job is same as before, but it’s 
gotten a higher pro+le and more personal largely because of the Byrd 
rule . . . [and] fast track [procedures]. More light will be shone . . . where 
expedited procedures have been written. And [they] have to make Solomonic 
decisions here and there.”569 Budget reconciliation proceedings, it was 
emphasized, “are very high pro+le, and criticized in the news . . . the Byrd 
rule is the thing that makes Parliamentarians almost ‘Washington famous’ 
every few years based on decisions that [they’re] making about what is or isn’t 
appropriate in reconciliation bills.”570 
Just as CBO became more politicized once the importance of its reports 
became more salient, the Parliamentarian becomes a divisive +gure when 
unorthodox processes put pressure on complex procedural workarounds. 
C. What Does the Supreme Court Think About Unorthodox Lawmaking? 
Congress is routinely disparaged and unorthodox lawmaking makes 
Congress appear even less deliberative than it did before. Years ago, some 
scholars had urged a theory of interpretation that considered whether 
Congress had adequately deliberated—in former Oregon Supreme Court 
Justice Hans Linde’s words, whether Congress had engaged in “due process 
in lawmaking.”571 Until recently, courts had resisted any kind of direct 
engagement with the question of how the seriousness of a statute’s legislative 
process should a,ect how that statute is interpreted.572 As noted, the Court 
has no coherent doctrine of statutory mistakes, and does not seem to want to 
 
568 Id. 
569 Id.; accord Gould, supra note !(. 
570 Id. 
571 Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, "" NEB. L. REV. !*), $#! (!*)(). 
572 By contrast, in the constitutional law context, Courts often scour the legislative record for 
proof that Congress deliberated. See William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record 
Review, "# STAN. L. REV. +), !%* ($%%!) (outlining the theory of legislative record review in the 
constitutional law context); cf. Kwoka, supra note "(,, at *)-*+ (noting legislative record review not 
based on accurate assumptions about legislative process). 
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understand how aspects of the process—including the disappearance of 
committee and conference reports—have changed. 
The Court has just started to grapple with these issues, but has a long way 
to go. The notable example is King v. Burwell, the *&!" challenge to the 
A,ordable Care Act’s insurance subsidies. Dealing with a likely 
amalgamation error in the ACA—an ambiguity caused by the sloppy merger 
of two di,erent versions of the law without an opportunity for conference to 
clean up errors—Chief Justice Roberts opined:  
Congress wrote key parts of the Act behind closed doors, rather than through 
“the traditional legislative process.”	.	.	. And Congress passed much of the 
Act using a complicated budgetary procedure known as “reconciliation”	.	.	.	. 
As a result, the Act does not re)ect the type of care and deliberation that one 
might expect of such signi!cant legislation.573 
For all the Court’s salutary interest in Congress—this was the +rst time 
the Supreme Court strove to bend interpretation to the realities of a statute’s 
unusual legislative process—it largely got the story wrong. The ACA’s 
unorthodox history was no parliamentary aberration; plenty of legislation had 
gone through reconciliation before (and only a portion of the ACA went 
through it). The statute also was exceedingly deliberated by a record-breaking 
+ve congressional committees for two years (including hundreds of hours of 
hearings). Legislative Counsel was intimately involved in the drafting. CBO 
and JCT were constantly engaged on scoring and estimating. CRS and 
MedPAC wrote numerous reports.574 It is true there was no conference, and 
as such the opportunity for Legislative Counsel to correct errors was indeed 
forgone. Arguably that means the +nal product was sloppy, but not necessarily 
that the law was not carefully deliberated and reviewed along the way. 
Studying the congressional bureaucracy substantiates the account that there 
is a “new normal” when it comes to the legislative process; how courts account 
for that has to be part of the project in statutory interpretation if the +eld is 
to have a democratic link to Congress. 
Finally, we note that, we did not hear from anyone that Congress is 
eschewing congressional bureaucracy consultations due to unorthodox 
lawmaking. But Congress could always pass rules requiring such consultation, 
 
573 !," S.Ct. $#+%, $#*$ ($%!"). 
574 See, e.g., JENNIFER STAMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R#%)$", REQUIRING 
INDIVIDUALS TO OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS ($%!$); Hinda 
Chaikind et al., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R#%*#$, Private Health Insurance Provisions in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) ($%!%). Compare MARCH $%%* REPORT TO CONGRESS: 
MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY, http://www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/march-$%%*-report-to-
congress-medicare-payment-policy.pdf?sfvrsn1% (last visited May !!, $%$%) (proposing hospice 
reforms) with the Pub. L. No. !!!-!#+, § ,!,$, !$# Stat. !!* ($%!%) (hospice reforms). 
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just as it has in requiring a CBO score.575 Congress could also develop a 
practice of noting in the materials accompanying legislation which 
bureaucracy institutions were in fact consulted—a practice that might assuage 
some public concerns about the lack of deliberation in our lawmaking process. 
At the same time, as we have noted throughout the Article, there are risks to 
elevating the pro+le of the congressional bureaucracy—risks to the 
institutions’ perceived neutrality and the lack of politicization around them. 
Mandating use of the bureaucracy might introduce new pathologies into the 
process, just as some have already argued that PAYGO has skewed the 
drafting process by excessively elevating the importance of the CBO score.576 
 
* * * 
In the next and +nal Part of the Article, we o,er more takeaways for 
courts, both for purposes of statutory cases and for overarching 
conceptualizations and assumptions about Congress’s rationality. Our aim in 
this Part has not been to advocate for speci+c legislative reforms, or to 
criticize unorthodox lawmaking, or to argue that courts should develop 
doctrines to curtail it—as Hans Linde and others likely might have. Rather, 
we have primarily aimed in this Part to show how courts’ assumptions about 
lawmaking and the materials produced therein have changed, even as courts 
have retained out-of-date assumptions about them; the congressional 
bureaucracy’s modern experience corroborates earlier accounts of those 
changes. 
And of course, we want courts to notice the congressional bureaucracy. 
American federal courts rarely cite to the institutions’ work. In the past 
decade, the Supreme Court has cited only a handful of times to CBO (+ve), 
the Legislative Counsel drafting manuals (two), GAO (two), and to CRS 
(eleven).577 It has never cited to MedPAC, MACPAC, parliamentary rulings 
 
575 Section #%$ of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of !*)#, while not 
framed as a rule binding on Congress, has a similar e'ect. It directs CBO to estimate the costs of 
bills and resolutions approved by Congressional committees other than the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees, thereby cementing a default practice of soliciting CBO input. 
576 See, e.g., John B. Wells, As It Applies to Veterans, It Is Time for Pay-Go to Go, THE HILL (Jan. 
$#, $%!*, !!:,% AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/&nance/#$()),-as-it-applies-to-veterans-it-is-time-
for-pay-go-to-go [https://perma.cc/EBF"-D("W]. 
577 See Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, _ S. Ct. _, at *!* (June !, 
$%$%) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing CRS report on Puerto Rico’s Current Fiscal Challenges); 
Maine Cmty. Health Options v. United States, !#% S. Ct. !,%+, !,!* ($%$%) (citing GAO, Principles 
of Federal Appropriations and referencing CBO score); Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, "() U.S. 
!+$, $%, ($%!$) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing GAO Principles of Federal Appropriations Law); 
Carr v. United States, "(% U.S. #,+ ($%!%) (citing Legislative Counsel drafting manual): United 
States v. O’Brien, "(% U.S. $!+ ($%!%) (citing Legislative Counsel drafting manual); cf. U.S. v. 
Woods, ")! U.S. ,! ($%!,) (dismissing JCT’s “Blue Book” as relevant). 
*&*&] #e Congressional Bureaucracy !%"! 
or precedents, and cited only once, in !)'", to OLRC.578 The Courts of 
Appeals have cited them more frequently: GAO (+fteen); CBO (twenty-
four) CRS (eighty-four); OLRC (+ve); Parliamentarian (two); MedPAC 
(+ve); JCT (twenty-four); and Legislative Counsel drafting manuals (eight). 
The next and +nal Part o,ers more concrete doctrinal payo,s for courts. 
IV. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS AND STATUTORY 
“DECONSTRUCTION” 
Is there a way to translate this Article’s +ndings to on-the-ground 
statutory interpretation doctrine? Remember, the question is not whether to 
ignore enacted text. Assume the text is always consulted +rst, but the question 
is where to turn when the text runs out. Would looking more frequently to 
the JCT’s report or revenue score, or considering Legislative Counsel’s 
established drafting conventions, or the parliamentarian’s jurisdictional or 
procedural rulings, or the CBO score, or GAO Red Book or its report that 
prompted new legislation shed as much—if not more—light on textual 
meaning than a dictionary or judicially crafted policy presumption? 
Recall the presumptions currently in use. They range from presumptions 
about language (e.g., it is not used redundantly) to presumptions about policy 
that judges, not Congress, devise (e.g., the presumption that construes 
statutory ambiguities in favor of Native American tribes, or in favor of 
bankruptcy debtors, or in favor of arbitration, or extraterritorial application 
of securities law, and scores more). Those judicially developed presumptions 
re.ect the normative choices of the courts that created and later perpetuated 
and entrenched them. Which sources are more relevant and why? 
This is a doctrinal legitimacy question. As Gluck’s work emphasizes, we 
do not have to have statutory interpretation tethered to Congress. But if a 
connection to Congress is going to be the justi+cation—including through 
policy presumptions the courts claim Congress knows or uses—then the 
doctrines should be tethered. Many canons simply are not. 
At least three possible paths forward present themselves. First, ignore the 
congressional bureaucracy on the grounds that Congress does not act 
collectively, or cannot be understood. We have already discussed how 
Congress does indeed act collectively when it comes to the formally delegated 
work of the congressional bureaucracy. Moreover, if Congress can never be 
understood, then the answer is to move away entirely from a faithful-agent 
 
578 Muniz v. Ho'man, #$$ U.S. #"#, #)$ n.!! (!*)") (referencing a point made “by the Law 
Revision Counsel to the House subcommittee which held joint hearings on the revision to the 
Judicial and Criminal Codes”). 
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approach to a judicially centered one, not to continue what we have now.579 
We will not devote further space to those arguments here. 
Second, assuming some link to Congress is desired in at least some cases, 
we can consider how to utilize the outputs of the congressional bureaucracy, 
just as we utilize other outputs from Congress, like legislative history. In at 
least some cases, the bureaucracy’s outputs may have more credibility than 
legislative history because they are nonpartisan and ex ante approved by 
Congress as a whole. 
Third, we might draw some lines as to which aspects of the bureaucracy’s 
work should be considered or consider some inputs as stronger than others, 
just as we prioritize di,erent kinds of legislative history and canons. For 
instance, those inputs that are directly part of the legislative process—scoring, 
parliamentary rules, Legislative Counsel drafting—might be considered more 
relevant than reference materials like CRS reports. 
Another place to draw a line might be at the vote. That is, perhaps post-
enactment work to organize and clean up the U.S. Code (OLRC) or explain 
changes to the tax codes (JCT) should be discounted because Congress 
votes before they happen. For those who take such an approach, the Statutes 
at Large presumably should replace the U.S. Code as the source for federal 
statutory law, especially for non-positive titles.  
But we also want to suggest a more provocative reconceptualization of 
“lawmaking” and the resulting statutory “text” that would include all the 
inputs and processes Congress sets up for itself when it creates and puts in 
motion its massive bureaucracy. Some of those inputs and processes are 
indeed explicitly set up by Congress to occur after the vote. The 
Constitution would seem to permit this: the text of Article I does not 
specify the rules, procedures, positions, or offices to create a functional 
legislature. Instead, it gives Congress the power to construct the 
institutions it finds most useful, including the power to create and choose 
its own officers, create its own rules, and use any necessary and proper 
powers to execute its functions.580 The fruits of those efforts are evident in 
Title * of the U.S. Code, where one finds the organic statutes for the 
congressional bureaucracy.581 
 
579 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold 
Story of Holy Trinity Church, "% STAN. L. REV. !+,,, !+(#-(( (!**+). 
580 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ $, ,, ", +; see also CHAFETZ, supra note ,$, at $() (“The ability 
of each chamber to determine its own cameral rules can be thought of as its authority to create its 
own constitution: the rules constitute it as a certain type of body with certain powers and procedures 
for exercising those powers, as well as certain constraints on its powers.”). 
581 $ U.S.C. § !(( et seq. ($%!+) (Congressional Research Service); $ U.S.C. $+!a et seq. ($%!+) 
(House O-ce of the Legislative Counsel); $ U.S.C. § $)" ($%!+) (Senate O-ce of the Legislative 
Counsel); $ U.S.C. § (%! et seq. ($%!+) (Congressional Budget O-ce); $( U.S.C. +%$! ($%!+) (Joint 
Tax Committee); $ U.S.C. § $+) et seq. ($%!+) (House Parliamentarian); $ U.S.C. § (",! et seq. ($%!+) 
 
*&*&] #e Congressional Bureaucracy !%"$ 
We start with a discussion of these and other ways that the congressional 
bureaucracy complicates the concept of “a statute.” We then introduce several 
more speci+c potential doctrinal moves. 
A. Deconstructing the Concept of “a Statute” 
Perhaps the most provocative output of our study is how the various 
duties of the congressional bureaucracy contribute to—and destabilize—our 
common understanding of what a “statute” is. 
Everyone knows that words must be understood in context, but the 
context of legislative language is much more than the surrounding words on 
the page. In fact, in many instances what we see when we pull up laws on 
Westlaw is not the entirety of what Congress wrote or how Congress arranged 
it at all. Lawmaking does not begin with the vote, and neither does it end 
with it. Final text re.ects, incorporates, and assumes the various inputs from 
the bureaucracy, some of which are provided after enactment. 
Statutory text is changed, reorganized, and reconceptualized by OLRC 
after enactment—and also explained and interpreted by JCT at that time. 
One of OLRC’s primary missions is to pull apart the individual texts that 
Congress enacts and recombine and reorganize them with other texts 
enacted at different times into coherent subject-matter areas. The OLRC 
organic statute actually (and aptly) uses the term “restatement”—not faithful 
reproduction but rational reorganization—to describe its work on positive-
law titles. The statute expressly calls the output a “revision” of the law—
another reference to an editorial function (in full: “complete compilation, 
restatement, and revision”). Congress also expressly directs OLRC, in its 
authorizing statute, to interpret its enacted language purposively, not 
literally, in carrying out its codification tasks, even those tasks that occur 
after the vote.582 
Indeed, the JCT sta, emphasizes the importance of “congressional 
intent,” as re.ected not only in the text but also in the revenue estimates, the 
legislative history, and other explanatory materials that accompany tax 
legislation. It thinks carefully about “what words should be in the statutes, 
and what words should be in the legislative history,” but it does not view them 
as of dramatically di,erent importance.583 
Congress structures itself across the board to think about law more as 
“topics” or +elds, than as individually coherent or consistent texts. The 
 
(Secretary of the Senate, which includes Senate Parliamentarian); $ U.S.C. § $+"a ($%!+) (O-ce of 
the Law Revision Counsel); ,! U.S.C. §§ )%! et seq. & ,"!! et seq. ($%!+) (Government Accountability 
O-ce). 
582 $ U.S.C. $+"b($) ($%!+). 
583 Sta'er Interview. 
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committee system, OLRC’s work to “restate” the Code into subject-matter 
areas, and the division of the bureaucracy—including Legislative Counsel, 
CRS, JCT, CBO, GAO—into sta, that specializes within topics and not 
across the entire Code all re.ect this consistent congressional organizational 
norm. The bureaucracy brings coherence to a subject-matter +eld but 
a-rmatively does not attempt to bring coherence across subjects. But that is 
not how our dictionary-wielding, statutory-interpreting, whole-code-
cohering courts think about text. 
Members focus only on broad policy brushstrokes. Sta,, particularly 
Legislative Counsel, is responsible for the textual language. To say, as 
textualists do, that legislative history is especially unreliable because it is 
written by sta, and not members is to say that the entire U.S. Code is 
unreliable: it is all produced by sta,. 
The entire process is iterative, with inputs from all of the bureaucracy. 
The real work of the modern legislative process, and especially members’ role 
in it, has more to do with +guring out large-scale policy for complicated 
problems, not debating individual words and phrases. Two cheers to Chief 
Justice Roberts in Burwell for seeing that, but no third cheer to the Court for 
reverting to strict hyper-textualism in cases immediately afterward.584 
What, then, is the “text?” Consider the Medicare statute. There is no 
“text” of that statute. The “text” of the Medicare “law” is a concept—one made 
up of many di,erent statutory texts enacted over time. It is only the post-
enactment, multi-year custodial work of OLRC that creates the illusion of a 
single, coherent text. They are the ones who take the original, thirty-six page 
Medicare statute enacted in !)%",585 along with the thousands of laws 
amending this original statute, and transform them into a single !,!($ page 
tome.586 However, this is simply their best guess at how to assemble a “text” of 
“Medicare law.” So is anyone else’s attempt to assemble that “text.” This is 
true of any law that has been amended—positive or non-positive law. 
Statutory law’s complexity—all of these layers—may be its modern 
de+ning feature. And yet courts place great weight on the structure of those 
 
584 See Lockhart v. United States, !,( S.Ct. *"+, *(#-(( ($%!() (majority and dissenting 
opinions based on grammar canons). For contrasts of Burwell and Lockhart, see Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation, +, U. CHI. L. REV. +!, +( ($%!)); Abbe 
R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s Un#nished Business in Statutory Interpretation: Where Textualism’s Formalism 
Gave Up, *$ NOTRE DAME L. REV. $%",, $%)$-)( ($%!)) (comparing interpretive methodology in 
both cases). 
585 Even the original statute was actually just an amendment of an older text, the Social 
Security Act. 
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“laws” as they appear in the U.S. Code, as if each law was birthed with its 
+nal structure. Not so. Understanding the bureaucracy helps to reveal this. 
Getting more granular, a statute that is parsed “like slicing garlic with a 
razor blade” to get the Parliamentarian to refer it to the jurisdiction of a 
certain committee incorporates an understanding of what subjects that statute 
is supposed to cover, because each committee only has jurisdiction over 
certain subjects.587 A statute that is repeatedly amended to get within a 
revenue or budget score incorporates the assumptions of those estimates. 
Statutes drafted with purpose clauses that no longer appear in the Code 
because OLRC moves purpose clauses to small side notes does not make 
those statutes less purposive and it does not erase the fact that Congress 
actually enacted purpose into statutory text in the +rst place. Should textualist 
courts ignore this? 
To understand that Legislative Counsel drafts only operative statutory 
text, and never legislative history except in the case of some explanatory 
statements for conference reports (detailing di,erences between House and 
Senate versions of bills and how they are resolved) and some appropriations 
legislative history, is to understand such history carries special operative 
weight—and is more akin to enacted text than legislative history—inside 
Congress. Many judges do give extra weight to conference reports, but the 
special weight for some appropriations legislative history that is produced by 
Congress’s own practices thus far has been ignored by courts.588 
On the other hand, it is interesting that Legislative Counsel typically does 
not draft those enacted purpose clauses—and disproves of enacting non-
operative text (that is, text without speci+c mandates). OLRC marginalizes 
those materials too. But the partisan policy sta, puts those materials in. What 
does that tell us about the weight they should be given? 
This is complicated, and one has to be honest in evaluating this evidence. 
It is not that all of it is unequivocally clear or that all unequivocally points in 
 
587 See supra note "(%. The Gluck–Bressman study likewise showed that committee jurisdiction 
is a strong proxy for which agency—the one under the committee with jurisdiction—is a statute’s 
primary delegate. This is not to say that sta' might not sometimes try to enlarge jurisdiction with 
statutory language, but if we are focusing on collective rather than subjective, individual decision-
making, then the focus belongs at the objective, transparent, institutional level. 
588 See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, #,) U.S. !",, !*! (!*)+) (“Appropriation Committees have expressly 
stated their ‘understanding’ that the earlier legislation would not prohibit the proposed expenditure. 
We cannot accept such a proposition.”); see also Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
Canonical Construction and Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon, !# J. L. 
& CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES ((*, (++-+* ($%%") (describing that the Court’s “appropriations canon 
rest[s] on a series of controversial assumptions”). Legislative Counsel also will draft motions when 
those motions operate as an amendment to bill text (e.g., a motion to recommit that instructs a 
committee to report back a bill with a speci&c amendment made to its text). 
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the direction of “use it!” But this evidence, no matter how one slices it, is 
much more tethered to the legislative process than what courts use now. 
B. What You Think Is the “Statute” Is Not; OLRC As a Deeper Example 
The best way to fully understand our point about deconstructing “text” is 
through a detailed example. Due to the post-enactment nature of OLRC’s 
work, the formidable role it plays in shaping the language as it appears in the 
U.S. Code, and how courts—and, to our surprise, many partisan sta, inside 
Congress—simply do not understand what OLRC does or how it a,ects text, 
we use it as our illustration.589 As we have emphasized, OLRC has broad, 
widely unknown, statutory mandates to rearrange federal law for various 
ends. For codi+cation bills it also is charged to “remove ambiguities, 
contradictions, and other imperfections both of substance and of form.”590 
!. When You Open the U.S Code You Only See About Half of Enacted 
Statutory Law 
For starters, there is the often-overlooked distinction in federal law 
between the “positive law” and “non-positive law” titles of the U.S. Code.591 
Positive law titles are arranged and edited by OLRC and then formally 
enacted as titles of the U.S. Code by Congress, which is also supposed to 
repeal the various underlying statutes collected therein at the same time.592 
By contrast, a non-positive law title of the Code has still been arranged and 
edited by OLRC (or OLRC working with a title previously organized), but 
the newly arranged title does not go through this bicameralism-and-
presentment process (the underlying statutes, of course, did previously).593 
In codifying titles, and in publishing both positive and non-positive law 
titles, OLRC makes consequential determinations that a,ect what we 
understand as the statute’s “text.” First, OLRC’s statutory mandate is to 
 
589 Gluck, supra note !, at $%+-%*, argued several years ago that courts have ignored OLRC’s 
work. Tobias Dorsey previously o'ered a pair of important meditations on the Code, with the the 
principal thrust of reminding readers that the Statutes at Large provide a truer source of law than 
the non-positive titles. See Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Re.ections on Yates and the Statutes We Threw 
Away, !+ GREEN BAG ,)) ($%!"); Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Re.ections on Not Reading the Statutes, !% 
GREEN BAG $+, ($%%));. A new project, Shobe, supra note !(, o'ers extremely valuable and detailed 
descriptions of OLRC’s functions. See infra note (#$ and accompanying text for our disagreement 
with some of his conclusions. Shawn Nevers and Julie Graves Krishnaswami, The Shadow Code, !!$ 
L. LIBR. J. (forthcoming $%$%), is a terri&c descriptive account. 
590 $ U.S.C. § $+"b(!) ($%!+). 
591 See Shobe, supra note !(, at #-"; see also Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note "+*. 
592 Positive Law Codification, supra note !," (noting that “the original enactments are repealed”). 
593 Id. (“A non-positive law title of the Code is an editorial compilation of Federal statutes.”). 
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codify only “general and permanent” laws.594 OLRC deems some important 
provisions to be nonpermanent, such as most appropriations riders and many 
pilot/demonstration projects. Those are not codi+ed at all. Second, OLRC 
often moves ancillary or nonoperative provisions (provisions that do not 
directly command) into statutory notes—a practice that has resulted in 
OLRC moving more than half of the words in the U.S. Code into statutory 
notes.595 That is, notes not visible when one pulls up a page of the Code on 
Westlaw or Lexis. 
OLRC regularly moves not only preambles and purpose clauses into notes 
but also e,ective dates, and sometimes even severability clauses and other 
provisions.596 OLRC emphasizes that those provisions in the notes or omitted 
from the Code as temporary are still law. Our point is that lawyers often miss, 
or misunderstand them.  
These decisions involve considerable discretion. Take the example of the 
O-ce of National Drug Control Policy, the authorizing statute of which 
required a statutory repeal of the law to occur in *&&$.597 That repeal 
eventually was undone by Congress in *&!(598—but between *&&$ and *&!(, 
the O-ce continued to exist (and be funded), even though it had no statutory 
authorization.599 OLRC deemed the o-ce permanent during that interim 
period—and consequently its statutory authorization was above-the-line in 
the U.S. Code despite being repealed. 
A di,erent example, and one that also illustrates the kind of judgment 
calls OLRC has to make, is the Hyde Amendment, an in.uential 
appropriations rider, which bars the use of federal funds to pay for abortions, 
and which is re-enacted every year. Per OLRC’s judgment, the Hyde 
amendment does appear in the U.S. Code, because it is consistently re-
enacted.600 On the other hand, an appropriations rider—again, part of an 
enacted statute—that defunded part of the A,ordable Care Act in *&!#, and 
 
594 See $ U.S.C. $+"b(!) ($%!+) (directing OLRC to prepare “a complete compilation, 
restatement, and revision of the general and permanent laws of the United States”). 
595 Harlan Ming-Tun Yu, Designing Software to Shape Open Government Policy, at *% (Sept. 
$%!$) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on &le with authors). 
596 The terms nonoperative and ancillary are ours, not those of OLRC. For e'ective dates and 
severability clauses, this placement also often results from these provisions applying to amendments 
made to scattered provisions in the main text of the Code, but (unlike the amendments themselves) 
without any explicit instruction to modify the Code text. For a detailed explanation of how OLRC 
makes these determinations, see Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note "+*. 
597 O-ce of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of !**+, Pub. L. No. !%"-$)), 
§ )!", !!$ Stat. $(+!. 
598 SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. !!"-$)!, § +$%$(b)($), !,$ Stat. 
,+*# ($%!+). 
599 Sta'er Interview. 
600 See !% U.S.C. !%*, ($%!+). 
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even became the subject of a Supreme Court case, does not.601 When we look 
at the Code, we only see part of enacted statutory law. 
Jarrod Shobe insightfully has posited that OLRC’s editing work in 
pushing prefatory and purposes language to the sidelines makes the Code 
look less purposive than it really is and gives courts more leeway to ignore 
congressional intent than they might otherwise.602 
Even lawyers well versed in statutory research are likely to be surprised by 
how much of enacted law is now in notes. It has been calculated that $% percent 
of the statutory text of the enacted laws of the United States are in the notes—that is, 
not in the main text of the U.S. Code.603 Shawn Nevers and Julie Graves 
Krishnaswami found that the Code contains a staggering &',('( notes in total.604 
As an exercise, assume a hospital general counsel is searching for her 
hospital’s Medicare payment amounts. Searching for “hospital Medicare 
payment” on Lexis or Westlaw would bring up #* U.S.C. § !$)"ww, 
“Payments to hospitals for inpatient hospital services,” and the familiar-
looking text of that section of the U.S. Code, as Figure ! shows. 
 
 
601 See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, $%!", Pub. L. No. !!,-$,", 
§$$), !$+ Stat. $!,%, $#*!; Me. Community Health Options v. United States, No. !+-!%$, (S. Ct. 
Apr. $), $%$%) (holding Congress could not repeal in appropriations rider payment promised to 
insurers in text of ACA). 
602 Jarrod Shobe, Enacted Legislative Findings and Purposes, +( U. CHI. L. REV. ((* ($%!*). 
603 Yu, supra note "*". 
604 Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note "+*. 
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Figure ! 
 
The text goes on for dozens of pages, but the counsel will not +nd 
anything about payment amounts for her particular hospital’s classi+cation 
unless she takes the additional step to “read below the line,” and scroll through 
to Lexis’s “Annotations” Section (which comes after the source notes), as 
Figure * shows. 




Once in the Annotations, the general counsel would still need to scroll 
through dozens of pages of other notes—amendment histories, OLRC 
editorial explanations, e,ective dates, and rules of construction—before she 
would +nd this provision, “Application § !"&&((a) of Act Dec. !$, *&!%”, as 
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Figure # 
 
This is where the correct payment calculation for her hospital’s Medicare 
classi+cation is found—duly enacted statutory text, but far outside the 
bounds of the “law” as displayed in the U.S. Code, and buried beneath more 
than one hundred pages of other material. 
Westlaw does not even display statutory notes on the landing page for each U.S. 
Code section.605 To even know whether there were notes of relevance, the 
attorney would have had to a-rmatively navigate a drop-down menu (+rst 
the “History” tab and then the “Editor’s and Revisor’s Notes” tab), then scroll 
through the dozens of pages before the “E,ective and Applicability 
Provisions,” which contain the relevant provisions of law, would appear.  
These payment policies were passed by bicameralism and presentment 
along with the rest of the statute, and carry the full force of the law, yet they 
 
605 Nevers and Krishnaswami similarly note that Westlaw’s display of notes is even more 
problematic than that of its competitors. See Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note "+*, at ,# 
(describing how “Westlaw is the only major legal research provider that breaks the mold [in its 
presentation of notes], but not in a good way”). 
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are nowhere to be found in the “text” of the law as encountered by most 
practitioners and judges. 
OLRC sometimes even inserts entire laws into statutory notes—so they 
do not appear as “law” at all to the uninformed when a title is pulled up on 
Westlaw.606 This often occurs when Congress enacts a freestanding law that 
relates, in terms of subject matter, to a topic within a codified (positive law) 
title. If Congress does not amend a codified title directly—an error that 
happens with relative frequency—the new freestanding law cannot simply 
be added to it.607 But OLRC wants to group like subjects together, so it 
appends the new law as a note to the codified title for subject-matter 
coherence. Westlaw and Lexis then make those notes not visible to the 
average researcher. 
The Wounded Warrior Project is an example of this problem.608 It was 
enacted as a freestanding law, but it was related to the topic of medical care 
for the armed services—a topic within Title !&, a positive law title. Because 
the bill that passed as law did not explicitly amend Title !&, but rather was 
drafted as freestanding new law, OLRC was forced to locate the program 
wholly in a statutory note under that title.609 Nevers and Graves identify 
many other examples.610 
Through the use of these notes, OLRC manages to keep seemingly similar 
subject-matters grouped together in the Code, while also keeping Congress’s 
enacted, positive law intact. It accomplishes this at the cost of accessibility, 
however, as lawyers and judges easily overlook these out-of-the-way 
provisions.611 Some nonexpert lawyers even dispute whether these outside-
the-code provisions are “equal laws” to those OLRC puts above the line. 
This accessibility problem is signi+cant enough that actors within 
Congress—in particular, in Legislative Counsel—have sometimes tried to 
devise their own creative workarounds, both to overcome this problem for 
themselves and to assist outside interpreters (although we would note here 
that failure to draft a particular law properly into the Code in the +rst place 
 
606 Accord id. at ,# (“When presented with a U.S. Code section . . . . in Westlaw, there is no 
indication on the face of the page that statutory notes even exist).  
607 This is because codi&ed titles are positive law; Congress enacts them like statutes, in 
codi&cation bills that simultaneously repeal the underlying public laws. 
608 Shobe, supra note !(, at ,#, uses it as well. 
609 !% U.S.C. § !%)! note ($%!+). 
610 See Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note "+*, at $# (citing $+ U.S.C. § !,"% note 
($%!$), the Torture Victim Protection Act, which is placed in its entirety in a statutory note); id. at 
!( (citing Pub. L. No. !!"-,*!, !,$ Stat. "!*# ($%!+), the First Step Act, recent criminal justice 
legislation which includes provisions regarding reports, appropriations, statutory construction, 
faith-based considerations, data collection, and a provision requiring the Director of the Bureau of 
Prisons to make feminine hygiene products available to prisoners for free, that did not explicitly 
amend Title !+ and so are placed in the notes even as the rest of the law is in Title !+). 
611 See Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note "+*. 
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might have been the responsibility of Legislative Counsel itself). We were 
told of attorneys in Legislative Counsel who, at times, maintained personal 
collections of slip laws to assist in the ongoing challenge of locating provisions 
that OLRC excludes or relocates. We also were told of attorneys in that o-ce 
adopting creative drafting techniques, such as inserting e,ective dates 
directly into the language of operative statutory rules, in an e,ort to tie 
OLRC’s hands and require them to include such dates in main text of the 
Code.612 
Ironically, a big part of the resulting transparency problem comes from 
relying on commercial providers like Westlaw and Lexis and the systems they 
design. Recall that OLRC itself was founded in part because Congress feared 
such reliance on outside compilers, namely West Publishing. 
As Nevers and Graves Krishnaswami additionally note, the fact that 
Westlaw places the editorial notes—which are explanations provided by 
OLRC about the statute’s history, references, amendments and other matters 
but are not actual law—together with the statutory notes, which are indeed law, 
“with no clear distinction, makes it di-cult for researchers to +nd statutory 
notes or to understand their importance.”613 We have begun an e,ort to have 
Westlaw and Lexis address this problem.  
Congress’s own work-product makes statutory notes more accessible than 
do commercial databases—the printed U.S. Code lists the notes in the side 
margins. The o-cial Code website lists them as searchable text beneath the 
relevant codi+ed provisions. Even so, where there are rules of construction 
or other notes that apply to more than one section, a reader just clicking one 
tab is unlikely to see them,614 because they are listed too far from the relevant 
provisions with no indication that the reader should look for them. To the 
uninitiated, even when found, they still appear to be of subordinate status to 
the Code’s “text” and thereby similarly invite confusion and 
misinterpretation.615 
 
612 Today, House Legislative Counsel also maintains its own internal, continually-updated 
collection of the major statutes that are in non-positive law, so that it can view these statutes with 
subsequent amendments added but without the other editorial alterations made by OLRC. See 
Statute Compilations—O"ce of the Legislative Counsel, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/comps (last visited May !!, $%$%) (providing “frequently 
requested compilations of . . . public laws”). 
613 Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note "+*, at ,%. 
614 For example, the relevant rule of construction for Yates appears in the Front Matter to title 
!+ (before section ! of the title), and the relevant provisions appeared hundreds of pages later in 
sections !"!$(c) and !"!* (which are found in Part I and Chapter ), of the title, which each have their 
own “Front Matter” sections). See Title !+ of United States Code, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION 
COUNSEL, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path1/prelim@title!+&edition1prelim (accessed 
June +, $%$%). 
615 Underscoring this risk, Nevers and Graves Krishnaswami note a $%%, case in which the !!th 
Circuit was required to correct the district court’s mistaken conception that statutory notes were of 
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*. Text Is Added, Edited, and Rearranged After Enactment 
In deciding the breadth of each topic that it will reorganize into a title for 
codi+cation, OLRC is statutorily directed to capture the presumed intent 
(speci+cally, “the understood policy, intent, and purpose”) of Congress—
including by modifying statutory language.616 An interviewee said: “The idea 
is to carry forward the precise meaning and e,ect without any change [in that 
meaning] . . . but [also] to make any adjustments to make it easier to 
understand and to navigate, to correct technical errors, and to resolve 
ambiguities.”617 
The changes that are made as a result to enacted text may surprise not 
only outsiders. Even most of the partisan sta,ers we interviewed, many of 
whom have worked in Congress for a long time, had no knowledge of OLRC’s 
editorial work.618 In combining, reorganizing, and restructuring statutes into 
new subject-matter documents—whether for a new codi+cation bill or to 
arrange a non-positive title—OLRC determines statutory structure, and it 
inserts cross references, subtitle divisions, and headings.619 In codi+cation 
bills, it sometimes even adds new textual provisions, like de+nitions(!). We 
see all those items when we look at the Code, and courts derive much meaning 
from them—where a provision is placed, what provisions it is near, what the 
title of the section is, and so on. 
For example, OLRC may insert what it calls a “no source” provision into 
a new positive title that it is preparing for Congress. A “no source” provision 
is one that did not exist in any congressionally enacted law, but that OLRC creates 
out of whole cloth.620 For example, if OLRC concludes that a new de+ned 
term will help it more easily articulate the policies that it is assembling in the 
title, it may insert a new de)nition into the title, and then use this newly 
de+ned term throughout the title.621 In the chapter of title #% labeled 
“Liability of Water Carriers,” for example, the very concept of a “carrier” is a 
 
lesser authority. See Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note "+*, at !" (discussing Schwier v. 
Cox, ,#% F.,d !$+#, !$++ (!!th Cir. $%%,)). It additionally was suggested to us that Legislative 
Counsel might consider releasing the compiled statutes that it now publishes as PDFs, see supra 
note (!$, in a format that outside companies could readily use and adapt (known as “USLM” format, 
which OLRC already uses). Email from Former Sta'er to Abbe Gluck & Jesse Cross (Jan. $(, $%$%) 
(on &le with authors). 
616 $ U.S.C. $+"b(!) ($%!+). 
617 Sta'er Interview. 
618 None of the partisan sta' we interviewed for the article was familiar with these details of 
OLRC’s work. 
619 Sta'er Interviews. 
620 Sta'er Interview. 
621 See, e.g., ,! U.S.C. *!%! ($%!+) (noting no-source provision de&ning “Government 
corporation”); "! USC §!%!%!($) ($%!+) (providing no-source provision de&ning the “Administrator” 
of NASA). 
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de+ned term added by OLRC in a “no source” provision (the term that 
indicates OLRC created it).622 While these the Revision Notes .ag those 
provisions as having no source, those notes are hard to +nd and do not appear 
in the main text—whereas the “no source” provisions themselves do appear 
in the main text of the Code un.agged, just like provisions that Congress 
actually had enacted in prior law. “In a positive law codi+cation bill,” an 
interviewee reported, “we create these de+nition sections pretty 
frequently.”623 
The Westlaw version of this title #% “carrier” de+nition is shown below. 
Figure # shows the de+nition as it appears in the main text of the Code, where 
it looks like any other provision—no indication is given that the de+nition 
was added via an OLRC-drafted “no source” provision. As Figure " shows, it 
is only when the reader selects the “History” tab (.agged with a yellow arrow) 
and selects “Editor’s and Revisor’s Notes” from that drop-down tab menu 
that one encounters the table and explanation where OLRC identi+es these 
as “no source” provisions (also .agged with yellow arrows); Westlaw’s mere 




622 #( U.S.C. ,%)%! ($%!+) (de&nition of “carrier”). Explaining the insertion, OLRC wrote in 
the notes: “A de&nition of ‘carrier’ is added based on language appearing in various provisions of 
the Harter Act. The de&nition avoids the need to repeat in various sections of this chapter the list 
of persons to whom the requirements and restrictions of this chapter apply, and it ensures that the 
list of persons is consistent in the chapter.” Id. 
623 Sta'er interview. 




OLRC also exercises its editorial discretion by formulating novel 
provisions to clarify what otherwise might only be implicit. Consider, again, 
Title !&, which contains a chapter entitled “Retirement of Warrant O-cers 
for Length of Service.”624 This chapter contains three provisions. Under 
section !*)$, it authorizes the Secretary to retire a warrant o-cer (upon their 
request) after twenty years of creditable active service, and under Section 
!$&", it provides that warrant o-cers shall be retired after thirty years of 
service (with some exceptions).625 These Sections, codi+ers believed, implied 
that warrant o-cers would receive retired pay (e.g., by discussing eligibility 
for such pay).626 However, Sections !*)$ and !$&" never made that 
entitlement explicit. Consequently, in preparing Title !& for codi+cation in 
!)"%,627 codi+ers at that time (predecessors to OLRC) created a “no source” 
provision to be added to the chapter: Section !$!", which would “make explicit 
the entitlement to retired pay upon retirement” for warrant o-cers under the 
chapter.628 It remains that way today. 
When Congress passes the codification bill it effectively blesses these edits 
and changes. As formal matter, they are enacted by Congress. But they are 
 
624 !% U.S.C. ch. (" ($%!+). 
625 !% U.S.C. §§ !$*,, !,%" ($%!+). 
626 See !% U.S.C. § !,!" ($%!+) (describing provision as added to “make explicit” the 
entitlement). 
627 Title !% and Title ,$, United States Code, Pub. L. No. +#-!%$+ (Aug. !%, !*"(), available at 
https://uscode.house.gov/codi&cation/$Stat_at_Large_Title!%andTitle,$.pdf. 
628 !% U.S.C. § !,!" ($%!+). 
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certainly much further removed from the core legislative process—in Justice 
Scalia’s terms, much more the product of staff—than many other materials 
courts eschew. The point is not that OLRC is acting ultra vires or secretively. 
OLRC actively solicits input from key staff, administrative agencies, and 
academics for its codification bills, but it is difficult to find evidence that many 
members and even most staff pay much attention to them. 
Looking to the legislative histories of the past five codification bills that 
have been passed, no committee hearings were held; all passed the Senate by 
unanimous consent and the House by voice vote, except for two recorded votes 
of #&)-& and $("-&. The sponsors of these bills consistently emphasize that they 
make no substantive change in existing law and that there has been a comment 
process that includes the agencies. These bills were rarely amended, and when 
they were, it was to make technical corrections or to incorporate revisions 
arising out of the OLRC review and comment process.629 
 
629 For example, for the most recent codi&cation bill, !!, H.R. !%(+ (!$/!*/$%!# Became Public 
Law No. !!,-$+)), To enact title "#, United States Code, “National Park Service and Related 
Programs”, as positive law, the bill passed the House on a motion to suspend the rules to pass the 
bill and passed the Senate without amendment by unanimous consent. Representative Bob 
Goodlatte introduced the bill stating, “The bill was prepared in accordance with the statutory 
standard for codi&cation legislation, which is that the restatement shall conform to the understood 
policy, intent, and purpose of Congress in the original enactments, with such amendments and 
corrections as will remove ambiguities, contradictions, and other imperfections.” !"* CONG. REC. 
H$$$+ (daily ed. Apr. $,, $%!,) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte). Representative Bass spoke in support 
of the bill as well, referring to it as a “commonsense, noncontroversial bill that enjoys strong 
bipartisan support.” Id. For similar elements in the title #! codi&cation, see Markup of H.R. $$(&, To 
Enact Certain Laws Relating to Public Contracts as Title ,$, United States Code, “Public Contracts”; H.R. 
$$-%, the “COPS Improvements Act o” '((%”; and H.R. $+&+, “The End GREED Act”, !!!th Cong. ##-
#" ($%%*) (statement of Rep. Lofgren, H. Comm on Judiciary) (Rep. Lofgren thanking the sponsors 
for doing this “unglamorous work; but it is necessary”). The bill was reported without amendments. 
Similarly, at the markup session of a previous version of the bill, Representative Bobby Scott gave 
an opening statement and stated, “We have a waiting period after introduction so that the bill could 
be reviewed by the relevant federal agencies, congressional committees and practitioners.” There 
were no further comments on the bill. Hearing To Consider a Resolution and Report Finding Karl Rove 
in Contempt for Failure To Appear Pursuant to Subpoena and Recommending to the House of Representatives 
That Mr. Rove Be Cited for Contempt of Congress; and Markup of . . . H.R. ,&&%, To Enact Certain Laws 
Relating to Public Contracts as Title ,$, United States Code, “Public Contracts,” !!%th Cong. !*+ ($%%+) 
(statement of Rep. Bobby Scott, H. Comm on Judiciary); !"( CONG. REC. H!%# (daily ed. Jan. !,, 
$%!%) (statement of Rep. Smith).(“H.R. ,$,) and similar law revision bills are important because 
they ensure that the U.S. Code is up to date and accurate, without making substantive changes to 
the law.”). On title #( codi&cation, see !"% Cong. Rec. H),("# (daily ed. Sep. $+, $%%#) (statement 
of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (noting that it had been circulated by OLRC to interested parties and 
congressional committees, that the Federal Maritime Commission and Department of 
Transportation had provided extensive comments, and that “Members should understand that 
because of the nature of this bill, supporting it does not imply support of the underlying provisions 
that are being reorganized and cleaned up”). 
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$. Yates v. United States—A Legislation Chestnut Misunderstood 
With respect to how OLRC reorganizes statutory text and the weight 
courts give such actions, a prominent recent example is Yates v. United 
States630—already a legislation-course chestnut for its memorable fact pattern 
(is a +sh a “tangible object” for purposes of the evidence destruction 
provisions of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act?) and its dueling textualist opinions by 
liberal Justices Ginsburg and Kagan. Writing for the plurality, Justice 
Ginsburg emphasized the provision’s Code placement, noting that it sat 
alongside rules for speci+c kinds of evidence, not generally-applicable 
prohibitions.631 By focusing on this issue, as commentators have noted, the 
plurality overlooked a rule of construction for Title !( prohibiting considering 
placement as evidence of meaning—a rule added by the codi)ers themselves 
to .ag that they arranged the title.632 Of course, the rule was voted on by 
Congress when it approved the codi+cation bill. The plurality likely missed 
the rule because OLRC had relegated it to the Code’s notes.633 
Both sides’ textual analyses also fall short in other ways in light of our 
knowledge of the enactment process. Take the Court’s use of the “same 
Act”/“whole act” canons. Interpreting Sections !"!*(c) and !"!) of the federal 
criminal code, the plurality applied a heightened rule against redundancy,634 
and the dissent applied a heightened rule of consistent usage,635 both of which 
apply speci+cally to provisions passed in the same Act. Sections !"!*(c) and 
!"!) both were enacted as part of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of *&&*, so these 
rules were assumed to apply. 
However, both Justices missed a relevant piece of Sarbanes–Oxley: the 
titles that added sections !"!*(c) and !"!) had “short titles” labeling each a 
separate “Act.”636 (Short titles, too, are moved into notes in the Code, 
 
630 ")# U.S. "$+ ($%!"). 
631 Id. at !%)) (arguing that “[s]ection !"!*’s position within Chapter ), of Title !+ further 
signals that § !"!* was not intended to serve as a cross-the-board ban on the destruction of physical 
evidence of every kind”). 
632 See Act of June $", !*#+, ch. (#", Pub. L. No. ))$, § !*, ($ Stat. +($. 
633 See Dorsey, Some Re.ections on Yates, supra note "+*, at ,+( (“I simply observe that while a 
congressional instruction on how to interpret title !+ exists, no one mentioned it (and everyone 
violated it).”); Daniel B. Listwa, Uncovering the Codi#er’s Canon: How Codi#cation Informs 
Interpretation, !$) YALE L.J. #(#, #)# ($%!)) (same); Shobe, supra note !(, at #" (same). 
634 See !," S.Ct. !%)#, !%+" (noting that canon applies to sections “passed in proximity as part 
of the same Act”); see also id. (emphasizing the “contemporaneous passage” of the two provisions). 
635 See id. at !%*( (Kagan, J., dissenting) (observing that canon applies “identical words used 
in di'erent parts of the same act”) (quoting Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, #)" U.S. +"! (!*+()). 
The dissent does at least also contemplate a belt-and-suspenders interpretation. Id. 
636 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of $%%$, Pub. L. No. !%)-$%#, § +%!, !!( Stat. )#" (“This title may be 
cited as the ‘Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of $%%$’.”); id. at § !!%! (“This title 
may be cited as the ‘Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of $%%$’.”). 
*&*&] #e Congressional Bureaucracy !%%) 
making them easy to miss.)637 As the House Legislative Counsel’s drafting 
manual specifies, provisions are labeled as separate short “Acts” specifically 
to signal that, rather than being drafted together, they were assembled by 
cobbling together separate, previously-drafted bills.638 This means that 
Sections !"!*(c) and !"!) were drafted with a dual blindness to each other—
each was drafted when the other was neither in the same bill nor in already-
enacted law, making it impossible for drafters to account for the other.639 
Absent evidence that these provisions were then modified to fit together, it 
makes no sense to interpret them via the “same Act” / “whole act” canons, 
which assume that neighboring provisions are drafted with each other in 
mind.640 If anything, a lessened rule of redundancy and consistency—not a 
heightened one—makes sense in this instance. The plain statutory language 
of Sarbanes–Oxley, understood in the light of Congress’s operations, 
therefore reveals that the Court’s application of its “same Act” canons to 
Sections !"!*(c) and !"!) was misguided—at least, to a reader who knows: 
(!) to look at statutory notes; and (*) to interpret in light of published 
Legislative Counsel drafting practices. Others have produced the same 
conclusion about these provisions using legislative history; our point is that 
these more objective inputs from the congressional bureaucracy’s own ex-
ante-defined rules are as instructive and can be easier to apply.641 
 
637 See !+ U.S.C. !"%! note ($%!+) (short title for title VIII); !" U.S.C. )+a note ($%!+) (short 
title for title XI). 
638 THE OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
HOUSE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE $(-$) (!**"), 
https://www.llsdc.org/assets/sourcebook/manual_on_drafting_style.pdf [https://perma.cc/+LAA-
"W(H] (explaining that, while “[t]he practice of providing a short title for each title . . . generally 
should be avoided,” congressional drafters make exceptions “[i]n cases of omnibus bills . . . that 
consist of proposals that had been . . . separate legislation.”). The drafting manual cites only one 
other instance where such short titles may be appropriate—one not applicable to Sarbanes-Oxley. 
See id. (appropriate when full Act’s short title misrepresents provision’s contents). 
639 Sure enough, this explanation proves correct for sections !"!$(c) and !"!*. On July !%, $%%$, 
Senator Leahy proposed an amendment to Sarbanes–Oxley that contained the new Section !"!*, 
and that was a repackaged version of companion bills previously introduced by Senator Leahy and 
Representative Conyers. See S.Amdt. #!+" to S.$(),, !%)th Cong. ($%%$) (Leahy amendment); !%) 
Cong. Rec. S(")+ ($%%$) (same); S. $%!%, § $, !%)th Cong. ($%%$) (earlier Senate companion); H.R. 
#%*+, § $, !%)th Cong. ($%%$) (earlier House companion). Also on July !%, an administration-crafted 
package of amendments containing the new section !"!$(c) was proposed by Senator Lott and 
adopted (with a companion bill introduced shortly thereafter in the House). See S.Amdt. #!++, !%)th 
Cong. ($%%$) (Lott amendment); !%) Cong. Rec. S("#$ ($%%$) (same); H.R. "!!+, § ,, !%)th Cong. 
($%%$) (House companion).  
640 Moreover, the short titles for sections adding !"!$(c) and !"!* are nearly identical, 
suggesting some overlap in content and thereby further heightening the concern for redundancy. 
Compare § +%! (giving title VIII the short title, “Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act 
of $%%$”); with § !!%! (giving title XI the short title, “Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of $%%$”). 
641 The legislative history thereby con&rms the lesson from statutory text. Senator Leahy 
proposed the amendment that added the new !"!*, and Senator Lott the amendment with the new 
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We recognize this feels like inside baseball. And courts could easily 
articulate other reasons for applying consistency rules to statutes—like public 
notice—reasons that would openly acknowledge “this might not be what 
Congress intended.” But instead, we have courts doing the kind of close-
reading and statutory-parsing, including deep dives into statutory history, 
grammar, and word meaning, that the Yates Court performed. 
Opinions like Yates are not easy public meaning opinions, as textualists 
would have us believe; rather they are textual detective missions to +gure out 
what Congress meant. Congress’s own conventions are uniquely importantly 
to any such mission and are no less text-tethered than some of the Court’s 
own tools. 
#. Positive v. Nonpositive Law 
To be sure, in the case of codi+ed titles, Congress formally votes on the 
title and structure when it votes to approve the codi+cation bill. But that 
distinction gives too much credit to the kind of vetting it is assumed Congress 
does in the process of codi+cation. We disagree with Shobe that enactment 
or nonenactment makes a dramatic di,erence in how little weight should be 
given to Code placement in statutory interpretation; this distinction only 
makes sense for pure formalists, not for anyone focused on linking statutory 
construction to what Congress actually meant. Far more reliance on “sta,” 
happens in this context than in other contexts, like committee reports, that 
judges who mistrust sta, are not willing to consider. As OLRC told us, there 
is “no political will” for its work, and in fact Congress has not taken up a 
codi+cation bill in more than " years.642 In reality, it is OLRC that edits, 
reorganizes, and adds to both positive and nonpositive law. 
As another indication, OLRC sometimes also drafts rules of construction, 
(OLRC’s predecessor codi+ers drafted the one at issue in Yates), to instruct 
courts not to rely on its work—for instance not to rely on organization of the 
title—as evidence of congressional intent, but the courts tend to overlook 
those provisions or not even realize they were added after the initial public 
law was enacted, in the codi+cation process.643 
 
!"!$(c), which had ties to the administration. There is some .oor debate about potential overlap, but 
changes were not made to the text. Having both in there was part of the compromise. See WILLIAM 
N. ESKRIDGE JR., ABBE R. GLUCK, & VICTORIA F. NOURSE, STATUTES, INTERPRETATION, AND 
REGULATION !$)-$* (Supp. $%$%) (explaining how these conclusions can be drawn both from 
bureaucracy’s inputs and from legislative history). 
642 Sta'er Interview. The most recent enactment was Title "#, National Park Service and 
Related Programs, in $%!#. See Pub. L. !!,-$+). For the current status of codi&cation bills that OLRC 
has prepared for Congress, see Positive Law Codi&cation, supra note !,". 
643 See Dorsey, Some Re.ections on Yates, supra note "+*, at ,)* (stating that section "(%% of the 
Revised Statutes of the United States of American included a provision that “no inference or 
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OLRC does flag the significant changes that it has made, via historical 
and revision notes, disposition tables, and data tables.644 But, again, they 
are difficult to locate on third-party sites and appear in the sidebar of the 
paper book. 
For non-positive law titles—the ones OLRC arranges for the Code (like 
Title #*, which includes the Civil Rights Act) but that Congress has not 
blessed by enacting into positive law—the current leadership of OLRC told 
us that it is their practice not to change text or add new provisions like 
de+nitions.645 Even in those titles, however, OLRC will rearrange provisions, 
add headings, and modify cross-references. 
For an example, consider sections $ and # of the Robinson-Patman 
Antidiscrimination Act. They are found in Title !", a non-positive title, but 
codi+ers have renumbered, rearranged, and modi+ed cross-references and 
section headings.646 Figure % presents these sections as they appear in the 
Statutes at Large. Figure ' then shows those sections in the Code on the 
OLRC website. In each Figure, the relevant provisions are identi+ed by a 
yellow box. Notice that the Code provisions have been renumbered, given 
section titles, and relocated between provisions from !)!# and !)$( (as .agged 
with red arrows). Additionally, note that these Code provisions appear in a 
Code chapter entitled “Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of Trade” 
and a title labeled “Commerce and Trade”—labels not in the original statute. 
 
 
presumption of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the Title, under which any 
particular section is placed”). 
644 Positive Law Codi&cation, supra note !," (discussing the preparation of these items and 
their inclusion in the Code). 
645 Nevers and Krishnaswami refer to this as OLRC’s preference for “act-code coherence”––
an approach that, as they observe, increases use of statutory notes in non-positive titles. See Nevers 
& Graves Krishnaswami, supra note "+*, at !* (explaining this “principle of act-code coherence”). 
646 Compare Act of Aug. $), !+*#, § )(, $+ Stat. ")%, Clayton Antitrust Act of !*!#, Pub. L. No. 
(,-$!$, §§ $-,, ,+ Stat. ),%, and Robinson-Patman Act, Pub. L. No. )#-(*$, §§ !-#, #* Stat. !"$( with 
!" U.S.C. § !!-!# ($%!+) (reorganizing provisions, modifying cross-references, and adding headings). 
For an example with an antitrust statute enacted after OLRC’s creation, compare Curt Flood Act of 
!**+, § ,, !$ Stat. $+$# with !" U.S.C. $(b (reorganizing provisions and adding headings). 
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And while the present-day OLRC emphasizes editorial modesty in its 
editing of non-positive law, previous codi+cation o-ces were sometimes 
more ambitious, on occasion signi+cantly rewriting enacted statutory text, 
and those changes remain. For example, * U.S.C. § *'! (the Senate 
Legislative Counsel charter) was prepared by a predecessor to the current 
OLRC. Among other editorial changes, it breaks up a long paragraph from 
the original !)!( Act into individual provisions with headings; modi+es the 
language to re.ect new labels for the Drafting Service and the draftsmen 
created by a !)*# Act; and strikes references in the text to the House 
Legislative Counsel and the Speaker of the House that Congress forgot to 
delete in a !)'& Act.647 
Present-day OLRC still also makes use of statutory notes in non-positive 
law titles. For example, the Belarus Democracy Act of *&&# contained mostly 
Sense of Congress provisions, reporting requirements, and quasi-temporary 
provisions—and the entire act was put in a statutory note.648 Severability 
provisions also sometimes will be located in statutory notes for non-positive 
titles, despite their high importance for judicial and other interpreters.649 
Figure ( shows how the Belarus Democracy Act of *&&# appears on 
Westlaw. To locate it, a reader must navigate on Westlaw to the U.S. Code 
provision for ** U.S.C. § "(!! (which contains only a +ndings section for a 
di,erent statute), click on the “History” tab, and select “Editor’s and 
Revisor’s Notes” from the drop-down tab menu (as noted with yellow 
arrows). The reader then must scroll through roughly seven pages of material 
to reach the heading of “Belarus Democracy Act of *&&#” as it appears in Fig. 
(. There, the reader +nds the full text of the statute. OLRC also adds the 
bracketed phrase “[enacting this note]” into the text of the statute (as .agged 
with yellow arrow) in order to clarify what the statute’s reference to “This 








647 See supra note *%; see also Dorsey, Not Reading the Statutes, supra note "+*, at $+"-+( 
(discussing this provision). 
648 See Pub. L. No. !%+-,#) (codi&ed at $$ U.S.C. § "+!! ($%!+)) (referencing Belarus 
Democracy Act of $%%# in the statutory note). 
649 See, e.g., $ U.S.C. § *%% note ($%!+) (stating the severability provision in the note section); 
!" U.S.C. !(%! note ($%!+) (same); supra note "*(. Severability clauses instruct courts whether to 
strike entire laws down if provisions are found invalid. 




As one interviewee put it: 
Should someone trying to understand the law skip over the notes? No! You’re 
not going to understand what [the law] is.	.	.	.	If there is a [provision] saying 
that “the above amendments only apply to people with blue eyes” or “[only 
apply] after such a year,” where do we put that information? In the notes.650 
OLRC is just one office in the congressional bureaucracy, but it offers an 
extreme and very important example of bureaucratic work that has gone 
unnoticed. Other inputs of the bureaucracy, including JCT’s post-vote Blue 
Book, CBO’s pre-vote score, and Legislative Counsel’s drafting work, including 
certain legislative history, are much more salient to members and as important. 
The “text” has more inputs than most courts and lawyers assume. 
C. New Canons, Canons, Canons 
This is not the place to spin out every possible implication of our study for 
statutory interpretation doctrine. We reserve those efforts mostly for future 
work, and instead offer some big-picture points, as well as some low-hanging 
fruit, for lawyers and judges, including textualists, by way of conclusion. 
Which aspects of the congressional bureaucracy are most relevant for 
those courts interested in the statutory meaning intended by Congress? If 
courts want to understand what elected members thought they were voting 
on, pre-enactment inputs like the CBO score and JCT estimate, legislative 
history, committee jurisdiction assignments, budget reconciliation rulings, 
and requested analyses of bills from CRS or MedPAC/MACPAC may be 
most relevant to the operating assumptions of elected members. 
 
650 Sta'er Interview. 
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We have already discussed the complexity of post-enactment bureaucratic 
work. If courts were concerned about bureaucracy work after the vote, they 
could construct “anti-deference” rules for that, as they have in other 
contexts.651 Alternatively, courts might respect Congress’s right—safeguarded 
in Article I of the Constitution—to establish its own procedures. That is, 
precisely because Congress has created OLRC and charged it with making 
those post-enactment edits, we should view those delegated responsibilities 
to be legitimate contributions to the statutory text that results. That is a much 
more expansive view of the lawmaking process than one cabined by the 
discrete moment of a vote. 
To make things simpler, as a start, we suggest some speci+c moves as low-
hanging fruit that eschews the harder questions of post-enactment work. 
Courts have actually proven quite willing to consider drafting realities when 
presented in small-scale form, case by case.652 As one example, after the 
Gluck–Bressman study’s +nding that Congress often legislates with 
intentional repetition, some judges have resisted applying the presumption 
against redundancy.653 
Judges of most interpretive stripes also should be attracted to the new 
canons we suggest—all of them are based on objective, not subjective, outputs 
that are the direct results of collective congressional direction. To those who 
would already consider legislative history, these outputs may be even more 
representative of collective intent. To those who would look instead to an 
objective source like a dictionary to glean how words were understood at the 
time of enactment, these outputs are similar but more closely tethered to 
Congress’s own democratic process. 
 
651 This is essentially what Listwa suggests with respect to OLRC code placement decisions. 
Listwa, supra note (,,, at #(+ (“[T]he interpreter ought to follow a simple rule: ignore editorial 
decisions made by the nonlegislative codi&ers—i.e., the OLRC—but consider those made by 
Congress.”). 
652 For examples of courts relying on CBO calculation, see, e.g., Halbig v. Burwell, )"+ F.,d 
,*%, #%)-%+ (D.C. Cir. $%!#) (citing the CBO analysis as inconclusive evidence of congressional 
intent); King v. Burwell, )"* F.,d ,"+, ,)# (#th Cir. $%!#) (relying on a CBO report to establish 
congressional intent to combine subsidies with the individual mandate); King v. Sebelius, **) F. 
Supp. $d #!", #,%-,! (E.D. Va. $%!#) (citing the CBO analysis and CBO director letter as indicative 
of congressional intent to create insurance subsidies for every state); Halbig v. Sebelius, $) F. Supp. 
,d !, $#-$" (D.D.C. $%!#) (same); see also Monk v. Shulkin, +"" F.,d !,!$, !,$% n.# (Fed. Cir. $%!)) 
(relying on CBO report for assumption Congress intended Veterans courts to allow class actions); 
U.S. House of Reps. v. Burwell, !+" F. Supp. ,d !(", !)$ (D.D.C. $%!() (relying on CBO 
characterization of cost-sharing reductions as direct spending). But see Ohio v. United States, !"# F. 
Supp. ,d ($!, (#$ (S.D. Ohio $%!() (claiming that “the CBO does not and cannot authoritatively 
interpret federal statutes”). 
653 See supra note !). 
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!. The CBO Canon—And Now, the JCT Canon, OLRC Canon, 
Parliamentarian’s Canon 
In *&!*, one of us suggested a new “CBO canon,” to push courts to take 
into account assumptions about the statute—including the understandings of 
its words—that CBO used in computing its budget score.654 The CBO canon 
is especially appropriate when the score is a matter of serious attention (the 
A,ordable Care Act is a prominent example). This canon quickly found its 
way into law and policy blogs,655 o-cial congressional correspondence,656 
litigation briefs,657 and court opinions.658 
Other scholars have followed upon this approach, and we now have a 
recent proposal, from Clint Wallace, for a JCT canon, building o, the CBO 
canon as the revenue analogue: look to JCT’s understanding of the tax law to 
resolve ambiguities.659 Wallace notes that, like the CBO canon, his approach 
has “democratic bona +des” of having been generated and required by 
 
654 See Bressman & Gluck, supra note !, at )+$ (justifying the CBO canon based on interviews 
with legislative drafters). See also Gluck, Statutory Interpretation, supra note ! (illustrating how CBO 
canon would work and why, in some cases, it would be more reliable indicium of statutory meaning 
than other common tools); Gluck, The “CBO Canon,” supra note ! (“[The CBO canon is [a]n 
interpretive presumption that ambiguities in legislation should be construed in the way most 
consistent with the assumptions underlying the congressional budget score on which the initial 
legislation was based.”). 
655 Timothy Jost, Tax Credits in Federally Facilitated Exchanges Are Consistent with the A!ordable 
Care Act’s Language and History, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July !+, $%!$), 
https://www.healtha'airs.org/do/!%.!,))/hblog$%!$%)!*.%$!,,)/full/ [http://perma.cc/,QZJ-)ZBK] 
(noting CBO’s assumption that “premium tax credits would be available to all Americans in all 
states”); Jonathan Cohn, The Legal Crusade to Undermine Obamacare—and Rewrite History, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Dec #, $%!$), online at http://newrepublic.com/article/!!%))%/legal-challenge-
obamacare-insurance-exchanges-full-holes [https://perma.cc/X*LT-NA",] (discussing Jost’s article 
and the CBO canon). 
656 See, e.g., Letter from, Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir. of the Cong. Budget O'., to Rep. Darrell 
E. Issa, Chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform at *! (Dec (, $%!$) 
(responding to a query regarding “CBO’s assumption that the premium assistance tax credits 
established by [the A'ordable Care Act] would be available in every state”). 
657 See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
at *$!, Halbig v. Sebelius, No. !,-cv-%%($,, (D.D.C. Sept. $), $%!,) (arguing that Congress’s intent 
was manifest through its heavy reliance on CBO’s assumption that tax credits would be available 
in every state); Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at *,, #, !$, !+, United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. !#-cv-%!*(), 
(D.D.C. Jan. !", $%!() (describing how Congress relied on CBO’s scoring of the Affordable Care 
Act’s insurance subsidy as mandatory spending); Brief of Appellants at *!$, "!, Ohio v. United 
States, No. !(-cv-,%*, ((th Cir. Apr. #, $%!() (relying on CBO descriptions to bolster point about 
reinsurance tax definition). 
658 For examples of relying on CBO calculation, see supra note ("$. 
659 See Clint Wallace, Congressional Control of Tax Rulemaking, )! TAX L. REV. !)*, $$" ($%!)) 
(“Under the JCT Canon, courts (and Treasury and IRS personnel) should construe ambiguous tax 
statutes in the same manner as the JCT did in producing revenue estimates and other analysis and 
explanations for the statute.”). 
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Congress itself.660 Indeed, the JCT sta, we interviewed emphasized that 
members “care about budgetary e,ect” and view them as “part of the day to 
day policy design.” 
Daniel Listwa also suggested a “codi+er’s canon,”661 which would direct 
courts to use captions and placement only when Congress itself enacts them 
directly into positive law—a conclusion that makes sense if we wish to ignore 
post-enactment modi+cations, thought not if we more provocatively view 
OLRC’s work as part of Congress’s delegatory authority.662 
Most recently, Jonathan Gould suggested a “Parliamentarian’s canon,” 
which would resolve ambiguities by interpreting them consistently with 
parliamentary precedent and “especially rulings of the chair.”663 We would go 
further and extend this deference to parliamentary decisions regardless if they 
are made from the chair, in public. Thanks to unorthodox lawmaking, we have 
seen that the most consequential rulings of late are not from the public chair 
at all, but rather resolved before a bill ever reaches the .oor. We think 
committee jurisdiction referrals would be as important, especially because 
such referrals are directly tied to statutory meaning and other important 
matters, including often which agency is the lead administrator.664 Sta,ers in 
the Parliamentarians’ o-ces told us they help partisan sta, who “might be 
putting their +nger on the scale to rewrite [bills] for jurisdictional 
concerns.”665 We would also emphasize rulings on reconciliation. 
Reconciliation bills, once unorthodox, are now a central means of legislating. 
Recent major statutes—e.g., the *&!' tax bill and parts of the ACA—were 
passed using this special process. The Byrd rule plays a pivotal role in shaping 
those bills, and so any “Parliamentarian’s canon” should also counsel not to 
interpret a reconciliation bill in a way that would have clearly violated the 
Byrd rule. 
Some scholars have voiced skepticism about the extent to which 
parliamentary or congressional-rules-based interpretations can be 
attributed to the larger Congress.666 But it matters not whether individual 
members of Congress subjectively agreed with the Parliamentarian’s ruling. 
 
660 Wallace, supra note ("*. Ultimately, he predicates the canon on the unique ability of JCT 
to add agency-like virtues to tax. Id. 
661 Listwa, supra note (,,. 
662 For Listwa, even codi&cation bills are not good enough because OLRC decides placement 
there and Congress gives such bills very little attention. Id. 
663 Gould, supra note !(, at $%$$. 
664 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note !, at !%%(-!%%) (detailing internal view that the agency 
under the jurisdiction of committee who drafts the bill is typically the lead agency, because the 
committee wants to oversee implementation). 
665 Sta'er Interview. 
666 For an excellent recent example, see Rebecca M. Kysar, Interpreting by the Rules, ** TEX. L. 
REV. (forthcoming $%$!). 
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What matters is that language inserted or deleted was necessary to clear 
procedural hurdles and should not be given short shrift by courts. For 
example, under the Byrd rule, a reconciliation bill cannot include any 
“extraneous” provisions (a complex standard more fully set out in the 
notes).667 When points of order are raised about language that does not fit 
this requirement, Legislative Counsel works with staff to modify the bill 
text (sometimes creatively) bring it into compliance with the rule.668 As one 
interviewee colorfully told us: “If it’s reconciliation, they are ripping things 
out of there left and right. It’s only when you see the final product and say, 
‘What is this crap?’”669 The result is a bill that may not be as internally 
consistent or coherent as the Court would assume. For the court to impose 
its usual canons here would undermine the specific moves Congress made 
to clear its procedural hurdle. There are other doctrines, like severability, 
under which courts are loathe to impose something on a statute that 
Congress never would. This should be no different. 
Gluck and O’Connell made the same suggestion about eliminating the 
presumption of consistency for omnibus legislation. Even more extreme than 
omnibus bills, interpreters cannot assume consistency even within provisions 
in a reconciliation bill. Because the Byrd rule is applied on a provision-by-
provision basis, drafters often will unnaturally cram together unrelated (or 
only semi-related) rules into a single provision for Byrd rule purposes.670 
Additionally, courts should have a heightened sense of budgetary windows 
when interpreting reconciliation bills, since reconciliation bills often are 
contorted in order to comply with year-speci+c +scal rules. 
What about Legislative Counsel canons? The Gluck–Bressman study 
o,ered some prospects. For example, Legislative Counsel drafts only one 
type of legislative history: certain parts of appropriations legislative history. 
By Congress’s own rules, appropriations bills list only outlays; the legislative 
history provides the programmatic direction. That is why Legislative Counsel 
 
667 $ U.S.C. § (## ($%!+). A provision is de&ned as “extraneous” if it: 
a) does not produce a change in outlays or revenues; 
b) produces an increase in outlays or decrease in revenues that does not follow the reconciliation 
instructions in the budget resolution; 
c) is not in the jurisdiction of the committee that reported the provision; 
d) produces changes in outlays or revenues that are merely incidental to the non-budgetary 
components of the provision; 
e) increases the de&cit in any &scal year after the period speci&ed in the budget resolution; 
f) recommends changes to Social Security. 
668 See Gould, supra note !(, at !*-$% (discussing the behind-the-scenes “Byrd bath” process). 
669 Sta'er Interview. 
670 In particular, this is done to satisfy subsection (a) of the Byrd rule (which requires each 
provision to have a budgetary impact). Here, a policy with no budgetary impact is combined with 
one that has such an impact, and so the provision is treated as compliant with the Byrd rule—thereby 
smuggling a “non-scoring” provision into the bill. 
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drafts the report language for part of the appropriations history—in this 
unique context, the history is e,ectively an operative provision. But courts 
do not give this kind of history any special deference. 
Legislative Counsel has its own drafting manuals, too.671 They include 
directions that contradict some judicial presumptions. For example, the 
House manual says that statutes need not have severability clauses to be 
presumed severable. Courts, however, sometimes attribute false meaning to 
the lack of a severability clause, especially if the House version of a bill has 
one and the Senate does not.672 We already have pointed out how the House 
Legislative Counsel manual directions on short titles would have informed 
the Yates case. 
It is true that a multitude of new canons might emerge from this kind 
of inquiry, and some judges might balk at the further complication of 
statutory interpretation doctrine. But this does not strike us as more 
onerous than the legislative history courts currently consider, or the more 
than one hundred policy presumptions courts already devise and apply to 
statutes. Concerns about volume are something of a straw man. And there 
are limiting principles. We focus on those stages in the lawmaking process 
that are critical turning points or hurdles for legislation or member focus. 
All of this comes with the important caveat that Gluck and others have 
noted—namely, that elevating Congress’s bureaucracy in this way could 
inject more pathologies into the legislative process—unhealthily skewing 
statutes, for instance by leading Congress to draft bills even more to the 
CBO score than they already are. 
D. Anti-Canons 
“A court that would look at placement in the Code to somehow imbue 
meaning into what a provision says is barking up the wrong tree.” 
!. Drop Canons on Code Organization 
The above quote comes from OLRC staff. If the goal is a formalist one 
of blessing the matter actually voted on, courts should emphatically reject 
any continuing use of the Code placement as evidence of intent for the 
 
671 See B.J. Ard, Comment, Interpreting by the Book: Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory 
Interpretation, !$% YALE L.J. !+", !*" ($%!%) (discussing the Legislative Counsel’s drafting manuals). 
672 See, e.g., Fla. ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., )+% F. Supp. $d !$"(, 
!,%! (N.D. Fla. $%!!) (reasoning ACA’s lack of severability clause “can be viewed as strong evidence 
that Congress recognized the Act could not operate as intended without the individual mandate”). 
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entire half of the U.S. Code—*' titles—that is not positive law.673 For those 
titles, courts should not presume that statutory section arrangement, 
headings, or title structure has anything to do with statutory meaning unless 
those details come from the public law enacted by Congress before it was 
reorganized in the U.S. Code.674 Frankly, we have doubts about relying on 
the organization of the Code for positive-law titles too. When OLRC 
creates those titles, it “restates”—reconstructs and reorganizes Congress’s 
work, sometimes years old. Although Congress as a formality blesses those 
acts by voting for codification, the kind of legislative (especially high-level 
partisan staff) attention to substance that attends the legislative process is 
wholly absent from this technical process of codification (Listwa agrees 
with us as to this point675). Indeed, some statutes even have provisos telling 
courts not to infer any intent from structure.676 No one seems to realize 
those provisions are written and inserted by OLRC precisely for this reason.677 
And yet, courts still grasp onto structure and placement because doing so 
“feels” more textualist than looking to legislative history, CBO scores, and 
so on—that is, Congress’s actual inputs and assumptions.  
*. Drop Grammar Canons 
Likewise, we suggest applying greater skepticism to grammar canons. 
Grammar is often changed after enactment by OLRC, for positive and—
especially in earlier eras—non-positive law alike.678 Even before the vote, to 
assume that any sta, or member other than Legislative Counsel focused on 
comma placement is pie in the sky. 
 
673 See, e.g., United States v. Sigillito, )"* F.,d *!,, *$( (+th Cir. $%!#) (citing Code placement 
in title $!); Reyes v. Sessions, ,#$ F. Supp. ,d !#!, !", (D.D.C. $%!+) (citing Code placement in title 
!" while noting that OLRC determined placement). 
674 For a rare example of Congress directing Code placement for an amendment to a non-
positive title, see the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. 
No. !!#-!+), § (, !,% Stat. "#* ($%!(); see also Lubben, supra note "%# (noting this provision, and 
&nding no other examples of Congress directing placement for non-positive provisions). 
675 Hence his recommendation that only when Congress itself actively amends already positive 
titles should code placement matter—because Congress would be e'ectively placing the amendment 
when it decides what and where it is amending. 
676 See Dorsey, Some Re.ections on Yates, supra note "+*, at ,)* (stating that section "(%% of the 
Revised Statutes of the United States of American included a provision that “no inference or 
presumption of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the Title, under which any 
particular section is placed”). 
677 Contra others who have written on OLRC, we also think it matters little whether a title 
has been enacted into positive law or not, since Congress has explicitly blessed OLRC’s post-
enactment organization. 
678 On the greater editorial discretion exercised by prior codi&ers, see supra notes (#), ($#-
($+, (#"–(#( and accompanying text. 
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$. Drop Anti-Purpose Canons and Recognize Congress’s Own Instructions 
to Construe Purposively 
For the same reasons—and here we agree with Shobe—we are disturbed 
by the practice of courts undervaluing or even overlooking entirely purpose 
provisions and +ndings enacted by Congress.679 We also agree that 
understanding OLRC’s work reveals Congress to be a more purposive 
institution than courts typically acknowledge. OLRC’s practice of placing 
purposive (but enacted) materials into notes—compounded by the way those 
notes appear on commercial research sites like Westlaw and Lexis—likely 
contributes to the court’s propensity to underemphasize them. 
We do not mean this as any critique of OLRC. Throughout our study, the 
sta,ers across the entire bureaucracy spoke of “statutes” far more holistically 
than legislation scholars commonly do. The nonpartisan sta, share customs 
and views about what belongs in the “text” and what is better put in legislative 
history, notes, or other materials.680 We heard that from JCT, Legislative 
Counsel, and OLRC, even as each of those entities emphasized the 
importance of consulting those other materials in actually understanding the 
law. This desire not to overcomplicate the words in the “text” seems to have 
been overread by courts and scholars to view statutes unduly narrowly. If 
something about the way that courts are dealing with those materials elevates 
some over others, to some extent that is the courts’ and lawyers’ problem, not 
the fault of the bureaucracy. At a minimum, Westlaw and Lexis could change 
the way it displays these materials to highlight them more. And textualists 
might start by reading the public laws themselves, if they really want to see 
what Congress considered and in what form it appeared. At best, we would 
like to see more dialogue between courts and Congress; previous e,orts to 
launch such a dialogue have been very di-cult.681 
As far as a purposive legislature goes, recall that Congress itself directs 
OLRC to draft a U.S. Code that “conforms to the understood policy, intent, 
and purpose of the Congress in the original enactments,” rather than a Code 
 
679 Shobe, supra note !(. 
680 Sta'er Interviews; see also Nevers & Graves Krishnaswami, supra note "+*, at !) (citing 
“legislative drafting manuals [that] show a distaste by drafters for including provisions in legislation 
that are ‘not legally useful,’ such as ‘&ndings that are nothing more than rhetoric, de&nitions that 
merely state the obvious, and precatory language . . . that has no binding e'ect’”). 
681 See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note "$, (suggesting checklists for drafters highlighting 
common statutory interpretation issues); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit 
Committee, !%% HARV. L. REV. !#!), !#,% (!*+#) (arguing for congressional committees that “would 
take a second look at a law once a court opinion or two highlighted the measure’s in&rmities”);; cf. 
Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in 
Statutory Interpretation, )" MINN. L. REV. !%#" (!**!) (detailing di'erence between close 
communication in state court/legislative systems as compared to Congress and the federal courts). 
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that preserves enacted statutory text verbatim.682 This seems to be statutory 
evidence that Congress shares three beliefs that are central to purposivist theory: (!) 
that Congress has an intent or purpose when enacting laws; (*) that statutes 
are, above all, an expression of intent and purpose; and ($) that Congress’s 
overriding desire is to see that intent or purpose carried forward. If courts 
wish to position themselves as “faithful agents” to Congress, they ought to 
consider this evidence of their principal’s principles. 
#. Drop the Whole-Code Canons 
Finally, we want to drive home the Gluck–Bressman study’s cry to 
abandon the courts’ beloved “whole code rules” and other canons that 
presume consistency and coherence across the U.S. Code.683 First of all, the 
“U.S. Code” is a construct made after legislation is enacted. Second, even 
OLRC told us they try to carry consistent language within titles, but not 
further than that. Third, as we have emphasized, not only every substantive 
committee but virtually every one of the congressional bureaucracy 
institutions works—and remains siloed—within topics, not across the Code. 
We think there is much to be said about resituating methods of interpretation 
around subject-matter areas, a point one of us has made elsewhere. Other 
scholars have shown that agencies likewise operate di,erently in di,erent 
subject areas and even deploy di,erent interpretive presumptions. The titles 
of the U.S. Code itself are the very result of ripping statutes apart to 
reconceptualize them this way. 
CONCLUSION 
We recognize the can of worms a study like this opens. But we do not 
think that an ostrich burying her head in the sand is any better a metaphor 
for how lawyers and judges should interpret statutes than the sausage factory 
is for the legislative process. Most practicing judges, including textualist 
judges, claim their legitimacy as statutory interpreters derives from their 
connection to and respect for Congress. Shouldn’t courts respect the inputs 
that Congress sets up for itself to face the challenges of the modern era? 
Aren’t the inputs of Congress’s own bureaucracy—a set of internal 
institutions Congress founded to be self-su-cient, to resist an encroaching 
 
682 $ U.S.C. § $+"b(!) ($%!+). 
683 Gluck & Bressman, supra note !, at *,( (demonstrating whole code rule does not re.ect 
how Congress drafts); Gluck, Statutory Interpretation, supra note !, at $%, (advocating a new rule: 
“Absent clear evidence to the contrary, consistency presumptions should not be applied for 
exceedingly lengthy statutes, for di'erent statutory sections within a single statute drafted by 
multiple committees, or across di'erent statutes.”). 
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executive, and to meet the needs of the increasingly complex statutory state—
as relevant as a dictionary or a judicially crafted policy presumption? 
We could go much further than we have. The exemplary canons and anti-
canons we o,er here are the lowest hanging, most formalist-friendly, fruit. It 
would be wildly richer and more provocative to reconceptualize “lawmaking” 
and the resulting statutory “text” to actually include all the inputs Congress 
sets up for itself, ex ante, when it creates and puts in motion its massive, 
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